Fall 2020

Bulletin of the German Historical Institute

GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON DC

Bulletin of the German Historical Institute
Washington DC

Editor: Richard F. Wetzell

Assistant Editor: Insa Kummer

The *Bulletin* appears twice a year and is available free of charge.

Current and back issues are available online at:
www.ghi-dc.org/bulletin

To sign up for a subscription or to report an address change
please send an email to mlist@ghi-dc.org.

For editorial comments or inquiries, please contact
the editor at wetzell@ghi-dc.org or at the address below.

For further information about the GHI, please visit our
web site www.ghi-dc.org.

For general inquiries, please send an email to info@ghi-dc.org.

German Historical Institute
1607 New Hampshire Ave NW
Washington DC 20009-2562
USA

Phone: (202) 387-3355
Fax: (202) 483-3430

ISSN 1048-9134

Bulletin of the German Historical Institute

67 | Fall 2020

3 Preface

FORUM: NEW RESEARCH IN TRANSATLANTIC HISTORY
Edited by Axel Jansen and Claudia Roesch

7 Introduction: New Trends in Transatlantic History
Axel Jansen and Claudia Roesch

17 "The Indians must yield": Antebellum Free Land, the Homestead Act, and the Displacement of Native Peoples
Julius Wilm

41 Trading in the Shadow of Neutrality: German-Speaking Europe's Commerce with Union and Confederacy during the American Civil War
Patrick Gaul

71 A Tumultuous Relationship: Nicholas Murray Butler and Germany in the Era of the Two World Wars
Elisabeth Piller

101 "Taken on faith": Expertise in Aerial Warfare and the Democratic "West" in the Twentieth Century
Sophia Dafinger

CONFERENCE REPORTS

125 Recreating Separate Spheres Across Not-So-Separate Worlds: Gender and Reeducation in Japan, Germany, and the USA after World War II
Claudia Roesch

133 GHI NEWS

New GHI Publications
Staff Changes
GHI Fellowships and Internships
GHI Fellowship Recipients for 2021
GHI Research Seminar and Colloquium, Spring & Summer 2020
Digital Cultural Heritage DC Meetup #DCHDC
GHI Calendar of Events 2020/21
GHI Library

PREFACE

As readers of the *Bulletin* know, the German Historical Institute Washington is not an institute for the study of German history but a German institute for the study of history. From its foundation, the Institute has sought to support not only the study of German history in North America but also the study of North American and transatlantic history in Germany — by connecting German academics studying North American and transatlantic history with the rich archival and academic resources of the United States and Canada as well as their colleagues on this continent. Beyond that, the Institute has, for some time now, also supported and conducted research in Atlantic and global history, some of which will be featured in our next issue. This issue of the *Bulletin* presents recent research in American and transatlantic history by junior historians who have recently published their first research monographs in the GHI's peer-reviewed "Transatlantic Historical Studies" (THS) book series; in one case, the book is forthcoming next spring. This special thematic *Forum* on "New Research in Transatlantic History" is edited and introduced by Axel Jansen, the GHI Deputy Director, and Claudia Roesch, GHI Research Fellow.

In the *Forum's* first article, Julius Wilm, whose book *Settlers as Conquerors: Free Land Policy in Antebellum America* (THS, 2018) recently won the University of Cologne's 2020 Offermann-Hergarten Prize, and who held the GHI's Gerda Henkel Postdoctoral Fellowship during the 2019-2020 academic year, deploys digital history methods to examine the 1862 Homestead Act in order to determine the extent to which homesteading was connected to the displacement of North America's Indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands. In the second article, Patrick Gaul, whose book on the impact of the American Civil War in German-speaking Europe will be published in the THS series next spring, draws on the material turn and the methods of transnational economic history to reveal that, despite political rhetoric voicing support for the cause of the Union or, at least, strict neutrality, in fact, the German states continued to conduct trade with and ship arms to the Confederate states during the U.S. Civil War.

The Forum's third contribution presents the research of Elisabeth Piller, whose book *Selling Weimar: German Public Diplomacy and the United States, 1918–1932* was awarded the 2019 Franz Steiner Prize for Transatlantic History and has just been published in the THS series

(and is available in open access). Piller's article focuses on the role of Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University from 1902 to 1945, in U.S. cultural diplomacy with Germany in order to reveal not only the importance that this leading academic had for cultural relations between the two countries, but also the tortuous path of Butler's relations with Germany in an era marked by the First World War, a difficult period of recovery, and the rise of Nazism. In the *Forum's* final article, Sophia Dafinger presents research drawn from her book *Die Lehren des Luftkriegs: Sozialwissenschaftliche Expertise in den USA vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis Vietnam,* also recently published in the THS series (and available in open access), which is based on her dissertation, for which she was awarded the Mieczysław Pemper Research Prize. Dafinger uses the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey conducted after the Second World War as a point of departure for examining the emergence of American experts and expertise in aerial warfare, which, she argues, was closely connected to the increasing influence and prestige of quantitative empirical research in the social sciences.

Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the GHI's conference program was suddenly and drastically curtailed, so that this issue can only report on one conference from the spring of 2020, namely the conference "Recreating Separate Spheres Across Not-So-Separate Worlds: Gender and Reeducation in Japan, Germany, and the USA after World War II," reported on by Claudia Roesch.

While the pandemic continues to make in-person academic meetings impossible, the GHI has begun to make the switch to virtual formats, both for seminars, such as this fall's Young Scholars Forum (on which we will report in the next issue) and a number of panel discussions — including panels on "Rethinking Memory and Knowledge during Times of Crisis," on "Rethinking Health and Power During Times of Crisis" as well as a conversation with the author Ingo Schulze on his recent book *Die rechtschaffenen Mörder* — video recordings of which you can access on our website.

Please turn to our news section for recent GHI news. For up-to-date information on upcoming (virtual) events, publications, fellowships, and calls for papers, please consult the GHI website (http://www.ghi-dc.org), Facebook page, and twitter account. Please stay safe. We look forward to the day when we can welcome you again in both Washington and Berkeley.

Simone Lässig (Director) and Richard F. Wetzell (Editor)



Forum: New Research In Transatlantic History

Edited by
Axel Jansen
Claudia Roesch

INTRODUCTION: NEW TRENDS IN TRANSATLANTIC HISTORY

Axel Jansen and Claudia Roesch
GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE

Not long ago, in October 2020, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* observed that German-American relations had reached a new low point.[1] A changing global order and the rise of nationalism, the British *Guardian* explained on a different occasion, had led to a decline of political networks as important pillars for an earlier era's transatlantic relationships by 2018.[2] Since the 2016 presidential election in the United States, a number of developments have eroded opportunities for exchange. President Donald J. Trump decided that troops stationed in Germany would be either relocated to Poland or withdrawn from Europe altogether, and allies such as Germany have been openly criticized by the U.S. for not doing their share in supporting NATO. This year, the Covid-19 pandemic prompted the United States to impose travel bans on arrivals from the European Schengen zone, a decision followed by the E.U.'s own restrictions on arrivals from the U.S. While the second Iraq War serves as an important reminder that German-American relations have a much longer history of post-Cold War strain, more recent political developments certainly accentuate the challenges to transatlantic relations. In view of such antagonism, however, it is important to remember that transatlantic trade, where it remains unaffected by the pandemic, remains vital to both the U.S. and Europe and that transatlantic cultural affiliations in recent decades have intensified rather than weakened. Arguably, some of these developments have not been interrupted by the current health crisis, as participants of transatlantic video conferences will groggily concede.

Current events and developments prompt us to revisit the history of transatlantic relations. At the German Historical Institute Washington, we have received inquiries from German audiences wondering about American populism and its effects on trade relations, tourism, and professional exchanges. At the same time, colleagues in the U.S. have looked towards Germany as an example of a functioning social state or to study *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* as an effective way of dealing with a country's racist past.[3] The current crises — among them a crisis of democracy, a crisis of transatlantic relations, and a global health crisis — prompt historians to uncover long-term developments that

1 Kurt Kister, "Verlorene Liebe," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Oct. 11, 2020, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/usa-trump-deutschland-verhaeltnis-kommentar-1.5060318?reduced=true

2 Madeleine Schwartz, "The End of Atlanticism. Has Trump killed the Ideology that Won the Cold War," *The Guardian*, Sept. 4, 2018: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/sep/04/atlanticism-trump-ideology-cold-war-foreign-policy.

3 See, for instance, Susan Neiman, *Learning from the Germans. Race and the Memory of Evil* (New York, 2019).

have resulted in our current predicaments and to assess historical comparisons and claims about the uniqueness of our situation. The current crises also invite us to focus on actors who sustained transnational relations at times when global crises challenged them.

This issue of the *Bulletin* introduces new work on transatlantic history that seeks to rise to the challenge. It raises questions about how to investigate transatlantic co-operation beyond traditional diplomatic channels in a globalized world in which nationalism is on the rise. By asking how transatlantic connections and exchange were maintained in times of crisis, we propose to highlight specific sets of actors who profoundly shaped transatlantic relations: researchers and experts who built and maintained scientific networks and practiced global science in shifting political realities, merchants who sought to translate such shifts into financial profits, and migrant families who created transnational lifestyles. This issue of the *Bulletin* presents innovative approaches to transatlantic history by featuring four emerging scholars. All four have recently published (or are about to publish) their studies in the GHI's "Transatlantic Historical Studies" (THS) book series, published with the Franz Steiner Verlag. For close to thirty years, this series has been a venue for studies on transatlantic networks and exchanges and for works by European authors in the field of American history. The series highlights European perspectives on and approaches to North American history and has made significant contributions to transatlantic historiography.

The term "transatlantic history" is, of course, reminiscent of a world order shaped by the United States and its North Atlantic allies. If conflated with "transatlantic relations" and diplomatic history, it sounds like a relic from the Cold War. Few will doubt, however, that the United States has remained a global military and economic superpower, a dominant hub for innovation in science and technology, a key destination for global migrants (including migrants from Europe), and a major producer of a globalized popular culture. German media and German students continue to look to the U.S. as a place for comparison and for engaging their ambitions. The recent global attention paid to the 2020 presidential election reflects the United States' continued relevance for Europeans and for people around the world. There is no question that the United States' international reputation as a leading voice in global affairs has been severely damaged under the Trump Administration. But calls for the U.S. to return to the global stage and take more responsibility for the future of the planet never ceased; on the contrary, they have become louder and

more urgent, and most observers expect the incoming Biden administration to reinvigorate multilateralism.

Rather than dismiss transatlantic history, therefore, we propose to engage its most promising trends and to build on them by extrapolating from strong research traditions and by developing new narratives. We can see a productive engagement with ideas that have evolved in global and transnational histories, such as using new approaches and broadening the field of actors. By tracing the transatlantic history of people, ideas, and objects in a globalized world, transatlantic history has, in recent years, been inspired by and contributed to migration history, the history of knowledge, the history of science and technology, and the material turn, to name but a few trends.

After 1945 and during the Cold War, transatlantic history focused mainly on international relations, nation states, and diplomats. Against the backdrop of the bloc confrontation and the Westernization of Germany and other U.S. allies, historians identified and analyzed ties between German-speaking central Europe and the emerging U.S. since the eighteenth century. Wars provided narrative turning points and allowed for perspectives that explored the role of Hessian mercenaries in the American War of Independence, European Forty-Eighters enlisting in the Union Army during the Civil War, anti-German sentiment in the U.S. during the First World War, the entrance of America onto the world stage with peace negotiations after that war, the United States' central role in European reconstruction after the Second World War, and the history of the Cold War between 1949 and 1989/91. Transatlantic history circumscribed the Atlantic by emphasizing the history, role, and relations of NATO member states. Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean usually remained out of sight, and Eastern European countries mostly hidden behind the Iron Curtain. Political historiographies that focused on the history of nation-building in the Northern Atlantic took either the French central state or the British parliamentary monarchy as ideal types to distinguish from it a German *Sonderweg* and American Exceptionalism.[4] This historiography was often embedded in a linear teleological modernization theory, which sought to identify patterns of industrial, social, and political development in order to assess a country's progress in establishing a stable liberal democracy and capitalist society. The problem, of course, was not so much the assumption that progress might occur, but to assume that such achievements could be directed from outside and that they were

4 On the German *Sonderweg*, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Volume3: Von der "Deutschen Doppelrevolution" bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges. 1849–1914* (München, 1995). On American Exceptionalism, see such older works as Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation. The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York, 1963) and, more critically, David M. Wrobel, *The End of American Exceptionalism: Frontier Anxiety from the Old West to the New Deal* (Lawrence, 1993). The concept of nation-building has recently been mobilized to explore U.S. history as well. Historians of early America, perhaps not surprisingly, have taken the lead. See, for example, Alan Taylor, *American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804* (New York and London, 2016). Taylor has reminded us that the American Revolution initiated rather than completed American nation-building. Implications of the unsettled nature of the American nation state have been explored by Axel Jansen, *Alexander Dallas Bache: Building the American Nation through Science and Education in the Nineteenth Century* (Frankfurt and New York, 2011). On recent efforts to write a comparative history of U.S. economic development "not built on analytical benchmarks derived from the American experience," see Stefan Link and Noam Maggor, "The United States as a Developing Nation: Revisiting the Peculiarities of American History," *Past & Present* 246 (February 2020): 269–306.

irreversible.[5] For believers in one-directionality, an important goal seemed to have been achieved when the Berlin Wall came down on November 9, 1989, which famously prompted political scientist Francis Fukuyama to proclaim the end of history.[6]

Since then, many developments, beginning with the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the contested NATO intervention in the Balkans, have put that theory under scrutiny. After the terrorist attacks of September 2001, American decisions to go to war not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq challenged important political pillars of transatlantic cooperation. The 2008 financial crisis led some critics to question the capitalist system and American globalization. Historians, too, have responded to such key developments by identifying new research questions. A new history of capitalism, for instance, historicizes capitalism to show that it is a man-made and thus non-essentialist form of world order. It seeks to uncover alternative economic systems discussed since the nineteenth century.[7]

Among the first historians to broaden the scope of transatlantic history was Bernard Bailyn, who set up the Harvard Atlantic Seminar as a platform to discuss it. Bailyn complemented political history with the history of ideas by investigating how enlightenment ideas traveled to the United States.[8] Other works inspired by *Ideengeschichte* investigated the reception of Marxism in late nineteenth-century America or European debates about slavery.[9] Daniel T. Rodgers revisited social progressives during the early twentieth century to trace the many ways in which social reform ideas moved across the Atlantic.[10] Meanwhile, other historians suggested that Europe be provincialized.[11] The "cultural turn" introduced new approaches to the fields of modern and contemporary history by focusing on political cultures. Feminism and post-colonialism have made their imprints on historical research by asking about the changing roles of the categories "sex," "gender," and "race" in different historical periods.[12] Works such as Paul Gilroy's *Black Atlantic* have created awareness for a Black diaspora and reclaimed historical agency for the most disenfranchised populations in the Atlantic, enslaved people.[13] Sven Beckert's *Empire of Cotton* has

5 There are countless critiques of a linear modernization theory, see, for instance, Michelle Murphy, *The Economization of Life* (Durham, 2017), 36-38; Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology. American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, 2000), and Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future. Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, 2007). Thomas Haskell, in turn, has provided a refreshing critique of critics of modernization theory, including Gilman. "Taking into account the breathtaking naiveté with which the intervention in Iraq was carried out," he wrote in 2005, "and observing hints here and there of an unaccustomed thuggishness on the rise in American political life, I take seriously the possibility that, by comparison with the planners who succeed them, the cold war modernizers with their welfare state values may ultimately come to be regarded as paragons of deep thinking, foresight, and probity." Thomas Haskell, "Modernization on Trial," *Modern Intellectual History* 2, no. 02 (August 2005): 235–263, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479244305000417.

6 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, 1992).

7 Hannah Ahlheim, "Ex Machina. Die Gestaltung der Utopie in der Arbeitswelt des britischen Frühsozialisten Robert Owen," *Historische Zeitschrift* 311 (2020): 37-69, here 44.

8 Bernard Bailyn, *Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 1967).

9 Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (Princeton, 2010).

10 Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA, 1998).

11 Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe* (Princeton, 2000).

12 Joan Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," *American Historical Review 91* (1986): 1053-1075.

13 Paul Gilroy, *Black Atlantic. Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA, 1993).

shed light on the connection between slave labor in the Americas and industrialization in Europe.[14] Other economic historians subscribing to a "material turn" have traced the journeys of commodities across the Atlantic and established a strong link between the slave trade, the transportation of consumer goods, and the circulation of knowledge across the Atlantic.[15] Following a similar trajectory, historian of science Lorraine Daston has sought to change the focus of her field by noting that "some version of the history of knowledge, of which the history of science is a part, is probably indispensable."[16] Emphasizing the role of knowledge has allowed historians in many subfields to focus on its circulation, often in the context of migration studies and in relation to the circulation of objects.[17] While migration history and exile studies have been an integral part of transatlantic historical scrutiny since the end of the Second World War, they often focused on the migration of single men and their subsequent achievements as military strategists or entrepreneurs. More recently, migration historians have shifted the focus to entire families, childhood histories, and the impact of migration on gender norms. The emerging scholars who have contributed essays to this "Forum" on "New Trends in Transatlantic History" practice this new kind of transatlantic history as they incorporate the new perspectives sketched here.

In his article on the nineteenth-century removal of Native peoples in the American West, Julius Wilm does not engage in transatlantic history in the strict sense but he applies digital methodologies that have become an important element for it. Specifically, Wilm uses digital tools to process large sets of data on the Homestead Act of 1862 to address an important lacuna in U.S. history. While everyone agrees that Indian dispossession in the late nineteenth century resulted from land allocated to white settlers (among them transatlantic migrants) by the U.S. government, we know little about the timing of these processes and whether they were in fact one and the same thing. Wilm addresses this key issue of nineteenth-century American history in three steps. First, he provides an overview of free land settlement laws in Florida and Oregon to show how, before the Civil War, white settlers were actively encouraged by the U.S. government to settle in disputed areas and to help expel Native nations. He then asks whether this same model also characterized the 1862 Homestead Act, wartime legislation that made land in the West available to U.S. settlers on a much larger scale than previous settlement laws. Wilm answers this question in the negative, arguing that the Act's political rationale differed from prewar federal

14 Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton. A Global History* (New York, 2014).

15 Ines Prodöhl, "A 'miracle bean': How Soy Conquered the West, 1909-1950," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, Washington DC* 46 (Spring 2010): 111-129; Londa Schiebinger, *Secret Cures of Slaves: People, Plants, and Medicine in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World* (Stanford, 2017).

16 See Lorraine Daston, "The History of Science and the History of Knowledge," *Know* 1 (2017): 131-154, here 142-143.

17 Johan Östling, David Larsson Heidenblad and Anna Nilsson Hammar, "Developing the History of Knowledge," in: idem, eds., *Forms of Knowledge. Developing the History of Knowledge* (Falun, 2020), 9-26, here 15, Anna-Carolin Augustin, "Nazi-Looted Precious Metal Objects, Art History and Jewish History in Postwar Germany," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, Washington DC* 66 (Spring 2020): 31-51.

land grants to settlers. Before the Civil War, the federal government openly endorsed settlers confronting and ousting Native Americans from their lands. The Homestead Act, however, was intended as a developmental policy tying settlers to the federal government without making them that government's spearhead. Having established this difference in legislative intent, Wilm goes on to ask about unintended consequences, by examining whether the new postwar policy, despite a shift in political rationale, nevertheless continued to result in Indian displacement. Using data analysis and digital mapping tools to analyze data on homesteading provided by the U.S. General Land Office, he is able to show that in several western states, land grants and the removal of Native Americans did indeed go hand in hand. Even if political rhetoric and government aims had shifted during and after the Civil War, the acquisition of lands by settlers and the displacement of Native peoples remained intertwined.

While Wilm places settlers in the middle of Indian removal, Patrick Gaul examines the role of German-speaking merchants in the middle of the American Civil War. Gaul focuses on the cities of Hamburg and Bremen to challenge the perception that, during the American Civil War, the German states sided with the Union because they rejected slavery. By tracing how businesses in such politically liberal cities preserved and expanded long-established connections with slave-holding cotton planters in the Confederate States, Gaul shows how trade interests trumped moral considerations. The German textile industry was dependent on cotton grown in the American South, which created strong incentives for merchants to break or by-pass Union blockades of Confederate ports and to move goods through the Gulf of Mexico. While cotton flowed in one direction, weapons flowed in the other. Transatlantic traders were able to deliver Prussian and Austrians arms to the American South, which helped prolong the Confederate fight for slavery and secession. Gaul concludes that the liberal political veneer of European merchants glossed over the illiberal effects of their lucrative transatlantic trade relationships.

Elisabeth Piller's article takes us into the twentieth century by tracing shifts in American cultural diplomacy vis-à-vis Germany from the *Kaiserreich* to the Second World War. She does so by establishing as her prism the long tenure of a key transatlantic actor, Nicholas Murray Butler, who was president of Columbia University in New York City from 1901 to 1945. At a time when the U.S. pursued no official

cultural diplomacy, Butler unofficially claimed the role of cultural diplomat for himself. Piller traces the many ways in which Butler came to stand for larger shifts in German-American relations. Before the First World War, Butler translated his belief in the significance of America's global role into supporting academic exchanges with Germany. At Columbia, he set up international houses and initiated exchange programs with Berlin. During the war, however, Butler was deeply disappointed by his German peers' blind defense of their country and their refusal to acknowledge its atrocities in Belgium. As a prominent peace activist before the war, he rejected what he took to be the results of German militarism, and in the immediate postwar years he paused cultural engagements with Germany. Partly in response to the role of France in postwar Europe, which he considered a break in peaceful developments, after 1924 Butler renewed his German connections and became instrumental in efforts to reintegrate German academics into the global research community. Piller points out that Butler felt such integration was necessary if another disastrous war was to be avoided. After 1933 and the Nazi rise to power, Butler remained reluctant to cut ties with Germany, and did so only in 1937, when the regime's racism, anti-Semitism, and rearmament could no longer be balanced by hopes of peaceful integration. Piller's essay provides an important perspective on twentieth-century transatlantic diplomatic history by expanding its range of key actors.

The Forum's final article, by Sophia Dafinger, traces the history of experts in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), experts recruited in 1944/45 by the American military in the social sciences to help evaluate the "success" of its bombing campaigns. While Dafinger's work may be considered U.S. history rather than transatlantic history, her perspective and approach are transatlantic in the sense that they are informed by German historical writing on the role of experts in government. While Nicholas Murray Butler had represented American academia at a time when the federal government was only beginning to grow into new diplomatic roles and responsibilities, the relationship between the state and academia was fully transformed during the Second World War. The war gave rise to science-based technological efforts on an unprecedented scale (such as building a nuclear bomb), which drew academics from around the world into the American military's orbit. Dafinger's story is that of another Big Science effort, the social scientific endeavor of assessing the impact of bombs on societies. Social scientists after the war ventured into bombed-out German and Japanese cities to conduct

interviews with local leaders and citizens in order to assess how U.S. bombings had affected the enemy's "home front." After 1947, such work was pursued by think tanks established by the newly founded U.S. Air Force. Dafinger shows how assessments made during and after the Second World War would inform American military strategies in Korea and Vietnam during the fifties, sixties, and seventies. She highlights how the cooperation between academics, the military, and politicians impacted all three spheres. The military's demand for experts who used quantitative methods, for example, fed back into the social sciences, where such methods came to dominate and push competing methods aside. Dafinger convincingly argues against narrowing the historical perspective by tying the twentieth century to the Cold War; instead, she insists that the Second World War marks a watershed in twentieth-century transatlantic and global history because it reshaped the most profound expectations about the legitimacy of war and about how it may be pursued.

Taken together, the four essays in this *Bulletin's* "Forum" provide a comprehensive view of recent trends in transatlantic history. These trends are closely connected to developments in other historical subfields. Julius Wilm, for example, in approaching a key issue in U.S. history, uses data-driven approaches, comparing patterns that emerge from one set of data with data accrued from other sources, thereby making visible patterns of settlement and their consequences. His methodological approach is complemented by an expanded narrative agenda that is also articulated in the articles by Gaul, Piller, and Dafinger. Patrick Gaul's work expands on lines of inquiry pioneered by Sven Beckert, Don H. Doyle, and others, who have sought to provide the steadfastly national narrative provided for the American Civil War with a global framework.[18] By expanding the frame of analysis, Gaul is able to illuminate an important European context for the war on American soil, and to demonstrate that economic motives remained unchecked by moral scruples. Similarly, by focusing on Nicholas Murray Butler as a key actor in transatlantic cultural relations, Elisabeth Piller rejuvenates and expands the history of transatlantic cultural diplomacy. Finally, Sophia Dafinger draws on recent work on the historical significance of knowledge and expertise to illuminate the significance of the Second World War in shaping the relationship between politics and academia in times of crisis. Through their new approaches and by expanding the range of historical actors, therefore, the four contributors to this "Forum" represent the vitality of transatlantic history today.

18 Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York, 2014); Don H. Doyle, *The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War* (New York, 2014).

Axel Jansen is Deputy Director of the German Historical Institute Washington. He works on U.S. history and the history of science. His books include *Alexander Dallas Bache: Building the American Nation through Science and Education in the Nineteenth Century* (2011) and, co-edited with Andreas Franzmann and Peter Münte, *Legitimizing Science: National and Global Publics, 1800-2010* (2015). With John Krige and Jessica Wang, he recently co-edited a special issue on "Empires of Knowledge," *History and Technology* 35 (2019).

Claudia Roesch is a research fellow at the German Historical Institute Washington. Her research focuses on the history of gender and the family in a transatlantic perspective. Her recent publications include *Macho Men and Modern Women: Mexican Immigration, Social Experts and Changing Family Values in the 20th-Century United States* (Berlin/Boston, 2015) and "Pro Familia and the Reform of Abortion Laws in West Germany, 1967-1983," *Journal of Modern European History* 17 (2019). She has just completed the manuscript of her second book, a transnational history of family planning in West Germany.

"THE INDIANS MUST YIELD": ANTEBELLUM FREE LAND, THE HOMESTEAD ACT, AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF NATIVE PEOPLES*

Julius Wilm

GERDA HENKEL POSTDOCTORAL FELLOW IN DIGITAL HISTORY AT THE GHI WASHINGTON, 2019-2020

In the middle of the Civil War, the United States Congress passed what would become the most influential settlement law of the following decades. The Homestead Act, passed in May 1862 and in effect from January 1863, allowed citizens and future citizens to acquire parcels of undeveloped land of up to 160 acres (i.e. 64.75 hectares) free of charge after improving and living on the land for five years.[1] At least in part, the law had been passed in response to war-time concerns. But the Homestead Act had its main effect in the decades after the conflict, as millions of predominantly white homesteaders claimed land well into the 1930s, mainly in the Great Plains and Far West, but also the Deep South and Great Lakes regions.

It is not a discovery of critical historians that the Homestead Act allowed these settlers to take over the ancestral lands of Native nations. Even when the law was still under debate in the U.S. House of Representatives, longtime advocate Galusha A. Grow of Pennsylvania promised the scheme would create "great empires of free States, built on the ruins of savage life."[2] During the homesteading period, state authorities did little to deny or prevent the ongoing displacement of Native peoples. Steeped in racial essentialism and the Lockean notion that property in land derived from agricultural improvement, which gave Euro-American settler-farmers a superior title, several of the states in the homesteading area incorporated the image of a Native rider giving way to a plowing settler into their seals.[3] In later years, when the ideas of Manifest Destiny and, more broadly, of a hierarchical order of human races lost some of their general acceptance, the destruction of Indigenous nations was widely described as a tragic flipside of homesteading's social promise. In a manuscript dictated after his presidency, Harry S. Truman, for example, noted that homesteading had contributed to "the real displacement of the Indian … after the Civil War."

* I would like to thank Richard Edwards and Sara Gregg as well as editors Axel Jansen, Claudia Roesch, and Richard F. Wetzell for helpful comments on previous drafts of this article. Needless to say, all factual errors and other deficiencies are my responsibility.

1 See "An Act to Secure Homesteads to Actual Settlers on the Public Domain," May 20, 1862, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, vol. 12, 392–393.

2 Galusha A. Grow, Speech of February 21, 1862, *Congressional Globe*, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., 910.

3 For examples of this iconography, see the state seals of Kansas, Minnesota, and North Dakota.

Figure 1. Minnesota's original state seal from 1858. In the words of a contemporary handbook, the seal "represent[ed] the encroachments of the domain of civilization upon that of the barbarians." George Henry Preble, *History of the Flag of the United States of America*, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1880), 648. In 1983, the state adopted a slightly altered design in which the Native warrior rides slightly towards the farmer, instead of fleeing straight west. Image courtesy of the Minnesota Historical Society.

Truman wrote: "That homestead business was to give former soldiers a means of livelihood so that the economy of the United States wouldn't be upset … and it worked. But nobody seemed to give much thought to the livelihood of the Indians; the whites just casually took all their hunting grounds and all the places where they'd lived for centuries away from them. The citizens of the United States, by the way of the president, would declare an area as public land, and the whites would take it over."[4]

Far beyond the circle of professional historians there has long been a broad understanding of a connection between the violent displacement and marginalization of Indigenous nations and the land allocation to U.S. citizens under the Homestead Act. This is not denied by any reputable historian and it is frequently referenced in popular culture. Against the background of this broad consensus, it is surprising that historians rarely go beyond the scope of individual case studies to map out how exactly Indigenous dispossession and homesteading intersected. The *how*, *where* and *when* of this relation has more commonly been assumed in the research literature than explored in any substance.[5]

In response to the renewed interest in the history of racism in the United States and encouraged by new digital possibilities for analyzing the very extensive sources left behind by land offices and settlers, a number of recent studies have explored the issue. These studies, however, come to very different conclusions. Political scientist Paul Frymer argues in a book that has been read widely among historians, that the Homestead Act should be understood in analogy to the

4 Truman went also so far as to voice understanding for the violent pushback against settlers' encroachments. "Whenever the whites infringed on one of those treaties that we made and then broke, why, the Indians would fight back. It was a terrible thing when some family would be massacred by the Indians, but the Indians were only protecting their ownership of the property that had been taken away from them." See Harry S. Truman, *Where the Buck Stops: The Personal and Private Writings of Harry S. Truman* (New York, 1989), 282.

5 On this point, see Richard Edwards, "The New Learning about Homesteading," *Great Plains Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (2018): 1–23, 4.

smaller free land laws of the antebellum period and thus as a method of conquest. Under these earlier laws settlers had been deliberately deployed to conquer specific areas for the U.S. government, and the Homestead Act should be understood as an extension of this scheme to the entire American West.[6] On the other hand, historians Richard Edwards, Jacob Friefeld and Rebecca Wingo have published an equally well-received book, which posits that homesteading was a driving force of Native dispossession, but only in several specific locations during definite time periods.[7] They argue, however, that this connection was not a general feature of the settlement practice and that, in most locations, homesteaders only claimed land long after Native nations had been forced to cede the areas to the U.S. government.

This article offers a critical appraisal of these recent interpretations and presents new evidence to make sense of the general relationship between homesteading and Native dispossession. The basis of my arguments and the theses I develop in the course of the article is, first, my book *Settlers as Conquerors* on free land laws in the antebellum period, which I published in the German Historical Institute's *Transatlantische Historische Studien* series in late 2018.[8] In this book, I critically examined the question of a continuity between the antebellum laws and the Homestead Act, specifically with regard to their relevance for Native-settler relations. Secondly, I draw upon an extensive geographical-statistical database on homesteading that I have compiled for an ongoing web-mapping project. This database combines settlement statistics from the General Land Office's Accounting Division and maps of local land districts and Indigenous land cessions.[9]

In the first section of this article I examine the specific configurations of antebellum free land programs to explain how legislators sought to use land grants to delegate the conquest of territory to settlers. As I show, developments on the ground soon discredited the notion that settlers could act as soldiers occupying the land for the U.S. government, and for this reason the Homestead Act would not renew this experiment. In the second section I use new statistics to explore the claim that homesteaders—with some exceptions—were absent from the process of Indigenous displacement and that therefore the homesteading experience should to a large extent be separated from the process of Native land dispossession. In the third section I attempt a short empirical and conceptual sketch of the relationship

6 See Paul Frymer, *Building an American Empire: The Era of Territorial and Political Expansion* (Princeton, 2017), 128–71.

7 See Richard Edwards, Jacob K. Friefeld, and Rebecca S. Wingo, *Homesteading the Plains: Toward a New History* (Lincoln, 2017), 91–128.

8 See Julius Wilm, *Settlers as Conquerors: Free Land Policy in Antebellum America*, Transatlantische Historische Studien 58 (Stuttgart, Germany, 2018).

9 I first embarked on this project in 2019-2020 as the Gerda Henkel Postdoctoral Fellow in Digital History at the German Historical Institute Washington and George Mason University's Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media. The fellowship provided me with the necessary funding, peace of mind, archival access and lots of technical support to pursue this project. I am cooperating with the University of Richmond's Digital Scholarship Lab on building a web map on the social history of homesteading and Indigenous displacement between 1863 and 1912. For updates on this project, see juliuswilm.com/projects.

between Native nations, homestead settlers, and federal power in the American West during the 1860s to 1880s.[10]

I. "Demon of origins": Free land in the antebellum United States

The Homestead Act was the U.S. government's most significant free land program, enabling millions of families to gain ownership of land and establish independent farms between the 1860s and 1930s. Almost three million households claimed land under the law—and just over half of these farm households fulfilled the requirements of five years' residency and improvements on the land in order to be issued a full property title.[11] While the Homestead Act was the most consequential free land program authorized by the U.S. government, it was not the first, as special laws had already provided free land to settlers on a smaller scale before the Civil War.

Some scholars see the roots of the Homestead Act in the laws of the antebellum period, which they investigate to reveal the essence of the later law. The most recent and most detailed example of this is political scientist Paul Frymer's widely acclaimed 2017 book *Building an American Empire*, which places the Homestead Act in direct continuity with the laws of the antebellum era.[12] According to Frymer, both were "designed to move as many settlers as possible onto contested lands in order to overwhelm and dominate the preexisting population."[13] Frymer develops the intention and effects of the Homestead Act on Native nations from the antebellum laws, which he understands as analogous.[14] As French historian Marc Bloch pointed out, however, there is a danger in focusing on beginnings as a way of understanding later iterations and developments in history. Rather than developing an understanding of things in their time, Bloch warned us that the "demon of origins" may lead us to reify things as unchanging after their entry into the world and ignore the need to explain their persistence and change.[15] In the following, I will examine the laws of the pre-Civil War period and show how the Homestead Act differed significantly from them.

It is hard to select any definite point of origin for the demand that American settlers should have free access to land. In principle, the demand had always been present in the political discussions of the Early Republic. However, the proponents of the concept had to struggle against strong fiscal and economic policy reservations. The U.S. government financed itself directly through the sale of western land,

10 This article does not deal with the loss of communal reservation lands in the allotment era after 1887, when Native reservations in California, Colorado, the Dakotas, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming were divided into private lots and the "surplus" land was offered to homesteaders. I am in the process of compiling statistics and other sources on these "homesteads on Indian lands" for a future publication.

11 See Paul W. Gates, *History of Public Land Law Development* (Washington DC, 1968), 799–801.

12 See Frymer, *Building an American Empire*, 128–71.

13 Frymer, 24.

14 See Frymer, 23–24, 152.

15 See Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft* (New York, 1964), 31–32.

and in addition it paid for the service of soldiers and the construction of infrastructure and schools with land grants. A transition to a policy of free land was therefore thought to undermine an important fiscal pillar of the state. Private landowners argued similarly: large parts of private wealth consisted of property titles to land. In addition, land was often used as collateral to secure loans. Many feared that if land were to become available free of charge, a general decline in land prices would have a negative impact on the wealth of private households and their ability to incur debt.[16]

The advocates of free land for settlers, who since the 1820s were elected to Congress in increasing numbers from western states, sought to disarm the fiscal-economic resistance by recalibrating their demands. They developed concepts which, through their limited scope, were designed to avoid economic disruption and, in addition, to make the enabled settlements strategically useful to the government. The agrarian utopia of free land, that is, the notion that all white men could become landowners and independent farmers through their own labor, was thus combined with economic policy considerations and government ambitions to project power, with sometimes the one, sometimes the other element being predominant.

This combination is exemplified in the first public statement on the land question by Thomas Hart Benton, who, as a senator from Missouri between 1821 and 1851, was a central proponent of the policy. On October 27, 1819, Benton—still a newspaper man, but undoubtedly already preparing his political career at that time—published an editor's column entitled "United States Refuse Lands" in the *St. Louis Enquirer*:

> After the public sales, when all the lands are sold, which will command more than two dollars per acre, and after the entries are made, when all are taken up that will command as much as two dollars per acre, there still remains upon the hands of the United States, lost to the public revenue, and shut up from cultivation, numerous parcels which would make desirable farms to young beginners in the world, and poor families who have not the means of paying down money for a home. Those parcels consist of all those quarter sections which contain some good land, but not enough to redeem the bad. …
>
> The principal cities in the United States abound with persons, who are out of employment, and being out of employ,

16 See Wilm, *Settlers as Conquerors*, 25–29.

> they are by consequence without the means of paying down any thing for a small tract of land. … To all these persons a tract of thirty, forty, or fifty acres of ground, would be a means of present support, and a foundation upon which they could build up a competent estate for themselves and their children. The wealth of the Republic, is not in the money which lies in its coffers, but in the numbers of its citizens, their attachment to their government, and their capacity to pay taxes, and bear arms for the service of their country.[17]

With the restriction that buyers of land should continue to have priority in the selection of parcels, Benton wanted to make his donation program compatible with the market for agricultural land and the fiscal interests of the government. He also promised that the government would gain more productive and loyal citizens by allowing the landless poor to become landowning farmers.

Already in this proposal, which may have contributed to the launching of Benton's Senate career, the social-reformist impulse of free land was modified and placed in the service of economic and political considerations. However, the concept never received recognition in the U.S. Congress in this form—despite the concept's close resemblance to earlier proclamations by founding father Thomas Jefferson.[18] Benton and his allies in Congress therefore endeavored to develop designs that would make free land appear even more directly servable and indispensable for the interests of the U.S. government by helping to solve real and conjured-up crises of western expansionism.

Initially, in the 1820s, Benton tried to make it plausible that land donations in the frontier states were necessary to prevent the westernmost settlements from losing their inhabitants by their moving to the Mexican province of Texas, where free land was available for settlers.[19] After the demographic collapse of the frontier obviously did not materialize and a carefully drafted bill failed in Congress in the spring of 1828, the proponents of free land shifted to a far more sinister strategy in the early 1830s: settlers on the southwestern frontier of Arkansas and Missouri were to receive land donations because the development of these settlements was absolutely necessary in order to form militias to keep the supposedly dangerous Native nations in the Indian Territory in check.[20] Native peoples who had been turned into refugees by the Indian Removal Act of

17 "United States refuse lands," *St. Louis Enquirer*, October 27, 1819.

18 See, for example, Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, October 28, 1785, in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Julian P. Boyd, vol. 8 (Princeton, 1953), 682.

19 See Wilm, *Settlers as Conquerors*, 48–53.

20 See Wilm, 66–83.

1830 and previous acts of ethnic cleansing were branded a threat in a ten-year campaign of defamation and countless inflammatory allegations. Rather than sending the army, the rationale was that the U.S. government would save money by having settlers deal with the alleged threat, southwestern politicians and citizens' petitions claimed. Settlers would therefore not receive land as a gift, but "in consideration for perils and services to be rendered upon a national object of the first magnitude and importance," according to Senator William S. Fulton from Arkansas, who pushed a high-profile bill in the Senate during the mid-1830s.[21]

Legislators, state officials, and citizens from Arkansas and Missouri campaigned for free land in their states in the strongest imaginable terms. "The indiscriminate slaughter of the whole population of both those States might take place before the Government could be informed war had commenced," Fulton claimed on one occasion.[22] This diagnosis of eminent danger, however, was not supported by military personnel stationed on the southwestern frontier. The Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Muscogee, and other Native nations in the Indian Territory were no danger in their own right and not interested in a conflict with the U.S., according to a series of military reports to Congress.[23]

In the summer of 1838, the second attempt to manufacture a national emergency, which was supposed to legitimize the granting of free land, failed with a defeat in the Senate vote. At the same time, however, the propaganda campaign defined the historically potent combination of state and settlers' interests which, in the antebellum era, gave land grants to settlers the status of a conceivable policy: settlers were to supplement and replace the army and act as agents of U.S. expansion against Indigenous nations and rival colonial powers. Moving away from the manufactured crises, Thomas Hart Benton and his Missouri Senate colleague Lewis Fields Linn now set out to promote free land as a response to existing crises of expansion—firstly, the protracted Second Seminole War in Florida and, secondly, the competition between the United States and the British Empire for control of the Oregon Country on the Pacific Coast.

Since the end of 1835, the U.S. Army had been fighting an increasingly grueling battle in Florida against the Seminole Nation, who would ultimately be driven from their homeland and resettled in the Indian Territory, today's Oklahoma. After the Seminole had initially confronted the army in some spectacular battles—on December 23,

21 William S. Fulton, Speech of June 13, 1838, *Appendix to the Congressional Globe*, 25th Cong., 2nd sess., 413.

22 *Appendix to the Congressional Globe*, 25th Cong., 3rd sess., February 26, 1839, 266.

23 See Wilm, *Settlers as Conquerors*, 77–81.

1835, for example, 108 army regulars and officers lost their lives in the so-called "Dade Massacre"—the Seminole successfully evaded the army's approach for a long time. The Seminole hid in the vast and inaccessible landscape of the territory and only undertook guerrilla attacks on white settlements and the army. While the army could not definitely win the fight despite the deployment of large troop contingents, epidemic tropical diseases such as yellow fever and malaria led to many deaths among enlisted men and officers. In the summer of 1838, after two and a half years of war and heavy casualties, military leaders and politicians searched for a way to end operations in Florida without giving up the goal of driving out all the Seminole.[24]

This problem was the starting point of a new free land concept: settlers endowed with land were to occupy the peninsula, pushing the Seminole to the uninhabitable swampy South. "When confined to that unwholesome and comfortless region," Florida territorial governor Richard K. Call wrote in a strategy paper, "if they [the Seminole] are not exhausted, by disease or famine, they will be contented to emigrate from a country, which can offer them no enjoyment."[25] Giving land to settlers was intended to bring the war to a radical end with the complete expulsion or annihilation of the Seminole, while saving the army from further losses and the treasury from escalating expenditures. A bill by Thomas Hart Benton from early 1839 was received positively and adopted after some political wrangling in the summer of 1842. Limited to one year and a maximum of 1250 applicants, under the Armed Occupation Act, the U.S. government for the first time gave free land to farm households that would settle on the Florida Peninsula south of present-day Gainesville for at least five years.[26]

The area on the West Coast then known as Oregon Country, which included the Pacific Northwest of the United States and today's Canadian province of British Columbia, offered another opportunity in the late 1830s to promote land grants to settlers as a solution to a dilemma of projecting state power. In 1818, Great Britain and the United States had concluded an agreement that granted the citizens of both countries the right to form colonies and exploit the natural resources in the area, while at the same time precluding claims to sovereignty on the part of both countries. In theory, this agreement secured U.S. interests on the Pacific Coast. But much to the dismay of American businessmen and politicians, in the course of the 1820s and early 1830s it became apparent that the British-Canadian stock corporation Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) commanded far superior

24 See Wilm, 87–95.

25 Richard K. Call to Zachary Taylor, August 21, 1838, in *The Territory of Florida, 1834–1839*, ed. Clarence E. Carter, The Territorial Papers of the United States, 25 (Washington, DC, 1960), 531.

26 See Wilm, *Settlers as Conquerors*, 96–115.

resources compared to all American companies, which allowed the British Canadians to prevail over all competitors. While the attempts of American fur trading companies to gain a foothold in the Northwest failed time and again, the HBC continuously expanded its operations and soon dominated social life in the tiny colony of white fur-hunters on the Pacific Coast. Politicians in Washington feared that this economic power would, over time, translate into political influence and that the whole area would fall to British Canada. Canada would then border directly on Mexico, which at that time also included California, threatening that the United States would be completely excluded from the Pacific.[27]

In late 1839, Lewis F. Linn introduced a proposal in the Senate that would use land donations to settlers to take possession of the Oregon Country for the United States. While a direct breach of the treaty with Great Britain—the world's largest military power—and the stationing of U.S. troops in the Pacific Northwest were out of the question, Linn proposed to offer American settlers land parcels by law after a treaty settlement of sovereignty claims. Settlers who moved to the Pacific Northwest in anticipation of this offer would thus strengthen the U.S. position even before negotiations with Great Britain.[28] Linn's proposal was not explicitly aimed at depriving Indigenous nations of their livelihoods, but it clearly implied that this would happen as a result of the settlement. In order to avoid sovereignty issues, the bill completely omitted the stage of buying-out Native land claims by treaty, which was required under the U.S. government's regulations for territorial incorporation laid down in the Northwest Ordinance. Even though Native cession treaties were usually only concluded by means of extortion and fraud, this willingness to completely override Indigenous life interests was a departure from established precedents.[29]

Linn's proposal did not receive legal status until the summer of 1850 with the passage of the Donation Land Claim Act—by that time Linn had already been dead for almost seven years and the United States had gained a sovereign title to the area south of the 49th parallel by treaty four years earlier. But already in the early 1840s, the promise of free land—not legally enshrined, but advertised and repeated like a mantra by politicians of the Democratic Party—had led a stream of settlers from the Mississippi River Valley to the Pacific Northwest.[30]

Both the Florida Armed Occupation Act of 1842 and the Oregon/Washington Donation Land Claim Act of 1850 were enacted as special

27 See Wilm, 117–24.

28 See U.S. Senate, *Motion Submitted by Mr. Linn, in Relation to the Occupation and Settlement of the Oregon Territory*, S. Doc. 25, 26th Cong., 1st sess., December 18, 1839; Wilm, 124–131.

29 See Wilm, *Settlers as Conquerors*, 128–31.

30 See Wilm, 136–40.



Figure 2. Map of Armed Occupation Act claims.

exceptions to the general policy that western lands should be sold and not given away. The settlers in these areas were to project and enforce American power under conditions where troops could not do so or only at very high costs. Both laws were designed so that settlers would displace Native people—as the main target in Florida and as an acceptable outcome in the Pacific Northwest.

However, from the point-of-view of politicians and the military, neither law delivered on the intended amalgamation of state and settler interests—the idea that settlers could be used as conquerors. In Florida, the tropical diseases that had already undermined the operations of the army and that were to be used as a weapon against the Seminole, turned against the settlers themselves. After a malaria epidemic in late summer 1843, many settlers fled from central Florida. Tropical storms destroyed the small settlements that had formed around the Seminole reservation in the south. Soon, nobody believed that the few remaining settlers could exert the required pressure that would force the remaining Seminole to give up. In the winter of 1855, the U.S. government sent the army once more.[31]

In the Pacific Northwest, the presence of American settlers was successfully built up with the promise of land donations, which enabled the United States to enter into negotiations with Great Britain from a stronger position. However, the extreme violence that the settlers unleashed against Indigenous nations caused irritation in Washington, DC. In late 1855, while a federal agent was still negotiating land cessions with Oregon nations, a settler militia began a genocidal war against Indigenous communities in the southern part of the territory. After it became apparent that settler militias were no match for the Indigenous retaliation, the army was called in to help. Although humanitarian objections were also raised in public debate, the U.S. military and politicians were particularly outraged by the militias' overly reckless and self-authorized actions, which sparked a destructive war they considered unnecessary and which cost Congress millions for militia and army operations.[32]

31 See Wilm, 177–80, 181–82, 190–91.

32 See Wilm, 209–12, 221–32.

The settlement experiments in Florida and the Pacific Northwest were very different. But from the point-of-view of politicians and expert witnesses called upon by Congress, both demonstrated that settlers could not easily replace soldiers. "As a measure of public policy, it has proved fallacious, and ought not be renewed," Interior Secretary Jacob Thompson summarily noted in his *Annual Report* of 1858.[33] Consequently, this argument no longer appears in the argumentation of the proponents of land donations to settlers—who were growing in number since the 1850s. As a result, the new homestead bills abandoned the argument that settlers should act as agents of the state. Therefore, disputed lands that had not been conclusively wrested from their prior Indigenous owners—such as those invaded by land claimants in Florida and the Pacific Northwest—were not to be made available for settlement.[34]

Homestead proponents countered fiscal and economic objections to land donations with economic and socio-political arguments in a narrower sense: free land would increase the number of taxpayers and accelerate the development of the frontier. While the supporters of land grants in the 1830s and 1840s had engaged in a particularly vociferous racism against Natives, since this enemy image construction was central to their legitimization, Indigenous nations no longer played a prominent role in the promotion of a general homestead law.[35]

During the 1850s, the homestead movement gained unprecedented popularity. At the same time, however, its demands only found the ear of a political majority in Washington in 1862, after the onset of the Civil War. Now a decisive element in the debate was the idea that land grants would strengthen frontier settlers' "attachment to their government," which Benton had already mentioned in 1819. The introduction of a national tax system in the course of the war mobilization also removed a weighty objection to land donations in the West.[36]

Although the antebellum laws may be regarded as the predecessors of the Homestead Act, their use of settlers in strategies of conquering territory differed greatly. In the minds of lawmakers and federal bureaucrats, the antebellum laws had demonstrated that land claimants could not be expected to act as agents of American state power. Instead of selectively providing land donations in contested areas, as the antebellum laws had done, the Homestead Act made public land generally available for free. Homesteaders were specifically not allowed to make claims on territories for which the U.S. government still recognized a valid Native title.

33 Jacob Thompson, Report of the Secretary of the Interior, December 2, 1858, in U.S. Senate, *Message of the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress*, December 6, 1858, 35th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Exec. Doc. 1, pt. 1, 73.

34 See Wilm, 234–238.

35 See Wilm, 238–246.

36 See Wilm, 246–50.

II. Statistics and definitions: Comparing the timing of Indigenous dispossession and homesteading

Unlike previous free land laws, the Homestead Act of 1862 was not *designed* to make settlers conquer Native land. But even if this legislative, strictly intentional connection does not exist, there is the question of how the Act affected Indigenous nations on a more implicit and structural level than an explicit call for conquest.

Richard Edwards, Jacob Friefeld and Rebecca Wingo have made a data-based contribution on this topic in the fifth chapter of their critically acclaimed book *Homesteading the Plains*, published in 2017.[37] The authors compare the timing of Indigenous land cessions to the U.S. government with the timing of homestead claims in different states in order to investigate a possible connection. They argue that a close temporal connection would suggest that land cessions were effected by the government due to pressure from potential homestead settlers, while a longer time interval between land cessions and homestead claims would make a direct connection implausible.

Based on their statistical analysis, Edwards, Friedfeld and Wingo distinguish three ideal-typical development paths. In the Nebraska pattern, which can also be found in California, Kansas and Minnesota, the displacement of Indigenous nations preceded the settlement by homesteaders by decades. The Homestead Act thus regulated the distribution of land long after the previous inhabitants had lost their homes. Homesteaders were not involved in the process of Indigenous displacement in these states.

A second pattern was the development in Colorado, which was also found in Montana, northwestern Nebraska, New Mexico and Wyoming. In these states, Indigenous nations were forced from their lands when the Homestead Act was already in operation. However, homesteaders only began to take an interest in land grants in these states many years after the Indigenous inhabitants had been confined to reservations. A connection between the expulsion of the Native nations and homesteading is unlikely in these areas, as well.

The authors identify a third pattern in the Dakotas, which can also be observed in the Indian Territory, now Oklahoma. Here, homesteading and the loss of Indigenous lands occurred simultaneously, and the displacement was largely due to the interest of homestead settlers in the areas. A close connection between homesteading

37 See Edwards, Friefeld, and Wingo, *Homesteading the Plains*, 91–128.

and the displacement of Indigenous nations was thus only found in three of eleven states studied—North and South Dakota and Oklahoma.

The analysis of Edwards, Friedfeld, and Wingo is groundbreaking in that it is the first comprehensive attempt to explore the connection between the taking of Indigenous land and homesteading using statistics and geographic data. This makes their publication stand out from all previous studies and it challenges assumptions that over decades had been solidified into unexamined truths of historical scholarship.[38] Statistically and conceptually, however, the source material of their study has some limitations.

The three authors take the homestead claims statistics in the individual states from a brochure published by the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in 1962.[39] But this brochure only lists annual figures for final claims, i.e. the number of settlers who had lived on their parcel of land for at least five years and were therefore issued a full land title. However, in order to assess the temporal relationship between homestead settlements and Indigenous land cessions, it is necessary to count original claims made at least five to seven years earlier, which were more numerous than the claims that were later converted into full land titles.[40]

Another problem with the figures listed in the brochure is that the settlement data gives fiscal years instead of calendar years, without indicating this.[41] At the time, fiscal years began on July 1 of the previous calendar year. This inaccuracy makes the settlers appear yet another half year late in the statistical compilation of homesteading and land cessions, in addition to the five to seven years between original and final claims.

Finally, it should be noted that for the years 1863 to 1905 the BLM's compilation only counts as "homesteads" land titles that settlers acquired by living and working on their land for five years. For the later years, however, the BLM additionally counts so-called "commutations" under "final homesteads." Commutations are claims originally registered as homesteads that settlers converted into full property titles by buying the land from the government before the end of the regular five-year settlement period. For the years up to 1905 these purchases were counted in a separate category. The inconsistent counting method results in a relative inflation of post-1905 homesteads. The settlements in the 1860s and 1870s that took place immediately after

38 The book has received much praise from reviewers. See, for example, Mark M. Carroll, "Homesteading the Plains: Toward a New History. By Richard Edwards, Jacob K. Friefeld, and Rebecca S. Wingo," *Western Historical Quarterly* 49, no. 3 (2018): 360–61, https://doi.org/10.1093/whq/why062; Walter L. Buenger, "Homesteading the Plains: Toward a New History," *Journal of American History* 105, no. 3 (2018): 670–71, https://doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jay322; Julius Wilm, "Landaneignung Und Siedlerkolonialismus," *H-Soz-Kult*, September 4, 2018, www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/rezbuecher-29178.

39 See *Homesteads* (Washington DC, 1962).

40 The authors point out the problem in using final instead of original claims in a footnote, but they do not adjust for this in their analysis. See Edwards, Friefeld, and Wingo, *Homesteading the Plains*, 229, fn 2.

41 That the figures are indeed for fiscal instead of calendar years can be seen by comparing them to the figures given in the annual reports of the U.S. General Land Office. The figures are identical, but the annual reports state explicitly that they cover fiscal years.

Indigenous land cessions appear relatively smaller when compared to these inflated figures.[42]

It is true, as Richard Edwards points out in an article, that homesteading statistics compiled by the land offices in the nineteenth century remain imperfect.[43] But the records of the U.S. General Land Office's (GLO) Accounting Division at the National Archives do provide far more accurate statistics than those published in different statistical compilations.[44] The books were likely kept with great care, as local land officials passed on fees to the GLO that homesteaders payed when filing and completing claims and local officials received commissions for these filings. Because of the significance of this fee-based system, accounting errors would not only have skewed official statistics, but directly impacted the GLO's revenue and land officers' compensation. While I have found a few minor mistakes, overall the statistical ledgers kept by the GLO appear to give quite precise figures of the homesteads filed, completed, and commuted under different statutes during each fiscal year between 1863 and 1912. These records also have the advantage that they provide information on local land office districts instead of aggregated state data.[45]

If one combines the Accounting Division's state-level statistics for fiscal years 1863-1912 and figures published in the GLO's annual reports for fiscal years 1913-1935 on *original homesteads* (instead of the figures on *final homesteads* from the BLM's 1962 brochure) with graphs of Indigenous land cessions in the different states, a substantially different picture emerges.[46] In particular, the clear temporal gap between land cessions and homestead claims that was thought to define the Nebraska and Colorado patterns disappears. Instead, an overlap of homesteading and Indigenous displacement emerges in all of the states that were chosen by the three authors to represent ideal-typical developments. To illustrate the difference between the data sources, I have also included the BLM's 1962 data of finished claims in Figures 3-6.

As Figures 3 and 4 show, Nebraska in the 1860s and Colorado in the 1870s saw major spikes in original homestead claims while larger portions of the state still remained in Indigenous hands. Far from suggesting a clear separation between the processes of Native dispossession and homesteading, the graphs indicate a period of overlap if not entanglement. At first glance, the development in Montana (Figure 5) does not seem to correspond to this pattern, as the great run for homesteads only began in the 1900s, after the Native nations had been confined to small reservations. But does this truly disen-

42 One source of the inconsistent way of counting could be that the BLM's compilers used statistics from the 1905 Public Lands Commission Report for the earlier years (which excluded commutations), which they then unknowingly supplemented with inconsistent data for the later years (by including commutations). See U.S. Public Lands Commission, *Report of the Public Lands Commission with Appendix*, 58th Cong., 3rd sess., 1905, S. Doc. 189, 175–179.

43 On the point, see Richard Edwards, "Why the Homesteading Data Are So Poor (And What Can Be Done About It)," *Great Plains Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (2008): 181–90.

44 U.S. General Land Office. Accounting Division, "Records of Disposal of Public Lands under the Homestead Laws, 1863-1912" (1912), RG 49, UD 788, National Archives I, Washington, DC.

45 This allows for an even more precise view of local dynamics that I will explore in a forthcoming web map. See fn 52 below.

46 I have extracted the acreage remaining in Native ownership from the respective graphs in Edwards, Friefeld, and Wingo, *Homesteading the Plains*, 97, 104, 108, 112.



Figure 3. Indigenous land and homestead claims in Nebraska.



Figure 4. Indigenous land and homestead claims in Colorado.

tangle homesteading from the story of Indigenous displacement? Even though much larger groups of homesteaders arrived in later years, some already claimed land from 1868 onwards. Until 1874, the year of a major land cession, 903 settler households had filed original homestead claims in Montana. While the *majority of Montana homesteaders* arrived long after the confinements of the state's Native population to reservations, the *existence of the settlement practice* may



Figure 5. Indigenous land and homestead claims in Montana.



Figure 6. Indigenous land and homestead claims in the Dakotas.

well have played a role in the process of displacement during the late 1860s and the 1870s. As I will show in the next section of this article, Indian Affairs and Army officials generally saw the *sheer existence* of homestead and other white settlements in the proximity of Native territory as a reason to push for Indigenous removal, rather than the absolute or relative size of these settlements.

Figure 6 on the Dakotas confirms that the timing of the taking of Native lands and homesteading intersected; the overlap was even more significant than the figures from the BLM brochure suggests. As a result of the large proportion of commuted claims in the Dakotas, the inconsistency of the BLM's pre- and post-1905 figures is especially apparent in this graph. While there was a major rush for homesteads in fiscal year 1883, many claimants did not secure a final title by living on their claim for five years, so this demographic surge is reduced to a more modest bump in final claims that appears around 1889 in the BLM figures. The figures of final claims in the 1900s (which included commuted claims from 1906 onwards) appear much larger. The BLM's inconsistent count thus skews the graph to make the later years appear more central to the homesteading story than they actually were.

The corrected data compilation of settlement applications and Indigenous land cessions in Figures 3-6 thus indicates that the processes of displacement and settlement followed each other closely. Beyond that, it is worth asking: to what extent are the dates of land cessions useful to show when Native nations definitively left an area? As Edwards, Friedfeld and Wingo point out, cession treaties were not freely made agreements between equal parties.[47] These agreements were made using a broad register of extortion and fraud and often lacked the consent of key Indigenous groups and actors. From 1871, the U.S. government went so far as to decide by presidential executive order on the transfer of Indigenous lands.[48] The date of a "land cession" therefore only reflects when a forced treaty or even a unilateral U.S. government decision went into effect. By contrast, the data does not reveal whether Native communities continued to live in officially "ceded" areas after this date because they either did not know about concluded agreements or did not want to participate in them. The struggle for control of the land was therefore messier—and lasted longer—than the chronology of Indigenous land cessions suggests. In the era of homesteading, the U.S. Army repeatedly waged wars against so-called "nontreaty Indians" who continued to live and hunt in so-called "ceded" territories.[49]

It can be argued, therefore, that looking only at the timing of land cessions and homestead applications, reproduces the view of the U.S. government, which wanted to define a definitive end to Indigenous claims with forced treaties. For historians, this raises the question of what the alternatives are for assessing the temporal relationship between homesteading and the displacement of Native nations.

47 See Edwards, Friefeld, and Wingo, 91–92.

48 See Stuart Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier* (Cambridge, MA, 2007), 252.

49 For examples, see Gary C. Anderson, *Ethnic Cleansing and the Indian: The Crime That Should Haunt America* (Norman, 2014), 259, 262.

A comprehensive study on the presence of Native peoples on the homesteading frontier (which would have to consider oral histories from an Indigenous perspective as well as reports and diaries of settlers and soldiers) remains to be written. On the basis of a dataset by political scientist Jeffrey A. Friedman on armed frontier conflicts, however, it can be shown that Native nations continued to fight the U.S. Army and settlers in areas for which, under U.S. laws in force at the time, Indigenous claims no longer existed.[50] According to Friedman's computation for Nebraska, soldiers and settlers fought against Cheyenne, Lakota, and Nakota well into the late 1870s. Between 1863 and 1879, these conflicts left an estimated 248 Natives and 236 white people dead. In Colorado, armed conflict with the Apache, Arapaho, Cheyenne, Kiowa, Lakota, and Ute only ended in 1887, with 248 Native and 145 white casualties falling into the homesteading years. Clashes of white people in Montana with Arapaho, Bannock, Blackfeet, Cheyenne, Crow, Lakota, Nez Perce, and Paiute continued until 1890, leaving a recorded 733 Native persons and 393 white people dead after 1863. In the Dakotas, fights with the Lakota and Santee Sioux continued until the notorious massacre at Wounded Knee in late December 1890, with a recorded 760 Natives and 151 white people being killed from the onset of homesteading in the territory.[51]

Although the Homestead Act did not provide for settlers to be used for military service, and although settlers could not take possession of Indigenous lands without the U.S. government first purchasing the lands from their Indigenous owners, a critical review of the GLO Accounting Division's state-level statistics shows that significant numbers of homesteaders still settled in the wider proximity of areas where the forcible expulsion of Indigenous people was not yet completed. Looking at all applicants for the Homestead Act, only a small proportion of the settlers may have staked claims in these contested areas. But it seems more than justified to consider the Homestead Act as an integral part of the violent conquest and transfer of Indigenous lands to white Euro-Americans. As I have demonstrated here, homesteaders took possession of land soon after the displacement of Indigenous owners, who were at times still fighting to maintain their residence. A more comprehensive and granular analysis of homesteading in different states and territories will reveal nuances.[52] But the GLO's state-level data does not support the ideal-typical distinction made in *Homesteading the Plains* between patterns in the timing of homesteading and Indigenous displacement Nebraska,

50 Jeffrey A. Friedman, "Using Power Laws to Estimate Conflict Size," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 7 (2015): 1216–41, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714530430. The dataset is available in the journal's online repository at Sage.

51 These figures most likely undercount Native casualties. Friedman's figures are directly and indirectly based on tabulations by the army, which did not keep accurate records of Indigenous deaths. On this point, see Joseph P. Peters, *Indian Battles and Skirmishes on the American Frontier, 1790-1898* (Ann Arbor, 1966), 23.

52 I hope to contribute to this with a web map that I am currently working on with University of Richmond's Digital Scholarship Lab. The map will visualize more granular homesteading statistics by local land office districts for the 1863 to 1912 period in combination with Indigenous land cessions and a host of other data and events that elucidate the diverse dynamics on the ground. For updates on this project, see juliuswilm.com/projects.

Colorado/Montana, and Dakota/Oklahoma, in which only the last pattern featured a significant overlap.

III. "The country needed by the whites": Homesteaders, Native nations, and federal power

What did it mean when the timing of homesteading and the displacement of Native nations overlapped? The antebellum free land laws had been explicitly premised on the idea that settlers would conquer territory. This had been the central selling point that helped win congressional approval for the Florida Armed Occupation Act in 1842 and the Oregon/Washington Donation Land Claim Act in 1850, but the results of both laws led free land advocates to drop the idea of delegating the conquest of territory from their pitch. Did the entanglement of homesteading with Indigenous dispossession mark an unacknowledged and unintended return to the antebellum model? A close reading of federal planning documents reveals a take on homesteading that differed significantly from the antebellum approach. Homesteading contributed to the process of Indigenous displacement and to the diminishment of Native lands, but in a way that was quite different from the antebellum laws.

Unlike the antebellum era, it was an important point in virtually all planning documents during the late 1860s that settlers and Natives should be kept apart. General John Pope, the commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, warned, "the security neither of white nor Indians is longer compatible" with white settlers pressing into Indigenous territory.[53] Nathaniel G. Taylor, the Indian commissioner, advised that Native peoples "are in the way of our toiling and enterprising population, and unprotected they will soon be inevitably submerged and buried beneath its confluent surges."[54] It was paramount "to keep the Indians as much as possible from mingling or coming in contact with the whites," special Indian commissioner John B. Sanborn argued.[55] While the free land strategists of the 1830s and 1840s had sold their concepts on the idea that settlers would conquer territory from Native peoples and the rival colonial power of Great Britain, military and Indian affairs officials of the post-Civil War era sought to prevent direct contact between settlers and Indigenous people.

Although planning documents, especially those authored by Indian affairs officials, at times included humanitarian arguments for keeping settlers and Natives apart, the consideration was predominantly

53 John Pope to William T. Sherman, August 11, 1866, in H. Exec. Doc. 1, pt. 3, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 27.

54 Nathaniel G. Taylor to William T. Otto, July 12, 1867, in S. Exec. Doc. 13, 40th Cong., 1st sess., 4.

55 John B. Sanborn to Orville H. Browning, July 7, 1867, in S. Exec. Doc. 13, 40th Cong., 1st sess., 69.

one of colonial strategy. Officials took for granted that the entire West would be settled by U.S. citizens, so the western Native nations had to be cleared out and removed from their homelands to reservations. Military officials and reform-minded Indian affairs officials disagreed about how best to accomplish this removal—through the expedient use of violent force or patient negotiations.[56] They agreed, however, that clashes between settlers and Native peoples were counterproductive.

Homesteaders and other frontier whites, therefore, no longer played the role of conquerors in the planning of officials. Instead, they were considered part of the entitled coalition of white interests for which the various departments of state power were facilitating the takeover of the frontier against the resistance of Native peoples. According to the understanding of these officials, the West should be proactively conquered and then made available to the white citizens and future citizens of the United States.

Official reports, however, frequently complained about white miners and settlers moving into frontier areas that had not yet been pacified and incorporated. Thus, in February 1867, Indian Commissioner Lewis V. Bogy described a "sudden overflowing of the whites throughout the Indian country, caused by the discovery of gold and silver and the rapid settlement of all the western Territories" that created "great trouble."[57] Likewise, the new commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, General William T. Sherman, complained in October 1867, "public lands have been surveyed and sold, railroads and stage roads located, and telegraph lines, with their necessary offices and stations, established in a country where the Indian title is clearly recognized" in Kansas and Nebraska, and the Territories of Dakota, Montana, Colorado, and New Mexico. "All parties interested turn to the military, the only visible national authority, to give force and effect to their titles or to their rights."[58] With the exceptions of Montana and New Mexico, homesteaders had registered claims in all of the mentioned locations at the time of this complaint.

Sherman's report of the following year renewed the complaint about western miners and settlers. The report called for greater coordination of the General Land Office and other government departments with the army, as the surveying of land and the "grant[ing] of patents to occupants" (homesteading) along with the construction of roads and telegraphs created conflicts throughout the West. "Over all these matters the military authorities have no control, yet their public nature implies public protection, and we are daily and hourly

56 While Indian Commissioner Lewis V. Bogy described more generous reservations as the method for taking over "the country needed by the whites", General William T. Sherman pitched expansive military operations to win western territory "for our people exclusively." Lewis V. Bogy to Orville H. Browning, January 23, 1867, in S. Exec. Doc. 13, 40th Cong., 1st sess., 20, William T. Sherman to George K. Leet, October 1, 1867, in H. Exec. Doc. 1, pt. 3, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 21.

57 Lewis V. Bogy to O.H. Browning, February 11, 1867, in S. Exec. Doc. 13 40th Cong., 1st sess., 39.

58 Sherman to George K. Leet, October 1, 1867, in H. Exec. Doc. 1, pt. 3, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 21.

called on for guards and escorts, and are left in the breach to catch all the kicks and cuffs of a war of races, without the privilege of advising or being consulted beforehand."[59]

Figure 7. Frederic Remington's undated painting "Battle of War Bonnet Creek." In this painting, Remington gives a disturbing rendition of the U.S. Army's last massacre of Native people in Nebraska. In late 1878, a group of Northern Cheyenne fled the brutal conditions in their assigned reservation in today's Oklahoma, crossing through Kansas and much of Nebraska to seek homes in Dakota Territory and Montana. After a group escaped their captors at Fort Robinson in late January 1879, army troops went after the Cheyenne and killed all Natives they could find. Image courtesy of the Gilcrease Museum.

Sherman did not attempt to weigh the extent to which the intruders throughout the West were made up of miners and other groups rather than farmer-settlers interested in filing homestead claims. Given the dependence of farmers on access to markets and transportation, it seems plausible that homesteaders would have been more inclined to stay near established settlements than itinerant miners, who were interested in quickly extracting precious metals and then leaving.[60] But Sherman clearly saw homesteading settlers as a part of the group that ventured far too close to Native territory. Given that state statistics show a broad temporal overlap between homesteading and Indigenous displacement, this observation was likely accurate. While Sherman was annoyed by frontier whites outrunning his efforts to force Native peoples onto reservations, to him it only underlined that the process of dispossession needed to be hastened. The 1868 report concluded:

> It is idle for us longer to attempt to occupy the plains in common with these Indians [Arapaho, Cheyenne, Comanche, Kiowa, and Lakota], for the country is not susceptible of close settlement with farms like Missouri and Iowa, and is solely adapted to grazing. All of our people there are necessarily scattered, and have more or less cattle and horses, which tempt the Indian, hungry, and it may be starving for

59 William T. Sherman, Annual Report, November 1, 1868, in H. Exec. Doc. 1, pt., 3, 40th Cong., 3rd sess., 1.

60 This would correspond to patterns seen among claimants under the antebellum free land laws, who clearly preferred parcels in areas that made market access easy, rather than more remote regions that were closer to unconquered Native groups. See Wilm, *Settlers as Conquerors*, 168, 198.

> want of his accustomed game; and he will steal rather than starve, and to steal he will not hesitate to kill. A joint occupation of that district of country by these two classes of people, with such opposing interests, is a simple impossibility, and the Indians must yield.[61]

Indian affairs officials only disagreed regarding the methods of affecting the removal, but not on the fundamental premise.[62] In the view of officials, the move of frontier whites into the proximity of contested territory—be they homesteaders or parties interested in other pursuits—necessitated the removal of Indigenous nations. Homesteaders were not purposefully sent into disputed territories like their antebellum predecessors. But the policy to prevent the comingling of Indigenous people and whites likely made the moves of even small groups of homesteaders into the proximity of Native nations into drivers of dispossession.

Conclusion

A close look at the Homestead Act and the antebellum free land laws reveals significant differences. The free land programs of the 1840s and 1850s for Florida and the Pacific Northwest were specifically designed to delegate the expansive enforcement of American sovereignty to settlers. Even before the Civil War era's general push towards centralizing government power, the disappointing result of both laws raised strong concerns among policy makers about leaving the conquest of territory to settlers. Therefore, the Homestead Act did not renew the antebellum experiment. Instead, both the army and Indian affairs officials sought to prevent direct clashes between white settlers and Native nations.

At the same time, however, the statistical analysis of the timing of original homestead claims and forced Indigenous land cessions in Nebraska, Colorado, Montana, and Dakota demonstrates that homesteaders were seeking out parcels in states when Native nations were still fighting to hold onto their homelands. And precisely because the army did not want to allow a repetition of the situation in Oregon in the mid-1850s, where settlers encroaching on Indigenous land triggered an uncontrollable escalation of violence, the homesteaders who sought out land close to Native nations became, yet again, a driving force of dispossession. In order to remain in control of the situation, the government hastened its efforts to force the Native peoples out of the way and onto reservations.

61 William T. Sherman, Annual Report, November 1, 1868, in H. Exec. Doc. 1, pt. 3, 40th Cong., 3rd sess., 5.

62 See Bogy to Browning, February 11, 1867, in S. Exec. Doc. 13, 40th Cong., 1st sess., 39.

The relationship between homestead settlements, military campaigns, and Native land dispossession in the American West during the late nineteenth century is in need of further temporal-spatial research and a larger qualitative study. But the broad overlap of homesteading and dispossession suggests that homesteading played a significant role in the taking of Indigenous lands in the Great Plains and Far West regions.[63] This history differs not only normatively from the representation in the seals of some Great Plains states, in which a white farmer seems to displace the Indigenous inhabitant all by himself. The American state was a central actor in this history. Settlers could not conquer territory on their own, as the experiments from the antebellum period showed. But as white U.S. citizens and future citizens, homesteaders were in a position to mobilize the government on their behalf. The one-sidedness of this state intervention is one of the enduring tragedies of homesteading that possesses an eerie topicality.

63 For newer iterations of this argument see, for example, Nick Estes, *Our History Is the Future: Standing Rock Versus the Dakota Access Pipeline, and the Long Tradition of Indigenous Resistance* (London, UK, 2019), 28; Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, *An Indigenous Peoples' History of the United States* (Boston, 2015), 140–41.

Julius Wilm is a postdoctoral researcher and lecturer in U.S. history. In 2019-2020 he was the Gerda Henkel Fellow in Digital History at the GHI Washington and the Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media at George Mason University. His book *Settlers as Conquerors: Free Land Policy in Antebellum America* (Transatlantische Historische Studien, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2018) won the University of Cologne's 2020 Offermann-Hergarten Prize. You can follow his digital and non-digital work on his website http://www.juliuswilm.com.

TRADING IN THE SHADOW OF NEUTRALITY: GERMAN-SPEAKING EUROPE'S COMMERCE WITH UNION AND CONFEDERACY DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR[1]

Patrick Gaul
FRANKFURT AM MAIN

"You are closer to the war than we are," wrote a German immigrant from California to his parents in Saarbrücken in 1862 as the American Civil War entered its second year.[2] He was not wrong. Around 1860, a journey from the eastern states of the United States (the main scene of the Civil War) to California by land and sea took longer than an Atlantic crossing from Bremen or Hamburg to New York or Charleston. Due to the geographical conditions of the Atlantic, America and Europe formed a traffic zone in the middle of the nineteenth century that was already over 300 years old: favorable trade winds, deep rivers that were navigable even for larger ships, such as the Elbe, the Rhine and their tributaries, had created cis-Atlantic hinterlands,[3] contiguous trading regions and informal niche spaces between the continents,[4] which, intentionally or unintentionally, could put the people living on them into momentous interdependence with one another.

Although research on the global history of the American Civil War (1861-1865) has made extremely innovative progress in the last 20 years, knowledge of the effects of the war outside the United States is still limited by comparison. This is especially true for German-speaking Europe.[5] Although we now know a great deal about events and contexts outside the borders of the American Empire[6] that can be understood as the prehistory of the war, we know surprisingly little about how the war per se affected regions

1 I would like to thank Axel Jansen and Claudia Roesch for the opportunity to publish this article in the GHI Bulletin. I would also like to thank Insa Kummer, who translated the article into English. Any discrepancies in language or content are my sole responsibility.

2 Peter Klein to his parents, May 1, 1862, in *Deutsche im Amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg: Letters from Front and Farm, 1861-1865*, ed. Wolfgang Helbich and Walter Kamphoefner (Paderborn, 2002), 382.

3 "Cis-Atlantic" in this context means the history of states, regions, cities or institutions and their interaction with the Atlantic world, regardless of their geographical distance from the Atlantic. See David Armitage, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History," in *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, ed. David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (Basingstoke, 2002), 21-26.

4 See Bernhard Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concept and Contours* (Cambridge, 2005), 83.

5 In the following, "German-speaking Europe" and "Central Europe" are understood to mean regions of the later German Empire and the Empire of Austria, where the majority of the population was German-speaking. This definition is borrowed from more recent relevant studies on the Atlantic history of non-Western Europe, such as those by Felix Brahm and Eve Rosenhaft, eds., *Slavery Hinterland: Transatlantic Slavery and Continental Europe, 1680-1850* (Woodbridge, 2016), and Jutta Wimmler and Klaus Weber, eds., *Globalized Peripheries: Central Europe and the Atlantic World, 1680-1860* (Woodbridge, 2020).

6 I am following William Earl Weeks here, who argues that the history of the United States' foreign relations before 1865 should be examined under the concept of an "American Empire." According to this concept, a "complex transnational, transborder reality" existed between the internal and external affairs of the United States, which was influenced by, among other things, individual economic motives, the urge for economic expansion, innovations in transportation and communications, and the discourse on the role and future of slavery. See William Earl Weeks, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: Dimensions of the Early American Empire, 1754-1865* (Cambridge, 2013), xvii-xxv.

and people beyond U.S. territory — and what kind of aftermath it provoked.[7]

Against this background, historians, and not only Civil War experts, plead for a more economic approach in the study of the middle decades of the nineteenth century.[8] In other words, they advocate for a stronger consideration of the interrelationship between state, culture, and market, which was duly shaken by this enormous conflict (inside and outside the United States). These interdependencies are still neglected, especially in traditional diplomatic history.[9] However, global historical debates on the USA and its relations with the world between the beginning of the nineteenth century and the end of the Civil War should also take into account the central importance of its material foundation and its most important symbol, cotton.[10]

From the perspective of this new material turn in the study of history, the effects of the American Civil War in German-speaking Central Europe pose revealing new questions.[11] These include questions about the economic effects of the Civil War, the economic and trade interests behind the diplomacy of governments, the socio-cultural entanglements of German merchants with North American slavery, discourses on imperialism and motives against or for the emancipation of discriminated population groups, and the roles of both the mobilized and those staying behind, for example. The role of smaller German states also gains more significance due to the material turn. Older introductory works on German-American relations often do not discuss entanglements between the two regions until the founding of the German Empire in 1871,[12] while ignoring the small states such as Hamburg or Bremen and their hinterland, which were politically relatively insignificant yet closely connected with the United States economically.

A continuous opening due to the material turn also broadens the view to North American actors in Europe, for example to the "lower ranks of diplomacy,"[13] i.e. consuls and (non-)state agents, middlemen as well as journalists and "ethnopolitical entrepreneurs" with a (German) American background.[14] There were hundreds of them in Europe at the time of the Civil War who tried to influence public

7 See Steven Hahn, "What Sort of World Did the Civil War Make?," in *The World the Civil War Made*, ed. Gregory Downs and Kate Masur (Chapel, Hill, 2015), 338-339.

8 See Hahn, What Sort, 340; Rosanne Currarino, "Toward a History of Cultural Economy," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 4 (2012): 564-585; A. G. Hopkins, *American Empire: A Global History* (Princeton, 2018), 12; Stefan Berger and Thomas Fetzer, eds., *Nationalism and the Economy: Explorations into a Neglected Relationship* (Budapest, 2019).

9 Donna Lee and David Hudson, "The Old and New Significance of Political Economy in Diplomacy," *Review of International Studies* 30 (2004): 343-360.

10 See Weeks, *The New Cambridge History*, 124.

11 On the material turn, see Kenneth Lipartito, "Reassembling the Economic: New Departures in Historical Materialism," *The American Historical Review* 121 (2016): 101-139.

12 See Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States: A "Special Relationship?"* (Cambridge, 1980); Manfred Jonas, *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History* (Ithaca, 1984).

13 Hillard von Thiessen, "Foreign Relations and Diplomacy in the Early Modern Period and in Transition to Modernity: Approaches of Research - Debates — Periodizations," in *Internationale Geschichte in Theorie und Praxis,* ed. Barbara Haider-Wilson, William D. Godsey and Wolfgang Mueller (Vienna, 2017), 158.

14 Following Pierre Bourdieu, the sociologist Rogers Brubaker defines ethnopolitical entrepreneurs as persons who "can live on or for ethnicity" and who "refer to" or "invoke" ethnic groups in order to "mobilize" and "incite" others. See Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnizität ohne Gruppen* (Hamburg, 2007), 20.

opinion from there by soliciting support from local "door openers" in order to pursue an agenda inclined towards the North or the South. To achieve success, money had to flow. The Civil War in Europe was a "battle for hearts and minds" — but also for "pocketbooks."[15]

This will be analyzed in more detail below. For this purpose, I will first give an overview of the historical interpretations of the involvement of German-speaking Central Europe in the American Civil War. I will draw on publications by contemporaries and discuss selected examples from twentieth-century historiography. Next, I will highlight socio-economic connections between Central Europeans and the so-called Confederate States, and I argue that these connections are fundamental to the creation of a Central European hinterland of transatlantic slavery. The concept of neutrality under international law at the time, as explained in the next section, set the course for the understanding and economic leeway of third parties during the war, whose influence on German consumer markets is illustrated in the fourth part: The cotton crisis triggered by the blockade of the South had far-reaching consequences for numerous regions of Europe and the people who made a living from the distribution and processing of cotton. The shortage of the raw material not only contributed to an economic structural change in the German states, it also encouraged shipowners to become extensively involved in smuggling operations. The war thus also offered the chance of a good profit — which I will demonstrate by the extensive sale of arms from Central Europe to both the Union and the Confederate States. It proves the far-reaching consequences that the niches of European neutrality had for the war-torn United States and for Central Europe.

I. Dubious alliances

Among the first to give assessments of the American Civil War were often people who had experienced the war firsthand, whether as soldiers in the army or as publicists and politicians, including some prolific writers who had been involved in the 1848 revolutions and who pursued an ethno-political agenda, thereby promoting a filiopietistic narrative of German participation in the war.[16] A German-American theologian who lectured on the Civil War in several German cities in 1865 made it clear to his listeners that Germany had every reason to "rejoice in the victory of the Union. In no other country in Europe has the sympathy for the cause of justice and humanity been greater and the confidence in its finite triumph stronger than in Germany."[17]

15 Brian Schoen, "The Civil War in Europe," in *The Cambridge History of the American Civil War, Volume 2: Affairs of the State*, ed. Aaron Sheehan-Dean (Cambridge, 2019), 351.

16 See Mischa Honeck, "An Uphill Battle: The American Civil War in German Historiography," *Civil War History* 66 (2020): 162.

17 Philipp Schaff, *Der Bürgerkrieg und das christliche Leben in Nord-Amerika* (Berlin, 1866), 16.

August Bebel, the future co-founder of the SPD, declared a few weeks after the end of the war in an address to the "people and government of the North American Union": "It is our fine share in the victories [of the Union] that we need not say that we Germans were far from the battlefield; for our sons and brothers who fought, bled, and won in the ranks of the Union army number in the thousands."[18]

Assessments such as Bebel's emphasized the participation of the German-speaking diaspora and those left behind at home on the Union side. And the figures seem to confirm them: Significantly more ethnic German soldiers fought in the army of the Union than in the Confederate army.[19] Of course, the collective memory of the participation of ethnic German soldiers in the Confederacy and the economic motives of German-speaking immigrants to enlist in both armies are comparatively unexplored. Their reappraisal has the potential to adjust the role and self-image of German immigrants during the Civil War and to reconsider the predominance of ideological motives.[20]

In the twentieth century, German-speaking historians have concentrated mainly on diplomatic relations when studying the effects of the war in Central Europe, evaluated dispatches from German-speaking envoys from the USA, or compiled press reviews in line with a "perception studies"[21] approach, which sometimes result in a passive examination, a relatively apathetic acknowledgement of one of the bloodiest conflicts between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of the First World War.[22] In Anglo-American Civil War research, Central Europe receives little attention. There are essentially two reasons for this: on the one hand, the language barrier makes it difficult for non-German-speaking researchers to deal with source material from German archives; on the other hand, the dominant influence of the period's world powers, Great Britain and France,

18 August Bebel, "Adresse beschlossen in der vom Arbeiter-Bildungs-Verein zu Leipzig einberufenen Volksversammlung," May 6, 1865, in National Archives: Dispatches from United States Consuls in Leipsic, 1826-1906, Roll 6, Volume 6.

19 The numbers of German-born soldiers and soldiers from German parents in the Union army fluctuate between roughly 180,000 and 240,000. The number of Confederate soldiers of German descent is estimated at 9,000 to 18,000. See Don H. Doyle, *The Cause of all Nations: An International History of the American Civil War* (New York, 2015), 173; Andrea Mehrländer, *The Germans of Charleston, Richmond, and New Orleans During the Civil War Period, 1850-1870: A Study and Research Compendium* (Berlin, 2011), 143.

20 First answers on these topics are given by Kristen Layne Anderson, *Abolitionizing Missouri: German Immigrants and Racial Ideology in Nineteenth-Century America* (Baton Rouge, 2016); Kristen Layne Anderson, "'Wir auch im Süden halten Wacht': Ethnic Germans and Civil War Commemoration in Nineteenth-Century Charleston", in *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 117 (2016): 294-313; Christian B. Keller, *Chancellorsville and the Germans: Nativism, Ethnicity, and Civil War Memory* (New York, 2007); William Marvel, *Lincoln's Mercenaries: Economic Motivation among Union Soldiers during the Civil War* (Baton Rouge, 2018).

21 On the widespread phenomenon of perceptions studies in German-language research on North America see Philipp Gassert, "Writing about the (American) Past, Thinking of the (German) Present: The History of U.S. Foreign Relations in Germany," *Amerikastudien / American Studies* 54 (2009): 357.

22 See Rudolf Ullner, *Die Idee des Föderalismus im Jahrzehnt der deutschen Einigungskriege: dargestellt unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Modells der amerikanischen Verfassung für das deutsche politische Denken* (Lübeck, 1965). Contrary to popular opinion, the American Civil War was not the bloodiest war of the nineteenth century. This sad record is held by the Taiping Civil War in China (1851-1864) with approximately between two and twenty million casualties. See Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, "Global Violence and Nationalizing Wars in Eurasia and America: The Geopolitics of War in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38 (1996): 657; Stephen R. Platt, *Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War* (New York, 2012), xxiii.

eclipsed other regions of Europe and the world. Both countries were the most influential political and economic global players during the Civil War. London and Paris respectively were the first points of contact for the diplomatic representatives of the combatants, and there were numerous supporters of both the Union and the Confederacy in both countries. Among the political decision-makers of the two great powers in particular, many spoke out in favor of an independent Southern Confederacy, because it was expected to weaken the United States in the long term and thereby increase the global influence of their own nation. These ambitions were to play a considerable role in the diplomatic crises caused by the war (the *Trent* Affair of 1861/62), public intervention debates and international legal disputes (Alabama Claims/Treaty of Washington 1871).[23] It is therefore not surprising that these two states receive the most attention in research on the transnational effects of the Civil War while Central Europe and its people have so far mainly been overlooked in American-influenced narratives of the Civil War as well.

Many of the existing works arrive at similar results: During the Civil War, the governments of the German states and the majority of their population had sided with the eventual victors, the Union, and supported their struggle for national unity and freedom. From the perspective of diplomatic history, this may be true — but only at first glance, as will become clear in the course of this article. In their analysis of the Civil War, historians have drawn a relatively clear line between conservatism and liberalism, which they see reflected in support for the Union and the Confederacy respectively: Accordingly, a majority of supporters from the bourgeois-liberal camp had spoken out in favor of the Union, while people with conservative or clerical (more precisely: Catholic) views tended to favor the South.[24]

The origins of this ideological dichotomy and the supposedly uniform German sympathies for the Union can be traced back to a Prussian Protestant, national-liberal view of history, which — fueled by the so-called "Wars of Unification" — was dominant and rarely questioned in the 1860s and 1870s, i.e. immediately during and after the Civil War.[25] From the teleological perspective of commentators at the time, it seemed only logical for the future German Empire to see itself as a perpetual supporter of the victorious central government in Washington, resisting "the temptations" of other "major powers" [i.e., Britain and France] to interfere in "America's internal disputes and speculate on the disintegration of the great Empire of the United States."[26] The

23 See Amanda Foreman, *A World on Fire: Britain's Crucial Role in the American Civil War* (New York, 2010); Howard Jones, *Blue & Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations* (Chapel Hill, 2010); Stève Sainlaude, *France and the American Civil War: A Diplomatic History* (Chapel Hill, 2019); Nimrod Tal, "Putting Out the 'Embers of This Resentment': Anglo-American Relations and the Rewriting of the British Response to the American Civil War, 1914-1925," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 8 (2018):87-110.

24 See Wilhelm Kaufmann, *Die Deutschen im amerikanischen Bürgerkriege* (Munich, 1911), 137-139; Ralph H. Lutz, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten während des Sezessionskrieges" (Ph.D. diss., Heidelberg University, 1911), 61; Baldur Edmund Pfeiffer, "Deutschland und der Amerikanische Bürgerkrieg 1861-1865" (Ph.D. diss., Mainz University, 1971), 61-67.

25 See Eckart Conze, *Schatten des Kaiserreichs: Die Reichsgründung 1871 und ihr schwieriges Erbe* (Munich, 2020), 95-98; Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866: Bürgerwelt und starker Staat* (Munich, 1998), 636-640.

26 Otto von Bismarck, March 13, 1884, in *Stenografische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages: V. Legislaturperiode, IV. Session*, ed. Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (Berlin, 1884), 28.

"friendly relations with the United States" were as old as the United States itself, Reich Chancellor Otto von Bismarck proclaimed in a speech in the Reichstag in 1884 (alluding to the Prussian-American Trade and Friendship Treaty of 1785). "The fact that we refused any involvement [in the American Civil War] [...] has not failed to create a permanently favorable impression in America [...]."[27] As Bismarck's remarks indicated, the German Empire's supposedly clear choice of a side could be used as a nationalist distinguishing feature; as an invented tradition that propagated political and moral progressiveness vis-à-vis European rivals and thus sought to legitimize claims within the new power relations in Europe: "Peoples and individuals document the stage of their political consciousness and enlightenment through the sympathies they devote as spectators of a people's struggle to one or the other of the contending parties," a journalist explained in a military magazine in 1866. While most of the other "European rulers" had the "stigma" of having sympathized with "the pitiful chiefs of the slave breeders," the "German people" had held fast to the Union, the "champion of freedom and humanity," and had, so to speak, avoided this stigma.[28]

American government officials were also eager to help establish an image of close ties between Prussia, the future German Empire, and the United States: John Lothrop Motley and George Bancroft, both highly popular historians and, in the 1860s, U.S. envoys at the courts of Vienna and Berlin respectively, described what they saw as a "special relationship" and "kinship" between the two countries.[29] Both Motley and Bancroft were of the opinion that the two (re)united states had suffered "similar crises" in the 1860s, "which would collectively result in an irrevocable expansion of the Empire of Freedom" and that Bismarck, like Lincoln, had served "the cause of democracy."[30]

As controversial as this telos of a supposed German-American alliance may be from today's perspective, it nevertheless persisted into the twentieth century. It was taken up in a modified form by individual West German historians after 1945, for example, who oriented themselves on the American "ideal" of democratic nation-state development and its lessons for the nascent Federal Republic and by interpreting transatlantic ideas on democracy and liberalism as a norm pointing the way forward and interpreting alternative paths as deviations from this Western ideal. [31]

Departing from this tradition of interpretation, which already gained momentum during the Civil War, I would like to take a new, critical

27 Bismarck, 28.

28 "Der Reichthum, die Hülfsquellen und die Nationalschuld der Vereinigten Staaten von Nord-Amerika," *Deutsche Wehrzeitung* (Coburg), April 9, 1866.

29 Gordon A. Craig, "Preußen und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika," *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands* 31 (1982): 54, 56.

30 Craig, "Preußen," 57.

31 See Gassert, "Writing," 345-382; Jörg Nagler, "National Unity and Liberty: Lincoln's Image and Reception in Germany, 1871-1989," in *The Global Lincoln*, ed. Richard Cawardine and Jay Sexton (Oxford, 2011): 242-258; Honeck, "An Uphill Battle," 162-163; Andrew Zimmerman, "Discussion Forum: The Vanishing Nineteenth Century in European History?," *Central European History 51* (2018): 692-693.

look at the consequences of the American Civil War in Central Europe in this essay and expand research on the cross-border dimensions of war to include economic aspects. I am basing my approach on a series of observations that I will outline below.

Liberal-minded Central Europeans' siding with the Union did not automatically mean support for the legal and social equality of African Americans; on the contrary: freedom — in the United States as in Europe — was first and foremost the freedom of white, adult men with economic capital. Ideals such as "the equality of the races, of everything that bears a human face" were considered "politically irrelevant" and "fantasy images" in times of bourgeois Realpolitik.[32] Nor does the supposed "opinion leadership"[33] of the liberal press (whose most important advertising customers and thus financiers included bankers, shipowners, merchants, and manufacturers) in the 1860s imply that this speaking elite was a representative majority in the German states. It is important to keep in mind that the main audience for liberal interpretations of the world represented only a small numerical proportion of the future German Empire's population.[34] Bourgeois liberal ideas did not have the dominance they gained in later times (and certainly not among the governments of the Central European states).[35]

The sympathies for the Union's war aims had many causes and were often based on pragmatic and material interests. For many people, as pointed out by Geoff Ely and David Blackbourn in their influential reappraisal of German history in the nineteenth century, material progress was most likely to be found where one could operate in isolation from sensitive social and moral issues (and slavery was such an issue).[36] To put it bluntly: While one part of the German-speaking bourgeoisie spoke out in favor of the Union in newspapers and pamphlets, the other part — perhaps even the greater one — was busy trying to derive the greatest possible profit from the chaos of the war, whether that benefitted the North or the slave-holding South.

In the course of a revisionist mid-nineteenth-century Central European historiography that is only just beginning to take shape, liberal ideas and their supporters are coming under new, critical scrutiny.[37] As a result, both have lost much of their former status as moral beacons. It is important not to see nineteenth-century liberalism as a single ideal type, but to "face" its "diversity and contradictions."[38] According to this revision, what is commonly referred to as liberal ideas does not appear

32 August Ludwig von Rochau, *Grundsätze der Realpolitik angewendet auf die staatlichen Zustände Deutschlands: Zweiter Teil* (Heidelberg, 1869), VII.

33 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Dritter Band* (Munich, 1995), 445.

34 For Prussia, the social historian Jürgen Kocka calculates a maximum of 20 percent, or less than five percent if one considers only the core of this group, the educated and the business middle classes. Jürgen Kocka, "Zur Schichtung der preußischen Bevölkerung während der industriellen Revolution," in *Geschichte als Aufgabe: Festschrift for Otto Büsch on his 60th birthday*, ed. Wilhelm Treue (Berlin, 1988), 385.

35 See Schoen, "The Civil War," 358.

36 See David Blackbourn and Geoff Ely, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford, 1984), 219.

37 See Zimmerman, "Discussion Forum," 693-694.

38 Jörn Leonhard, "Politisches Gehäuse und ideologische Sprache des Fortschritts: Verfassung, Verfassungsstaat und Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert," in *Durchbruch der Moderne? Neue Perspektiven auf das 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Birgit Aschmann (Frankfurt, 2019), 237, 239.

as a "warming fire"[39] for the benefit of broad sections of the population, but rather as flexible ideologies of dominance, competition, imperialist exploitation and war that promoted transnational markets in which exclusion, dehumanization and terror were systemic.[40]

Against this background, the choice of sides by German-speaking Central Europeans in the American Civil War must be reevaluated. In the following, I will examine the role of merchants from the free cities of Bremen and Hamburg (known at the time as liberal strongholds[41]), and I will show that some of these supposed followers of peaceful (economic) liberalism were actually cosmopolitan custodians of traditional trade relations with the Confederate States and, through the trade in arms, promoted war and the continued existence of slavery. This also raises questions about the silent majority among the wider population, about the attitudes of uninvolved and non-political people who actually had nothing to do with the Civil War or wanted nothing to do with it, but who were affected by this conflict because of their economic ties to the global empire of cotton.

II. In the hinterland of slavery

Older studies in diplomatic or perception history on this topic sometimes fail to take into account the fact that regions, cities and people in Central Europe were already highly entangled with the Atlantic world in the middle of the nineteenth century, especially in economic terms. This aspect, too, has only recently received increased attention among historians. The significance of centers and peripheries in Atlantic history is currently undergoing a reappraisal.[42] "Germany cannot be an island," a "circumscribed and self-referential world" isolated from events on the other side of the Atlantic, is what global historians Jürgen Osterhammel and Sebastian Conrad have noted with regard to the transnational interconnections of the German Empire.[43] This fact also applies — possibly even to a greater extent — to the time before the founding of the Empire. Before 1871, however, the connections between the two parts of the world were rather punctual and translocal and thus more difficult for today's historians to trace, because these connections and the associated actors often moved away from institutional frameworks such as nation states and, as a result, left fewer traces in archives. Or, as was not uncommon, they operated under the flag of other states,[44] giving German merchants, shipowners, and other actors before 1871 the appearance of the "invisible" in Atlantic history.[45]

39 Friedrich Bülau quoted in Rudolf Vierhaus, "Liberalismus," in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Band 3*, ed. Otto Brunner and Werner Conze (Stuttgart, 1982), 764.

40 See Matthew Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism in Germany: 1848-1884* (New York, 2008); Jens-Uwe Guettel, *German Expansionism, Imperial Liberalism, and the United States: 1776-1945* (Cambridge, 2012), 27-41; Domenico Losurdo, *Liberalism: A Counter-History* (London, 2011), 340-344; Jan-Werner Müller, *Furcht und Freiheit: Für einen anderen Liberalismus* (Berlin, 2019), 72-73.

41 See Lars Maischak, *German Merchants in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic* (Washington, D.C., 2013) 82-83.

42 See Jutta Wimmler and Klaus Weber, "Constructing Atlantic Peripheries: A Critical View of the Historiography," in *Globalized Peripheries: Central Europe and the Atlantic World, 1680-1860*, ed. Jutta Wimmler and Klaus Weber (Woodbridge, 2020), 1-18.

43 Jürgen Osterhammel and Sebastian Conrad, "Einleitung," in *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914*, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (Göttingen, 2006), 7.

44 See Jochen Meissner, Ulrich Mücke and Klaus Weber, *Schwarzes Amerika: Eine Geschichte der Sklaverei* (Munich, 2008), 94.

45 See David Blackbourn, "Germans Abroad and 'Auslandsdeutsche': Places, Networks and Experiences from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century," in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 41 (2015): 333.

Central European ties with the New World were characterized by informal trade and information networks that had less contact with states than with regions and were thus part of an informal reality that was constantly in motion and should not be casually interpreted as an extension of the history of European nations overseas.[46] From the seventeenth century onwards, German-speaking Central Europeans migrated back and forth between North and South America and formed multi-layered nodes and trading points with their home regions. These diasporas were extremely heterogeneous groups with different political convictions, denominations and social backgrounds, whose motives did not necessarily coincide with the interests of their home regions. The motives of most German-speaking Central Europeans who emigrated to America in the nineteenth century were largely economic. Better wages, free land and lower taxes were important pull factors. When emigrants wrote letters to their relatives and friends in their old homeland about the freedom that was to be found in America, they mostly meant freedom from material obstacles.[47] This primacy of the economic among German emigrants to America in the nineteenth century was downplayed for a long time, since both political exiles at the time (like the Forty-Eighters) and many later historians anchored emigration to America in the collective memory primarily as a political moment, as an expression of protest.

Relations between Central Europe and the United States in the mid-nineteenth century were primarily commercial in nature, operated by private individuals, occasionally supported by intergovernmental trade treaties and consulates, which were intended to ensure that governments also made a profit from Atlantic trade.[48] For German-American relations in particular, it was not contacts with Prussian or Austrian cities with access to the sea (such as Stettin on the Baltic Sea or Trieste on the Mediterranean) that were of particular importance, but the coastal strips and port cities on the North Sea. The free cities of Bremen, Hamburg and their neighboring states formed the most important economic hinges between the Central European interior and the United States at that time. Economic crises such as the Civil War had consequences for the Hanseatic cities as well as for the interior of the country: "Whether Hamburg or Bremen prosper or suffer has an impact on the smallest Swabian or Thuringian factory city," a contemporary article stated.[49] The first evidence of North American rice, cotton and tobacco imports by North German merchants dates back to the first third of the eighteenth century. Even then, North American ports served as loading stations for transporting slave

46 See Bailyn, *Atlantic History*, 60-61.

47 See Max Paul Friedman, "Beyond 'Voting with Their Feet': Toward a Conceptual History of 'America' in European Migrant Sending Communities, 1860s to 1914," in *Journal of Social History* 40 (2007): 557-575; Wolfgang Helbich, "Land der unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten?: Das Amerika-Bild der deutschen Auswanderer im 19. Jahrhundert," in *Deutschland und der Westen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Teil 1*, ed. Jürgen Elvert and Michael Salewski (Stuttgart, 1993), 311, 318.

48 See Sam A. Mustafa, *Merchants and Migration: Germans and Americans in Connection, 1776-1835* (Aldershot, 2001), 255-260; Weeks, *The New Cambridge History*, xxiii.

49 "Der Seehandel und Schifffahrtsverkehr der deutschen Post- und Nordseehäfen in seiner Gegenwart und wahrscheinlichen Zukunft," *Deutsche Vierteljahrs-Schrift* 1 (1852): 38.

products such as sugar, tobacco and cotton to Germany. Central European shipowners, captains, ship crews, dock workers, factory owners and bankers[50] thus profited directly or indirectly from an economic system based on racist forced labor.[51] Many regions of Central Europe therefore formed a hinterland of transatlantic slavery.[52]

The Central European demand for slave products from the American South was enormous and took on ever greater proportions in the last years before the war. The owners of German trading houses sent their sons or other close relatives across the Atlantic to establish branches in the production markets. Between 1850 and 1860, the proportion of the German-speaking population in the territory of the future Confederate States grew by eighty percent.[53] Among the most popular emigration destinations were the commercial centers of Galveston, New Orleans, Charleston, Savannah and Baltimore. The majority of the German immigrants there came from northern Germany.[54] Since it was usually difficult to compete with slave labor in agriculture, commercial occupations were an "economically sensible decision" for German immigrants in the South.[55] In Wilmington, North Carolina, in 1850, more than 80 percent of the male ethnic Germans were employed as merchants, traders, shopkeepers or in shipping.[56] Other German Southerners, in turn, made their living as brokers or importers of Bavarian porcelain, Rhenish wine or Thuringian musical instruments.[57] Since the mid-1840s, about 200 North German company branches in the USA ensured a steady flow of traffic between Central Europe and North America.[58] This transatlantic network of relationships was further intensified by marriage networks. Close acquaintance with the plantation owners, their sons and daughters, was important for profit and prestige.[59] The closer one was to the producers or buyers of one's goods, the more advantageous this was for one's own business conduct.

The liberal worldview that was often ascribed to the German-speaking overseas merchants within this network proved to be extremely selective and guided by interests.[60] As a result, they now appear more like conservative cosmopolitans — similar to many merchants and slave owners in the Southern United States — who spoke the same language as their American business friends: that of global capitalism.[61]

50 See Mustafa, *Merchants*, 122.

51 See Heike Raphael-Hernandez and Pia Wiegmink, eds., *German Entanglements in Transatlantic Slavery* (London, 2018); Klaus Weber, "Deutschland, der atlantische Sklavenhandel und die Plantagenwirtschaft der Neuen Welt," in *Journal of Modern European History* 7 (2009): 37-67.

52 This phrasing is taken from the highly interesting anthology by Felix Brahm and Eve Rosenhaft, eds., *Slavery Hinterland*.

53 See Andrea Mehrländer, *The Germans of Charleston, Richmond and New Orleans during the Civil War Period 1850-1870* (Berlin, 2011), 295.

54 See Mehrländer, *The Germans*, 295.

55 Jens Bodamer, "Von Hannover in die Südstaaten: Deutsche Auswanderer in Wilmington, North Carolina, 1840-1914," in *Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte* 81 (2009): 334.

56 See Bodamer, "Von Hannover," 334-335.

57 See Edmund Flagg, *Report on the Commercial Relations of the United States with all Foreign Nations: Volume 1* (Washington, D.C., 1856), 337-339.

58 See Karin Schniedewind, *Begrenzter Aufenthalt im Land der unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten: Bremer Rückwanderer aus Amerika 1850-1914* (Stuttgart, 1994), 114.

59 See Horst Rössler, "Bremer Kaufleute und die transatlantische Sklavenökonomie 1790-1865," *Bremisches Jahrbuch* 95 (2016): 96; Margit Schulte Beerbühl, *Deutsche Kaufleute in London: Welthandel und Einbürgerung 1660-1818* (Munich, 2007), 201-206.

60 See Maischak, *German Merchants*, 83.

61 See Maischak, *German Merchants*, 82-107.

All of Bremen's interests, it was said, were "subordinate to those of commerce."[62] This seemed suspect to nationalist critics at home: Those in the country's interior accused the Hanseatic merchants of acting as "Yankee monkeys," a lack of patriotism, an excessive eagerness to enrich themselves and of being stooges for the interests of non-German states, among other things.[63] One of the characteristics of merchant trading as practiced by Bremen and Hamburg merchants was and still is that it is often conducted "completely detached from national interests."[64] For inhabitants of small states with few natural resources of their own, participating in a world market that is as open and extensive as possible was and is essential for survival. When war broke out between the Union and the Southern Confederacy in April 1861, this was to prove true.

III. Neutrality, war business, and international law in the middle of the nineteenth century

The majority of Europeans, as historian Brian Schoen recently noted, were flexible and ambivalent when considering the Civil War. The resulting strategic neutrality that German-speaking and other European actors maintained during the conflict offered them a great deal of latitude.[65] The (often ignored) rules for this room for maneuver were derived from the contemporary understanding of the behavior of neutral states during a war between third parties. No European government recognized the Confederacy de jure as an independent state. Like Britain and France, the member states of the German Confederation had declared their neutrality after the outbreak of war. And they did so by not declaring it: in international law even silence was considered a declaration of neutrality in times of war.[66] Although the German states avoided official declarations of neutrality — which later historians liked to interpret as proof of sympathies with the Union — this was not formally necessary for the recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent party. Its status as a belligerent party allowed Confederate negotiators to buy weapons abroad, equip and build ships, and take out loans (for example, in the form of bonds, as in the case of the Franco-German bank Erlanger). Central Europeans were not prevented from trading with either the North or the South. The greatest risk for shipowners and middlemen was the possible confiscation of their cargo by one of the warring parties, who were allowed to stop and search ships sailing under a neutral flag if they suspected that they were transporting munitions for the enemy. As a rule, the neutral state under whose flag the respective ship was

62 "Bremen," in *Das Staats-Lexikon: Dritter Band*, ed. Carl von Rotteck and Karl Theodor Welcker (Leipzig, 1859), 87.

63 See Rolf Engelsing, "England und die USA in der bremischen Sicht des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu Bremen* 1 (1957): 33-65.

64 Lea Haller, *Transithandel: Geld- und Warenströme im globalen Kapitalismus* (Berlin, 2019), 18.

65 See Schoen, "The Civil War," 342-343.

66 See Heinrich Marquadsen, *Der Trent-Fall: Zur Lehre der Kriegscontrebande und dem Transportdienst der Neutralen* (Erlangen, 1862), 24.

sailing had no complaints or sanctions to fear, since its government could not be expected to be "held responsible for all the actions of [its] subjects."[67] This also applied to the shipment of weapons.

In the mid-nineteenth century, transnational trade in war materials was widely considered a "peaceful business"[68] that retained this character in the event of war and provoked less severe criticism in civil society (which at that time was "closely interwoven" with the military "in many ways")[69] than in the following century. Nevertheless, there were some individuals who even then expressed their misgivings about these "peaceful deals": "To deliver the means to fight this war victoriously [to the South] means nothing other than to re-fasten the already loosened chains of the unfortunate Negroes with our own hands. [...] Just as [...] the governments are still far from letting the dictates of public conscience guide their actions, this also applies to the larger commercial enterprises, and the public conscience only very gradually begins to resist this disregard of its precepts," a Frankfurt journalist warned about German support for the Confederate States in 1863. "Currently it is in fact a recognized doctrine that the money market and wholesale trade has just as little to do with morals as does politics."[70]

To merchants, brokers, shipowners and manufacturers the war in North America, Europe's most important overseas supply and export market,[71] was primarily an evil that had to be accepted, but at the same time could be minimized by restricting trade with the Union and the Confederacy while continuing it on an equal base. This urge for economic continuity in times of war, which, according to the economic historian Karl Polanyi, made peace in the nineteenth century a "by-product of the economy," was symptomatic of this period.[72] Examples of this process can also be found in other conflicts of those years.[73] The cotton and arms trade with the South or the North was in most cases free of ideology for the German-speaking actors involved. The merchants were free to trade with whomever they wanted, especially if they sold their goods to the belligerent parties on their own, that is, neutral, soil. "The neutral actor wants to remain in good relations with both belligerents, and consequently to continue his trade with both."[74] In practice, whether German states sided with the North or South was therefore often based on pragmatic reasons rather than primarily ideological motives.

This almost dogmatically pursued principle of neutrality offered little room for political alliances, but all the more room for maneuver for

67 Friedrich Heinrich Geffcken, "Die Lieferung von Contrebande seitens Neutraler," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft* 1 (1881): 100.

68 August Wilhelm Heffter, *Das europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart auf den bisherigen Grundlagen* (Berlin, 1861), 299.

69 Ute Frevert, *Die kasernierte Nation: Militärdienst und Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland* (Munich, 2001), 297.

70 Frankfurter Reform (Frankfurt am Main), March 13, 1863.

71 See Jörg Fisch, *Europa zwischen Wachstum und Gleichheit: 1850-1914* (Stuttgart, 2002), 343.

72 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: Politische und ökonomische Ursprünge von Gesellschaften und Wirtschaftssystemen* (Berlin, 2013), 336.

73 During the "German War" of 1866 it was a matter of course for the Prussian cast steel foundry Krupp to supply Austria with cannons ordered from the company by the Imperial War Ministry, even though it was already at war with the northern German states at that time. Krupp saw this as a concession to the "facts of modern life and work." In 1870/71 French and German merchants also continued to conduct financial transactions and invest in companies in the other country while French and German soldiers fought each other on the battlefields. See Lothar Gall, *Krupp: Der Aufstieg eines Industrieimperiums* (Berlin, 2011), 154-155; Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, 31.

74 Geffcken, "Die Lieferung von Contrebande," 82.

the population and the economy.[75] It involved people in global crises to a greater extent than a clear commitment to a belligerent party. The opportunities for interaction were much greater for those affected than in the case of an alliance that would have illegalized and thus marginalized contact with the Union or Confederacy. The formation of political camps or world views had little effect. "Practical and experiential" considerations had priority.[76]

This also made clear how strongly the contemporary understanding of neutrality aimed to stabilize the world economy in times of crisis and enabled third parties to do business despite a war.[77] If, for example, a Hamburg shipowner independently (not on behalf of his government) transported weapons to a representative of the Union or the Confederacy, then contemporary international law saw in this "the purpose of business profit" but not a form of direct support of the recipient's war effort.[78] Things became more precarious when states supplied a warring party with larger quantities of war material in their own name: Herein lay the suspicion of direct, unilateral war assistance (although what exactly was meant by a larger quantity was not defined anywhere). Deliberately supplying one combatant only meant simultaneous damage to the other and thus amounted to a violation of neutrality. Neutral states had the duty to ensure that they did not "assist only one combatant in the war effort from neutral ground."[79] Even the vague formulations of the treatises on international law of this period suggest that neutral actors did not adhere particularly strictly to these guidelines. In fact, the American Civil War prompted some prime examples of this nonchalance.

IV. The silence of the looms: Consequences of the Cotton Famine in Central Europe

Due to the naval blockade imposed by the Union Navy in April 1861, the South was logistically cut off from the rest of the world and could no longer export the cotton so important to Europe — at least on paper. In reality, the blockade of the 3,500 miles of Southern coastline by approximately 500 ships of the Union Navy (of which on average only 150 were on patrol at the same time)[80] left plenty of openings. On average, four out of five ships managed to break through the blockade.[81]

Despite these loopholes, the blockade of the South did not fail to have the desired effect. Hundreds of thousands of European factory owners and workers, from Lancashire to Alsace and the Ore

75 See Martje Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics 1815-1914* (Cambridge, 2014), 1-21, 108-119.

76 Frank Möller, "Vom revolutionären Idealismus zur Realpolitik: Generationswechsel nach 1848?," *Historische Zeitschrift, Beihefte* 36 (2003): 79.

77 See Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals*, 19.

78 Geffcken, "Lieferung," 100.

79 Johann Caspar Bluntschli, *Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt* (Nördlingen, 1868), 438.

80 James M. McPherson, *Für die Freiheit sterben: Die Geschichte des amerikanischen Bürgerkrieges* (Munich, 1995), 358, 368.

81 M. Brem Bonner and Peter McCord, "Reassessment of the Union Blockade's Effectiveness," *The North Carolina Historical Review* 88 (2011): 397.

Figure 1. Cotton factory in Leutersdorf, Kingdom of Saxony, 1859. The Saxon cotton industry was one of the largest German consumers of North American cotton in the nineteenth century. Public domain.

Mountains, could not continue their work without cotton supplies. With the beginning of the second year of the war, the first global raw material crisis in history,[82] the Cotton Famine, hit the German states with full force.[83] Throughout Europe, cotton imports plummeted and by spring 1862 had fallen by 96 percent.[84] The deficit was so dramatic that John Lothrop Motley, a fervent opponent of slavery and American envoy in Vienna, remarked with consternation in 1862 that the Europeans would understand the Civil War primarily as a "cotton question."[85]

This is hardly surprising since the cotton crisis seemed to be omnipresent. At the beginning of the 1860s, around 220,000 women, men and children living within the boundaries of the German Zollverein earned their living in the cotton industry.[86] This does not include the countless cottage industry looms, Austria, whose cotton industry workforce was estimated at 350,000 around 1860,[87] and the German states and territories that were not members of the Zollverein.[88] Only partially included are people who worked in related industries and also depended on a constant import of cotton such as dyers, clothiers and hosiery makers, or lacemakers. Taken together, the share of textile products manufactured by these occupational groups accounted for about half of all commercial export goods of the Zollverein.[89]

82 Sven Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War," *The American Historical Review* 109 (2004): 1406.

83 See Georg Hirth, "Statistisches über die Lage der Baumwollindustrie im Zollverein vor, während und nach der Krisis," *Annalen des Deutschen Reiches* 3 (1870): 534-562.

84 Beckert, "Emancipation," 1410.

85 John Lothrop Motley to William Seward, August 25, 1862, in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, ed. United States Department of State (Washington, D.C., 1862), 555.

86 A. Bienengraeber, *Statistik des Verkehrs und Verbrauchs im Zollverein für die Jahre 1842-1864* (Berlin, 1868), 12, 197-199.

87 Verein der österreichischen Industriellen, ed., *Jahrbuch für Industrie und Handel in Österreich: Jahrgang II* (Vienna, 1866), 86.

88 These were the Hanseatic cities of Bremen, Lübeck and Hamburg, as well as Liechtenstein, Holstein, Mecklenburg-Strelitz and Mecklenburg-Schwerin.

89 Wolfram Fischer, *Expansion-Integration-Globalisierung: Studien zur Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft* (Göttingen, 1998), 106.

The American Civil War had deep-seated consequences for such a large industry that depends on world trade. The Civil War had dealt "the entire cotton industry" in Germany "a blow from which it would not recover anytime soon," complained Prussian traders.[90] "The entire civilized world faces this war and its consequences like a fate from which no nation [...] is able to escape completely."[91] Berlin, where every 13th inhabitant worked in the clothing trade,[92] soon counted 5,000 unemployed workers. Almost all cotton spinning and weaving mills in the Rhineland and Westphalia had either shut down their operations completely or were producing only part-time.[93] In the Austrian Empire, the number of people employed in the cotton industry decreased by eighty percent until 1864.[94] In Vienna, men who had become unemployed as a result of the crisis at least found alternative employment in the construction of the Danube Canal and in street cleaning.[95] Others, such as North Bohemian clothiers, suffered doubly from the effects of the Civil War, however. Not only did they soon lack yarn for the production of their cloth, but exports to the United States, where they traditionally delivered a large share of their goods, became unprofitable due to the lack of demand and the Union's increased import duties, and in some cases exports stopped completely.[96] "The clacking and creaking of the looms usually heard from houses everywhere and at all times" in the villages of North Bohemia had ceased, a journalist wrote about the situation in that region.[97] Through appeals for donations, the Austrian local governments tried to alleviate the general state of emergency and to prevent famine. Emperor Franz Joseph II even donated funds from his private fortune.[98]

In Saxony, which, like Austria, obtained its cotton mainly via Bremen, some thirty percent of workers in the textile industry lost their jobs.[99] The cotton crisis there also dragged neighboring industries into the depression. In May 1862, a spinning mill owner from the Ore Mountains turned to the Saxon Ministry of the Interior and asked for an advance of 4,000 thalers, as otherwise he would not be able to pay the mortgage on his factory and thus faced bankruptcy and the dismissal of his employees. Lacemakers, hosiery knitters and miners were also dependent on the continued operation of this

90 Preußisches Handels-Archiv, *Jahresberichte der Handelskammern und kaufmännischen Korporationen des preußischen Staats für 1862* (Berlin, 1863), 82.

91 Preußisches Handels-Archiv, *Jahresberichte*, 183.

92 Wilhelm Treue, *Wirtschafts- und Technikgeschichte Preußens* (Berlin, 1984), 520.

93 See W.O. Henderson, "The Cotton Famine on the Continent 1861-65," *The Economic History Review* 4 (1933): 200.

94 Verein der österreichischen Industriellen, *Jahrbuch*, 86.

95 *Das Vaterland,* January 25, 1863.

96 See Peez, "Zur Baumwollkrise: Ein Beitrag aus Nordböhmen," *Österreichische Revue: Erster Band* (Vienna, 1863): 157-163.

97 Peez, "Zur Baumwollkrise," 156.

98 See *Wochenblatt für Karlsbad und die Umgegend*, January 24, 1863.

99 Sven Beckert, *King Cotton: Eine Geschichte des globalen Kapitalismus* (Munich, 2014), 238.

spinning mill, as they processed its products.[100] Another spinning mill operator had to lay off seventy employees by April 1864 and lost several thousand thalers due to a lack of cotton deliveries. Both applications were rejected by the Ministry of the Interior because of allegedly non-existent funds.[101] But more and more factory owners turned to the government and asked for financial support during this "quite abnormal business crisis."[102] The applications became more frequent and the situation became more acute.

After lengthy deliberations and under great public pressure, the Saxon government intervened at the end of 1863 and, by decree, subsidized the worst-affected companies and regions with 122,000 thalers from the state treasury.[103] Divided by the 50,000 or so registered women, children, and men who worked in Saxony's textile industry (home weavers were not counted here), this sum corresponded roughly to the weekly wage of a male factory worker.[104] A cynical government commentary stated that it was not least the "frugality" and "ability to make sacrifices" of the Saxon workers that had prevented mass poverty such as that seen at the same time in the English cotton region of Lancashire.[105] The extent of the poverty among the numerous weavers, spinners and workers can only be guessed at due to the lack of ego-documents. From the province of Westphalia, a rare letter from a home weaver has survived, who wrote to his war-weary brother, who fought as a soldier in the Union Army, that he should think very carefully about returning home, because "for earning a living things are much worse [than before] because weaving is completely finished and this is because of the American war because no cotton can be obtained [...] we have no earnings at all."[106]

Incidents like those in Austria and Saxony revealed the extent to which the cotton crisis necessitated state intervention. But for many, the aid received from their rulers was not enough to survive. In the course of the Civil War, thousands of people gave up the centuries-old tradition of home weaving and began working as day laborers or in another industry and thus inevitably became part of the industrial structural change.[107] The crisis also made the people of Central Europe aware of

100 Mining was doubly affected. On the one hand, the cotton industry had been an important buyer of salt, which was used in the dyeing of fabrics, and on the other hand, chemically treated (gunpowder) cotton served as a blasting agent for mining tunnels. See *Der Berggeist: Zeitung für Berg-, Hüttenwesen und Industrie* (Cologne), May 5, 1863.

101 See Hubert Kiesewetter, *Die Industrialisierung Sachsens: Ein regional-vergleichendes Erklärungsmodell* (Stuttgart, 2007), 537-538.

102 J.D. Fischer to Royal Saxon Ministry of the Interior, January 31, 1863, in Kiesewetter, *Die Industrialisierung*, 538.

103 See Kiesewetter, *Die Industrialisierung*, 537-539; Sächsischer Landtag, ed., *Mitteilungen über die Verhandlungen des ordentlichen Landtags im Königreich Sachsen während der Jahre 1863/64: Zweiter Band* (Dresden, 1864), 1022-1056.

104 C. R. Isbary, *Statistik und Lage der Industrie und des Handels im Königreich Sachsen bis auf die neueste Zeit: II. Abteilung, Unterabteilung A.* (Leipzig, 1865), 56.

105 Sächsischer Landtag, *Mitteilungen*, 1024.

106 J. H. Brandes to Theodor Heinrich Brandes, July 20, 1863, in *‚Für gans America Gehe ich nich Wieder Bei die Soldaten': Briefe des Ochtruper Auswanderers Theodor Heinrich Brandes aus dem amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg 1862-63*, ed. Antonius Holtmann (Bremen, 1999), 104.

107 See Gustav Schmoller, *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kleingewerbe im 19. Jahrhundert* (Halle, 1870), 534-614.

how close the transatlantic world had come together — the mental map of hundreds of thousands of Europeans had expanded considerably: never before had "the interdependence of international relations [...] become more tangible than in the current cotton crisis."[108]

V. Blockade smuggling: New markets for cotton

The cotton crisis not only threatened weavers and spinners in the interior of the German states, it also provoked a phase of wildest speculation and feverish search for new supply markets among the North German cotton importers, who purchased most of the goods for further processing in Austria and Saxony. Hanseatic merchants now took the Civil War "into account as a new factor." In December 1861, Bremen-based brokers observed that "business here [...] had been little dependent on politics, but almost solely on harvest reports. From now on, however, our relationship with the United States alone became decisive. Every letter that sounded belligerent [...] raised prices, and often with astonishing rapidity."[109] While manufacturers paid an average of about 0.18 Louis d'Or for a pound of cotton from Bremen in 1860, twelve months later it was already 0.21 Louis d'Or. Three years later, the pound price was to reach its peak during the war at 0.55 Louis d'Or — a price increase of over 67 percent compared to the last year of peace.[110] With the consolidation of the blockade ring around the Confederate ports, the cotton trade fell "almost entirely into the hands of the speculators."[111] Those who somehow managed to get hold of cotton wanted to sell it profitably. But the sources in the South were blocked and new supply markets were needed.

A glance at Bremen's trade statistics reveals something astonishing: after England, which was also home to many trading houses of German origin,[112] the second largest cotton supplier to the Hanseatic city between 1862 and 1865 was the Confederate state of Texas.[113] This was made possible by a form of trade as old as trade itself: smuggling. The first destination of the much sought-after goods from Texas was Matamoros in Mexico, on the border with the Confederate States. "Matamoros is to the rebellion west of the Mississippi what the port of New York is for the United States," a Union general conceded.[114] During the war, some 20,000 European merchants were drawn to the otherwise small trading city.[115] The neighboring Texas cotton traders and planters profited from the small number of Union troops stationed there and were therefore able to bring their supplies

108 *Central-Organ für den deutschen Handelsstand*, May 10, 1862.

109 *Weser-Zeitung*, December 30, 1861.

110 Figures compiled from Bremer Behörde für die Handelsstatistik, *Tabellarische Übersicht des bremischen Handels im Jahr 1865* (Bremen, 1866)

111 *Weser-Zeitung*, December 30, 1861.

112 See Ulrike Kirchberger, "German Overseas Interests in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Britain," in *Transnational Networks: German Migrants in the British Empire 1670-1914*, ed. John R. Davis, Stefan Manz and Margit Schulte Beerbühl (Leiden, 2012), 59-78.

113 Figures compiled from Bremer Behörde für die Handelsstatistik, *Tabellarische Uebersicht des Bremischen Handels* (Bremen, 1861-1866)

114 Quoted in Peter Andreas, *Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America* (Oxford, 2013), 162.

115 Andreas, *Smuggler Nation*, 162.



Figure 2. View of Matamoros, Mexico, as seen from pontoon bridges constructed by U.S. Forces across the Rio Grande River from Brownsville, Texas, ca. 1866. © Library of Congress.

unnoticed to Matamoros, the nearest neutral port with access to the open sea.[116] Many German traders had already settled on the Mexican Gulf Coast in the 1840s. By the early 1850s, more than 60 German companies were already established in 15 Mexican cities, and after the United States, Great Britain and France, German ships were the fourth most frequently landing foreign ships in Mexico's ports.[117] In addition to shipowners and importers from Hamburg and Bremen, businessmen from the neighboring Grand Duchy of Oldenburg discovered the profitability of blockade smuggling. Some revealing figures give an idea of the extent to which the merchants there invested in clandestine trade via Mexico. The insurance sum for the loss of ships or goods contracted by Oldenburg shipowners (due to the risk of confiscation by Union or Confederacy ships) rose from 1.4 million thalers in 1861 to 2.3 million thalers in 1865.[118] While 47 ships left Oldenburg for the Gulf of Mexico in the last five years before the Civil War, their number rose to 72 during the war.[119] A glance at Bremen's trade statistics also shows that the city received more than 460,000 pounds of cotton from Oldenburg companies during the war. During the last five years of peace, this value amounted to only 8,500 pounds.[120]

One of the big profiteers in the smuggling business via Mexico was the trading house Droege & Oetling. The Bremen-based company had branches in Havana, Manchester and Hamburg in addition to its branch in Matamoros.[121] Through agreements with Confederate officers, Droege & Oetling exported the majority of Texan cotton to

116 See James W. Daddysman, *The Matamoros Trade: Confederate Commerce, Diplomacy and Intrigue* (Newark, 1983), 107-137, 151-155.

117 Felix Becker, *Die Hansestädte und Mexiko: Handelspolitik, Verträge und Handel, 1821-1867* (Wiesbaden, 1984), 67-68; Hendrik Dane, *Die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen Deutschlands zu Mexiko im 19. Jahrhundert*, (Cologne, 1971), 41-42, 52-53; Ernst von Halle, *Amerika: Seine Bedeutung für die Weltwirtschaft und seine wirtschaftliche Beziehungen zu Deutschland insbesondere zu Hamburg* (Hamburg, 1905), 414-415.

118 Figures compiled from *Statistische Nachrichten über den Freistaat Oldenburg* 10 (1868), 34.

119 Figures compiled from *Statistische Nachrichten über den Freistaat Oldenburg* 5 (1862), 94-95 and 10th (1868), 82-83.

120 Figures compiled from *Tabellarische Uebersicht des Bremischen Handels* (Bremen, 1857-1866).

121 See Maria Möring, *125 Jahre G.A. Droege & Sohn* (Hamburg, 1972), 17-28.

Europe during the war, where it was sold on behalf of the Confederate government. Droege & Oetling earned millions through this business deal.[122] The company also became a transfer site for the mail traffic of the South and probably also for weapons.[123] German ships, which played a large part in this business, acquired the reputation of being eagerly active in the Confederate trade with Europe. "The port of Matamoros has acquired a great and sudden importance as a point of attraction to the German [...] adventurer," reported a British observer from Hamburg.[124] Union authorities prohibited individual German ships from calling at reconquered ports in the South such as New Orleans unless they intended to take a direct route. [125]

The smuggling via Mexico soon had an effect not only in Bremen: Between 1862 and 1863, Hamburg's cotton imports from eastern Mexico shot from literally zero bales to over 1,400 bales.[126] The trade was extremely profitable. At the beginning of 1863, the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce justified the establishment of a consulate in Matamoros as "appropriate and desirable" because trade between the two regions had increased so significantly.[127] Unfortunately, the names of most of the traders who participated in the blockade smuggling were lost over time or were deliberately concealed. Discretion has always been considered a merchant's virtue, especially when doing business underhand.[128]

One of the few known smugglers operating from Germany was Charles W. Adams. He owned a trading company in Galveston, but moved to Hamburg shortly after the outbreak of the Civil War. Like many overseas merchants who had emigrated, Adams did not break off his transatlantic relations. He continued his business with Galveston, where agents now shipped his cotton to Europe via Matamoros.[129] He was also suspected of buying weapons in Germany for the Confederate army.[130] Through the efforts of the Union consuls in Hamburg and in neighboring Altona, Northern officials became aware of Adams' business. When he appeared at the Mexican border in 1864 to personally supervise his shipments,

122 See James L. Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States: April-June 1863* (Edinburgh, 1863), 10-11; *Der Kamerad. Oesterreichische Militär-Zeitung*, February 27, 1866.

123 See J.A. Quintero to J. P. Benjamin, September 16, 1863, in *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion* (ORN) II, 3, 901-902; H.P. Bee to A. Superviële, October 13, 1863, in *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies in the War of the Rebellion* (ORA), I, 26 (Pt. II), 309; S. Hart to George Williamson, December 28, 1863 in: *ORA*, I, 53, 946.

124 Foreign Office of the United Kingdom, *Commercial Reports received at the Foreign Office of her Majesty's Consuls between July 1st, 1862 and June 30th, 1863* (London, 1863), 88.

125 James Anderson to William Seward, July 1, 1862, in National Archives, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Hamburg: 1790-1906* (hereinafter: NA Hamburg).

126 Figures compiled from Bremer Behörde für die Handelsstatistik, *Tabellarische Uebersichten* (Bremen, 1859-1866).

127 Minutes of the Commerzdeputation Hamburg, February 11, 1863, *Archiv der Handelskammer Hamburg* S/599 1863.

128 See Hermann Wätjen, "Blockade, Kaperfahrten und neutrale Handelsschifffahrt im amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg," *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 60 (1936): 63.

129 United States House of Representatives, *Reports of the Committees: 43rd Congress, 1st Session* (Washington, D.C., 1874), 15.

130 See Testimony of Emil Liefmann, May 4, 1864, in James H. Anderson to Frederick W. Seward, May 4, 1864, NA Hamburg.

the consuls had arranged for Adams to be arrested and his goods confiscated by Union troops.[131] After his release and a ten-year trial by both German and American authorities, Adams' claim for compensation was rejected by the Congressional War Claims Committee in Washington. The committee argued that Adams was an "outspoken, bitter rebel" and a "blockade-runner."[132]

VI. Dealings with death: The arms trade

Charles Adams was only one among many in Central Europe who supplied weapons to one of the two warring parties. Numerous agents of the Union and the Confederacy flocked to Europe after the war broke out in order to buy arms for their governments. The agents knew that the German arsenals were filled with large quantities of discarded rifles and guns and that the governments were willing to sell them.[133] By selling its old muzzle-loaders, which had become obsolete anyway with the introduction of the firing pin rifle among the troops since the mid-1850s,[134] Prussia was able to dispose of old remaining stock at profitable prices and generously offered its assortment to the highest bidders.[135]

The Civil War also offered a welcome occasion for Austria to fill its chronically empty state coffers. In the fall of 1861, a Washington negotiator bought over 70,000 rifles from the Austrian army for about 1.05 million dollars.[136] Austria's government was flexible in its choice of trading partners. Although the Imperial Foreign Minister assured Austria's solidarity with the Union and affirmed that the Empire would not support separatist movements or de facto governments,[137] Vienna's foreign policy was overshadowed by the economic interests of the financially stricken Empire. The imperial government seemed to take full advantage of the crisis in the United States. While officially issuing diplomatic declarations of solidarity, the Imperial Ministerial Council was of the opinion that Washington "at this moment [had] good reason" to "treat Austria with respect so that it does not recognize the independence of the slave states."[138] Consequently, political partisanship played no role in business relations with North America during the Civil War. The Confederates were also welcome trading partners. In Vienna, a Confederate arms buyer managed to commission a large shipment[139] that included over 100,000 rifles and sixty ready-to-fire cannons including ammunition.[140]

Austria did not hide its business relations with the South. But it naturally bothered the Union representatives in Vienna that the

131 See James H. Anderson to William H. Seward, October 10, 1862; William Marsh to William H. Seward, April 9, 1864, May 14, and November 8/9, 1864, in National Archives, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Hamburg and Altona*, various rolls.

132 United States House of Representatives, *Reports*, 34.

133 Caleb Huse, *The Supplies for the Confederate Army: How they were obtained in Europe and how paid for* (Boston, 1904), 26-28.

134 See Christopher Clark, *Preußen: Aufstieg und Niedergang* (Munich, 2008), 614-617.

135 See *Marcellus Hartley: A Brief Memoir* (New York, 1903), 133-134.

136 See George L. Schuyler, *Report of George L. Schuyler to the Secretary of War*, April 8, 1862 (New York, 1862), 8.

137 See Glancy Jones to William Seward, April 15 and July 20, 1861, in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, ed. United States Department of State (Washington, D.C., 1861), 189.

138 "Protokoll der Ministerratssitzung, "May 14, 1861, in *Die Protokolle des österreichischen Ministerialrats 1848-1867: V. Abteilung*, ed. Stefan Malfér (Vienna, 1981), 43-44.

139 See Hartley, *A Brief Memoir*, 130.

140 See Huse, *The Supplies*, 26.

Empire was supplying the Confederacy with weapons.[141] "[T]his Government sells anything to get money" wrote the local consul to Washington.[142] The Imperial Foreign Ministry justified the sale with the financial imbalance of the Empire and referred to international law, according to which the Confederate States were a belligerent party and legitimate trading partners. U.S. envoy John Motley was not pleased with this justification, but did not pursue the matter any further so as not to burden the relations between the two states. [143]

The government in Washington was so engrossed by the Civil War that it sought to avoid diplomatic conflicts with other states. This attitude played into the hands of the South, which was aware of its opponent's limited room for maneuver. The North had nothing more than formal protest to offer to the European arms suppliers of the South. If it did, Washington's additional expenditure would have swallowed up valuable time and material and would have helped the South even more. Consequently, the weapons commissioned for the South could be transported unhindered from Vienna. A Viennese bank helped with the payment arrangements and the transport of the arms to Hamburg, where they were loaded onto a blockade runner flying the British flag.[144]

In the port of Hamburg, dozens of blockade runners were equipped for the South during the Civil War and loaded with war material.[145] With its free port, the city provided the appropriate logistics required for the rapid transfer of arms "duty-free and without further inspection," as the local authorities proudly advertised.[146] Hamburg was home to more than a dozen gunsmiths who made considerable profits by reprocessing rifles and cannons from Saxony, Austria and Prussia that had been purchased by middlemen there.[147] Other German merchants also participated in the arms business. For example, as forwarding agents or agents who, well aware of the great demand in America, bought tens of thousands of rifles directly from the authorities of the German states and had them transported to the Hanseatic cities.[148] It is documented that at least 18 arms factories, dealers and brokerage firms in Hamburg were involved in the arms trade during the Civil War. Four of these companies sold their goods to both the Union and the Confederacy.[149] For observers, the involvement of Hamburg merchants in the shipment of war material to the rebellious South became even more evident when, in 1864, members of the Hamburg Bürgerschaft, which consisted mainly of merchants engaged in transatlantic trade, spoke

141 See Burton Ira Kaufman, "Austro-American Relations during the Era of the American Civil War," *Austrian History Yearbook* 4 (1968), 217.

142 Theodore Canisius to William Seward, November 18, 1862, in National Archives, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Vienna: 1830-1906* (hereinafter: NA Vienna).

143 See Kaufman, "Austro-American", 217-218.

144 See Theodore Canisisus to William Seward, November 18, 1862, *NA Vienna*; Huse to Gorgas, April 1,1862, in *ORN*, II, 2, 177.

145 Figures based on *Despatches from United States Consuls in Hamburg and Altona* and James H. Anderson Papers, Ohio Historical Society.

146 Minutes of the Commerzdeputation Hamburg, June 6, 1864, in *Archiv der Hamburger Handelskammer*, p/599 1864.

147 Figures based on *Hamburgisches Adreßbuch für 1862*.

148 See *Weser-Zeitung*, September 9 and November 14, 1861.

149 Figures based on *Despatches from United States Consuls in Hamburg and Altona* and James H. Anderson Papers, Ohio Historical Society.

Figure 3. Landing stage for steamships at the port of Hamburg, 1868. During the American Civil War, Hamburg became one of Europe's most important transshipment points for arms and other goods destined for the United States. Photo by J.F. Lau. © Bokelberg Verlag. Used by permission.

out against the obligation to report the destination of their ships, which would have revealed the involvement of many members of parliament in the smuggling business with America.[150]

Hamburg and Bremen developed into important supply bases for both North and South. The consul of the Union in Hamburg, James Anderson, undertook several observation trips in the city's harbor, sailing a small boat between blockade runners and noted as best he could their cargo and the names of the companies involved. Anderson was able to identify more companies that supplied the Confederacy than those that supplied the North.[151] When the consul complained to the Hamburg authorities that the city was inflicting a "great deal of injury" on the United States by allowing its merchants to supply the rebels with weapons, Hamburg's foreign minister Carl Hermann Merck responded that his government's hands were tied.[152] All suspected ships sailed under a neutral flag and indicated neutral ports such as Nassau or Havana as their destinations — notorious transfer points for onward transport to the Confederate States. Thanks to this clandestine trade, tons of weapons could be shipped from the German states to the Confederacy.

The German merchants involved in clandestine trade actively helped to support a war of secession fought by a new slave-owning empire. Apart from British ships, most of the ships that sailed between the North American and European coasts during 1861 and 1865 are said

150 See William Marsh to William Seward, October 4, 1864, in *Despatches from United States Consuls in Altona*, National Archives.

151 Various Despatches of James H. Anderson to William H. Seward 1861-1862, NA Hamburg; Letterbook of James H. Anderson, Ohio Historical Society, Box 7, Folder 2, Mss 84.

152 James H. Anderson to William Seward, July 2, 1862, NA Hamburg.

to have been owned by Bremen and Hamburg shipowners.[153] The value of the arms for the South can only be estimated due to the clandestine trade. It is assumed that at least over 100,000 rifles, dozens of cannons and several tons of sabres, clothing and other material were traded.[154] The Union was also supplied in abundance. The customs office in New York alone registered war material worth 1.4 million dollars between 1861 and 1865 that was shipped via Hamburg or Bremen. This made the German states, after Great Britain, the largest foreign supplier of arms to the Union armies. [155]



Figure 4. Drawing of a blockade runner loaded with supplies for the Confederate States anchored in the port of Hamburg, made by an agent of the U.S. Consulate, 1863. National Archives: Dispatches from U.S. Consuls in Hamburg, Germany, 1790-1906, Microfilm No. T-211, Roll 16, Vol. 16.

In order to gain a strategic advantage over the enemy, both sides had to transport their war material across the Atlantic as quickly as possible. Steamships were therefore the first choice to meet the needs of the armies. A large part of the transports was carried out by the major steamship companies of Hamburg and Bremen, Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft (Hapag) and the North German Lloyd. As a result of the collapse of their main source of income, the transport of emigrants, the ships of the two shipping companies had more empty cargo space than they wanted. So the Civil War in America came at just the right time. With the elimination of American merchant ships (most of which were now in the service of the Union Navy), the market was almost completely in the hands of European shipping companies — a particularly favorable opportunity for profit. Hapag's agents in New York were instructed by their executive board to "derive the greatest possible benefit [...] for us from this situation."[156] At the request of the dealers involved, Hapag declared weapons as "merchandise" in order to avoid any inconvenience with

153 Rudolph Schleiden to Abraham Lincoln, December 17, 1862, in State Archives Hamburg, *Hanseatische Gesandtschaft in Washington,* 132 - 5/9.

154 See Hartley, *A Brief Memoir*, 130-149; Caleb Huse to Josiah Gorgas, April 1, 1862, in *ORN*, II, 2, 177-179.; Huse, *The Supplies*, 26-27.

155 See House of Representatives, Executive Documents No. 324, 42nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C., 1872).

156 Minutes of the Hapag executive board meeting, April 23 1861, Staatsarchiv Hamburg/ Hapag-Archiv, 621-1/095, 163 vol. 1.



Figure 5. Value of fire arms imported into the United States from Europe, 1860-1865, as entered in the U.S. Custom-House returns. Figures based on: U.S. House, Executive Documents, No. 324, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1872).

the authorities and to reduce the risk of seizure by Southern captains.[157] In addition to income from postal services, which had risen by forty percent in 1861 thanks to new treaties,[158] the most lucrative business for Hapag between 1861 and 1862 was the transport of arms to the Union. The lead trade via Hamburg also flourished. The War Department in Washington ordered several thousand tons of the raw material needed for ammunition production from mines in the Harz and Ore Mountains.[159] Bremen authorities also recorded over 14 million pounds of lead, which was shipped to the USA between 1861 and 1865.[160]

The flourishing business of German shipowners and merchants was further boosted by the greatest diplomatic crisis of the Civil War, the *Trent* affair. When a war between the Union and Great Britain threatened to break out in the winter of 1861/62, Bremen and Hamburg steamers bypassed the English ports where they usually loaded further mail and cargo for North America and instead set a direct course for America in order to avoid confiscation by British authorities. Northern arms dealers had requested this direct route.[161] When both the British and French governments issued an export ban on war material on November 30 and December 4, respectively, the two largest competitors in the arms trade were temporarily out of business. As a result, German arms manufacturers, exporters, and shipowners experienced a veritable rush by negotiators

157 Minutes of the Hapag executive board meeting, May 21 1861, Staatsarchiv Hamburg/Hapag-Archiv, 621-1/095, 163 vol. 1.

158 See Protokoll der Vorstandssitzung der Hapag, January 13 1862, Staatsarchiv Hamburg/Hapag-Archiv, 621-1/095, 163, Vol. 1.

159 See House of Representatives, Executive Documents, 2nd Ses, 42nd Cong. Vol. 16, No. 324 (Washington, D.C., 1872) 950-951.

160 Figures compiled from Bremer Behörde für die Handelsstatistik, Tabellarische Uebersicht 1861-1865.

161 Minutes of the Hapag executive board meeting, December 27 1861, Staatsarchiv Hamburg/Hapag-Archiv, 621-1/095, 163, Vol. 1.

161 Minutes of the Hapag executive board meeting, December 27 1861, Staatsarchiv Hamburg/Hapag-Archiv, 621-1/095, 163, Vol. 1.

from North America.[162] While the total value of all weapons imported to Hamburg in 1860 was just 716,000 Marks, in the following two years it was eight and 6.5 million Marks, respectively.[163] Most deliveries came from Prussia, Hanover, Saxony and Austria. Hapag soon demanded premiums for transport to New York and granted freight discounts if the buyers guaranteed fixed delivery quotas.[164] Soon advertisements appeared in newspapers from Northern Germany to Bavaria and Austria in which the shipping company promoted the shipment of "weapons and war material" to New York.[165] The monopoly position that German shipping companies and factories now held in the arms trade brought considerable profits. The year 1862 became the most successful financial year in Hapag's history up to that point, with the company making a profit of over one million thalers. [166]

The loss of the Northern market would have meant a serious financial loss for the shipping company. Accordingly, Hapag's trade was concentrated on traffic with New York, which had been the main destination port for its ships for more than ten years. "This company would not of course jeopardize its standing with us by assisting the Rebels," the American consul in Hamburg assured his government, "to act against us would be to cut its own head off."[167] In May 1861, an envoy of the Confederate States approached Hapag's board of directors with a proposal to establish a direct connection between Savannah or another Southern port, but the response to this proposal was "very polite, but negative."[168] Likewise, the board of directors spoke out against the transportation of men who intended to join the Southern army. Union army volunteers, on the other hand, were welcome passengers.[169] On several occasions Hapag granted German officers reduced travel costs for their passage to New York. The most prominent passenger in this incentive program was the later Union General Carl Schurz, who enjoyed a free first class passage to New York in January 1862.[170] Of course, there was also some calculation behind this concession, since Schurz seemed to have "a lot of influence in America" and might "perhaps be very useful with regard to the postal

162 Enno Eimers, *Preußen und die USA 1850 to 1867: Transatlantische Wechselwirkungen* (Berlin, 2004), 463-465.

163 Figures compiled from Handelsstatistisches Bureau Hamburg, *Tabellarische Uebersichten des Hamburgischen Handels* (Hamburg, 1861-1866).

164 See minutes of the Hapag executive board meeting, December 5, 1861, and January 13, 31 and February 21, 1862, Staatsarchiv Hamburg/Hapag-Archiv, 621-1/095, 163, Vol. 1.

165 See *Bayerischer General-Anzeiger,* June 11, 1862; *Hamburger Nachrichten*, July 21, 1862; *Kemptner Zeitung*, April 11, 1862; *Fremden-Blatt*, July 16, 1862.

166 Minutes of the General Assembly, March 19, 1863, Staatsarchiv Hamburg/Hapag-Archiv, 621-1/095, 178, Vol. 2.

167 James H. Anderson to Henry Sanford, March 12, 1862, in James H. Anderson Papers.

168 Minutes of the executive board meeting of Hapag, May 7, 1861, Staatsarchiv Hamburg/Hapag-Archiv, 621-1/095, 163, Vol. 1.

169 Minutes of the executive board meeting of Hapag, August 9, 1861, Staatsarchiv Hamburg/Hapag-Archiv, 621-1/095, 163, Vol. 1.

170 See minutes of the Hapag executive committee meeting, September 13 and October 25, 1861, and February 7, 1862, Staatsarchiv Hamburg/Hapag-Archiv, 621-1/095, 163, Vol. 1.

contract [with the United States government] or otherwise," as the management noted.[171]

To its regret, Hapag's largest competitor, the North German Lloyd in Bremen, was not able to participate to the same extent in the "large-scale shipping of war material" to North America as its executive board members had hoped. Repair work and delivery delays for two ships prevented Lloyd from participating more extensively in the arms trade with America. As a result, Lloyd's five-figure deficit in the trading year 1861 caused by the lack of emigrants who refrained from crossing into war-torn America and reduced exports of goods due to the war-related drop in demand and increased customs duties could not be compensated for.[172] However, profits from previous years, slowly increasing passenger numbers and income from mail traffic with the United States spurred the shipping company to continue investing in the future. In 1863, Hapag and North German Lloyd moved their joint pier from New York Harbor to Hoboken, New Jersey, opposite the port, due to lack of space.[173]

However, neither Hapag nor the Lloyd were entirely opposed to the establishment of a direct transport route with the South.[174] The two shipping companies did not take part in blockade smuggling with the Confederacy as their ships were too large and not maneuverable enough. But if the Confederate States were to successfully break away from the Union, Lloyd's executive board, for example, planned to establish two routes to North America. One route was to call at the Southern ports, the other at the Northern ports. To this end, the shipping company called an extraordinary general meeting, at which the shareholders approved a bond in the amount of 400,000 thalers, which enabled the Lloyd to build a fourth ship for traffic with North America.[175] Washington's consul in Bremen mocked the fact that the mood in favor of the South on the Weser was so great that it would be more appropriate for the Lloyd to christen its new steamship "Confederacy" rather than "Union" as intended.[176] Cotton also played a role in this decision. Lloyd's board of directors speculated on the boom in cotton transport that was to be expected after peace and the end of the blockade. "It is therefore certainly advantageous and appropriate to be prepared for this eventuality."[177]

Conclusion

The arms trade and cotton smuggling between the coasts of the Atlantic and the North Sea shows that Europe's neutrality during the American

171 Minutes of the Hapag executive board meeting, January 13, 1862, Staatsarchiv Hamburg/Hapag-Archiv, 621-1/095, 163, Vol. 1.

172 General Assembly of Lloyd, April 28, 1862, Archive of North German Lloyd, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 2-R. 11. mm. 4.

173 See Christian Ostersehlte, "Hoboken: Ein Lloydterminal bei New York 1863 bis 1917, "*Bremisches Jahrbuch* 90 (2011): 139-144.

174 Minutes of the Hapag General Assembly, December 2, 1861 and March 19, 1863, Staatsarchiv Hamburg/Hapag-Archiv, 621-1/095, 163, Vol. 1; 621-1/095, 178, Vol. 2.

175 Lloyd General Assembly, December 16, 1861, Archiv des Norddeutschen Lloyd, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 2-R. 11. mm. 4.

176 Johannes Rösing to Heinrich Smidt, August 8, 1862, Bremer Staatsarchiv, Senat B. 13a, Manuscript Materials relating to American History in the German State Archives, Library of Congress.

177 Lloyd General Assembly, 16 December 1861, Archiv des Norddeutschen Lloyd, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 2-R. 11. mm. 4.

Civil War was not necessarily a stabilizer for peace or a guarantee of Europe's non-intervention in the Civil War.[178] "Neutral" German-speaking merchants, arms dealers and cotton importers contributed significantly to the extent and duration of the bloodshed in the United States. The Confederate States imported some 400,000 rifles (of which an estimated one quarter alone came from Austria[179]) — sixty percent of all Confederate small arms used in the Civil War — three million pounds of lead and two million pounds of saltpeter (two thirds of all Confederate gunpowder) from Europe, primarily from the German states and Britain.[180] Added to this were countless tons of food, uniforms, shoes, coal and other war essentials. The Union, too, bought abundantly from European dealers and arsenals: their agents there spent 11.7 million dollars on small arms alone — a quarter of the total expenditure between 1861 and 1866 on weapons in this category.[181]

These enormous figures alone underscore the remarkable niches in which cotton smugglers, shipowners and arms dealers were able to operate in Central Europe during the Civil War. They were extremely flexible, choosing the side that suited their interests, served supply and demand and followed a situational logic based on unpredictability, which is almost always characteristic of dynamic events such as wars.

It was advantageous for Hapag and the Lloyd, for example, that their existing ports of destination were in New York and that the Union needed weapons, while British and French competitors were unable to participate in the sale of weapons to America for a short but decisive period of time. As a result, German shipowners held a temporary monopoly position, which compensated for the lack of income that had been lost due to the collapsed emigration business. The chairmen of the two shipping companies were not blinded by this coincidence, however, and throughout the entire war they kept the possibility of independence for the Southern states in mind.

As stock corporations with numerous shareholders throughout Germany, the Lloyd and Hapag represented "intersections of city, state and nation" whose success or failure had a direct impact on the economic situation of the Hanseatic cities — and beyond.[182] On the one hand, the shipping companies' overseas business prepared potential breeding grounds for private and government ambitions of imperialism,[183] but at the same time those involved acted transnationally, beyond such ambitions, and driven by the prospect of profit. Like almost all entrepreneurs of the "Age of Capital" (Eric Hobsbawm), German shipowners proved

178 See Niels Eichhorn, "North Atlantic Trade in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Case for Peace during the American Civil War," *Civil War History* 61 (2015): 138-172.

179 See Jac Weller, "Imported Confederate Shoulder Weapons," *Civil War History* 5 (1959): 170.

180 See Stephen Wise, *Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running during the Civil War* (Columbia, 1991), 7, 226.

181 See Mark R. Wilson, *The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861-1865* (Baltimore, 2006), 231.

182 See Andreas Schulz, *Vormundschaft und Protektion: Eliten und Bürger in Bremen 1750-1880* (Munich, 2002), 484.

183 See Fitzpatrick, Liberal Imperialism, 75-92; Jay Sexton, "Transport, Sovereignty, and Empire in North America, circa 1850-1885," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 7 (2017): 620-647; Eugene Staley, *War and the Private Investor: A Study in the Relations of International Politics and International Private Investment* (Chicago, 1935), 77-78.

to be extremely flexible actors[184] who were interested in private-sector expansion, unrestricted access to as many markets and resources as possible — even though they encouraged war and supported slavery.

The war had also made it clear to large parts of the population of Central Europe that dependence on one commodity market could prove fatal. The "enormous interdependence" between the Old and the New World had now been brought home to the "seamstress" and the "farmer's wife" as well as to the merchant and the factory owner by the Civil War.[185] Cotton producers urged their governments to look for new, reliable supply markets. In Germany, this pressure came especially from factory owners in Saxony who had experienced first-hand how closely they were entangled with the Atlantic world during the Civil War. This now set the course in the once "merchant-driven world of cotton."[186]

Until the 1860s, the Atlantic world was characterized by private traders and their networks. This changed after 1865. Many Bremen importers, for example, were never able to completely overcome the consequences of the war — in contrast to their colleagues in Hamburg, who were more specialized in trade with South America and thus had a broader portfolio and customer network. The trade in cotton became more independent of location and generally cheaper due to the calls for alternative supply markets (India and Egypt, for example), technical innovations (such as the transatlantic telegraph cable that went into operation in 1866) and the increasing number of large steam ships. German merchants in Germany increasingly communicated directly with cotton producers thanks to the growing interdependence of both continents. The Hanseatic middlemen, who had long acted as "loyal and reliable advisors" to weavers and spinners in Saxony, Bavaria and elsewhere, were marginalized.[187] "The cotton intermediary trade of our place has sunk at a rapid pace, many houses have disappeared from the address book," complained one man from Bremen eleven years after the end of the Civil War, "many traders turn directly to American export companies, the first hand here has become considerably weaker."[188]

This reorganization of the global cotton trade through cooperation, technical innovation and large stock corporations such as the Lloyd or Hapag, and no longer through private hands alone, was a phenomenon that spread to Central Europe as well as to England, France, Portugal, Russia and China. The global economic market experienced an accelerated consolidation due to the war. Private traders and

184 See Lipartito, "Reassembling," 121.

185 *Central-Organ für den deutschen Handelsstand*, February 6, 1864.

186 Beckert, "Emancipation," 1432.

187 *Fragmente über Deutschlands und insbesondere Bayerns Welthandel* (1849), 22.

188 *Deutsches Handelsblatt*, June 8, 1876.

subnational, personal trading networks lost their dominance, and a growing number of capital-rich stock corporations and state trading conglomerates gradually opened up alternative production markets and systematically exploited the inhabitants of these regions led by the "fetish of colonial thinking,"[189] namely promising free labor. Emancipation and imperialism went hand in hand during the Civil War period.[190]

Trade with the Confederacy was financially more profitable than trade with the Union, but the risk of loss was far greater. Although transport to the North may have brought less profit on average, it was less risky to send a ship full of cargo to New York than to Mobile or Galveston. This wartime trade was the domain of private individuals who did this business at their own risk and could not expect protection from their state — proof of the ambivalence that characterized Europe's attitude during the Civil War: for some, the Civil War was the "greatest and most momentous struggle for principles of the nineteenth century,"[191] for others it was a fight for market access.

Governments were often caught between these positions. While Vienna and Berlin asserted their sympathies for Washington, freight carriers and shipping companies loaded ships with weapons from Austrian and Prussian army arsenals, which were exchanged in Wilmington, Havana or Matamoros for cotton and tobacco from slave labor. From this point of view, the diplomatic expressions of sympathy to Washington's representatives seemed like mere lip service, far removed from any politics of opinion: "One is gradually becoming indifferent here to the victory of one or the other," wrote the mayor of Bremen at the end of 1863. The confidential letters of the Union consuls and envoys to one another, few of which survive,[192] also attest to resignation and doubts about Central European support.[193] "Europe is watching to see which side is the strongest. When it has made the discovery, it will back it as also the best and the most moral," wrote John Lothrop Motley to an acquaintance.[194]

A back-door policy prioritizing trade as well as deliberate calculation determined the actions of many of the actors involved in the Civil War in German-speaking Central Europe. This behavior can be better understood if one (again) focuses more strongly on material aspects of Atlantic history and takes into account the enormous share slavery had in it. Seen from this perspective, it becomes evident that for numerous actors the pendulum swung in the opposite direction to the supposed liberalist imperative that demonized the rebellion

189 Andreas Eckert, "Ungleichzeitigkeit, Mobilität und die Transformation von Arbeit: Globalhistorische Perspektiven auf das 19. Jahrhundert," in *Durchbruch der Moderne? Neue Perspektiven auf das 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Birgit Aschmann (Frankfurt, 2019), 288.

190 See Beckert, "Emancipation," 1428.

191 Fritz Anneke, *Der Zweite Freiheitskampf der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika: Erste Abteilung* (Frankfurt, 1861), 5.

192 Arnold Duckwitz to Rudolf Schleiden, November 7, 1863, Nachlass Rudolf Schleiden, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 7,116-2-13.

193 See Anderson to Sanford, October 1861, James H. Anderson Papers; William W. Murphy to John Bigelow, January 31, 1863, Bigelow Correspondence, Union College, Schenectady.

194 John Lothrop Motley to Oliver Wendell Holmes, November 14 1861, *The Correspondence of John Lothrop Motley: Vol. 2*, ed. George William Curtis (New York, 1889), 42-43.

of the South and slavery and seemed to be omnipresent in German-speaking Central Europe after the victory of the Union. The Civil War thus appears not only as a crisis. As cynical as it may sound, it also held tempting economic opportunities.

Translated by Insa Kummer

Patrick Gaul is a former doctoral fellow of the German Historical Institute Washington and of the Leibniz Institute of European History (IEG). He received his PhD in history from Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main. His research focuses on German-American and transnational economic history as well as on the history of racism and migration. His book on the impacts of the American Civil War in German-speaking Europe will be published in the GHI's Transatlantic Historical Studies (THS) series in spring 2021.

A TUMULTUOUS RELATIONSHIP: NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER AND GERMANY IN THE ERA OF THE TWO WORLD WARS[1]

Elisabeth Piller
UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG

The relationship between Germany and the United States in the first half of the twentieth century was a tumultuous one, to say the least. In the era of the two world wars, transatlantic relations oscillated between rivalry and partnership, confrontation and cooperation, resentment and reconciliation. The interactions of German and American academics encapsulated and shaped this volatile relationship: they studied and taught at each other's universities, served their respective nations as cultural diplomats and propagandists, and helped shape national images in elite discourse and public opinion.[2] Importantly, the academic world also embodied the sea change in international prestige and influence that characterized German-American relations at large. By the late nineteenth century, Germany still occupied a preeminent place in international academia, and U.S. universities vied for German contacts and connections. Half a century later, German universities were in spiritual and physical disarray, looking for support to the United States, which had become an economic, political, and academic superpower.

This article explores this tumultuous relationship through the life of one American academic, Nicholas Murray Butler. Butler, a philosophy professor and president of Columbia University from 1902 to 1945, was both a witness to and a key protagonist in German-American relations. Although largely forgotten today, Butler was among the most prominent Americans of his time. Driven by seemingly boundless energy and equally boundless ambition, Butler rose from a middle-class background to become not only Columbia University's longest-serving president but also a well-known champion of international cooperation, serving as a director (since 1910) and president (since 1925) of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and receiving the Nobel Peace prize in 1931. As an avid public speaker, interviewee and writer of opinion pieces (his bibliography includes more than 3,200 published items up to 1932 alone) Butler exerted considerable influence in the public sphere in the United States and beyond.[3] So prominent was Butler in his day that the *New York Times* for decades published his annual Christmas greetings.[4] If Butler's national standing was

1 I would like to thank my colleagues at the University of Manchester's Cultures of Diplomacy Reading Group, including Charlotte Faucher, Christian Goeschel, Mercedes Peñalba-Sotorrío and Tom Allcock, for commenting carefully on an earlier draft of this paper; I would also like to thank Tomás Irish and Charlotte Lerg for sharing my Butler enthusiasm over the years and Tomás for reading and carefully commenting on this paper (and many others this year). Finally, I want to express my appreciation to Axel Jansen, Claudia Roesch and Richard Wetzell of the GHI Washington, who provided useful pointers on how to revise the piece and improve its flow and argument.

2 Anja Werner, *The Transatlantic World of Higher Education: Americans at German Universities, 1776-1914* (New York, 2013).

3 Albert Marrin, *Nicholas Murray Butler* (Boston, 1976), 29.

4 Michael Rosenthal, *Nicholas Miraculous: The Amazing Career of the Redoubtable Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler* (New York, 2006), 10.

Figure 1. Nicholas Murray Butler in Berlin, June 1926. *Der Welt-Spiegel* Nr. 27, 3 (Beilage *Berliner Tageblatt*).

impressive, his international stature was truly astounding. Over the course of his long and active life he accumulated honorary degrees and state decorations from all over Europe. On his annual visits to the Old World, he wined and dined with kings and queens, scientific and intellectual luminaries, statesmen and politicians. Wherever he went, Butler was celebrated and honored as *the* cultural ambassador of the United States. As the Progressive journalist William Allen White wrote about Butler's influence: "Probably no other citizen of this land [the United States] for the last forty years has known so many of the powerful figures of business, education and politics in Europe and the United States. … He has made his private opinion public sentiment probably more definitely than any other living man in this country … ."[5]

And yet, surprisingly little is known about Butler's role in international relations and German-American relations in particular. In contrast to his role in domestic affairs (including Butler's long involvement in educational reform and the Republican party),[6] his engagement with Germany has received only limited and piecemeal attention.[7] Thus Charlotte Lerg recognizes Butler as a determined *university diplomat* who in the decade after 1900 built close ties to German universities

5 Quoted in Marrin, *Nicholas Murray Butler*, 13.

6 Marrin, *Nicholas Murray Butler;* Rosenthal, *Nicholas Miraculous;* Milton Halsey Thomas, *Bibliography of Nicholas Murray Butler, 1872-1932: A Check List* (New York, 1932); A number of focused pieces: Michael M. Sokal (2009), "James McKeen Cattell, Nicholas Murray Butler, and Academic Freedom at Columbia University, 1902–1923," *History of Psychology* 12, no. 2 (2009): 87-122; Charles F. Hewlett, "John Dewey and Nicholas Murray Butler: Contrasting Conceptions of Peace Education in the Twenties," *Educational Theory* 37, no. 4 (1987): 445-461.

7 Joseph Winn, "Nicholas Murray Butler, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Search for Reconciliation in Europe, 1919–1933," *Peace & Change*, 31 (2006): 555-584. David Clinton, "Nicholas Murray Butler and 'The International Mind' as the Pathway to Peace," in *Progressivism and US Foreign Policy between the World Wars,* eds. Molly Cochran and Cornelia Navari (New York, 2017) 49-72; Andrew Williams, „Waiting for Monsieur Bergson: Nicholas Murray Butler, James T. Shotwell, and the French Sage," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 23, no. 2 (2012): 236-253; Nadine Akhund and Stephane Tison, *En guerre pour la paix. Correspondance Paul d'Estournelles de Constant et Nicholas Murray-Butler 1914-1919* (Paris, 2018);

and officials (as well as Western Europe more generally) to advance his own, Columbia University's and America's prestige in the world.[8] During the First World War, as Tomás Irish shows, Butler was at the forefront of integrating American universities in the U.S. war effort and forging a cultural alliance against Germany;[9] from the mid-1920s onward, however, as Katharina Rietzler and Michael Wala demonstrate, Butler once again used the resources of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) and Columbia University to champion reconciliation with Germany and rebuild ties with German universities and officials.[10] These ties he maintained even after 1933 and thereby, as Stephen Norwood argues, helped condone and legitimize Nazi Germany in the United States.[11] While existing scholarship thus conveys the intense and volatile nature of Butler's relationship with Germany, much of what we know remains episodic. Above all, Butler's engagement with Wilhelmine, Weimar and Nazi Germany is usually treated separately, even though personal and cultural relationships do not necessarily align with political periodization.

By contrast, this paper argues that Butler's relationship with Germany — and Germany's relationship with Butler — is best understood through a long-term analysis, covering the period from around 1900 to the late 1930s. What is more, this paper seeks to use Butler's life as a lens to comprehend a complicated German-American relationship beyond its better-known military and political caesura. What makes Butler such an illuminating subject of historical study is his five decade-long involvement with international (academic) relations. Unlike other university presidents of his time, who served much shorter tenures, Butler allows for a long-term perspective on a crucial half-century of German-American relations. And only such a perspective can explain, I believe, why Butler and other internationalists, staunch anti-militarists that they were, seemingly ended up condoning the Third Reich.

On the one hand, this paper treats Butler as representative of a generation of U.S. cultural internationalists, often educators, who used their access to published opinion and academic networks to pursue an informal foreign policy fostering international intellectual cooperation and, thereby, they hoped, lasting peace.[12] On the other hand, the paper explores German attitudes and ambitions towards Butler, approaching them as an indication of German attitudes and ambitions towards the United States more generally. Accordingly, the paper

8 See Charlotte Lerg, *Universitätsdiplomatie. Wissenschaft und Prestige in den transatlantischen Beziehungen, 1890–1920* (Göttingen, 2019).

9 Tomás Irish, *The University at War, 1914-25* (London, 2015), 96-97.

10 Katharina Rietzler, "Philanthropy, Peace Research and Revisionist Politics: Rockefeller and Carnegie Support for the Study of International Relations in Weimar Germany," in *Beyond the Nation: United States History in Transnational Perspective*, eds. Thomas Adam and Uwe Luebken. Supplement 5, *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* (2008): 61–79; Michael Wala, "'Gegen eine Vereinzelung Deutschlands'. Deutsche Kulturpolitik und akademischer Austausch mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika in der Zwischenkriegszeit," in *Deutschland und die USA in der internationalen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, eds. Manfred Berg and Philipp Gassert (Stuttgart, 2004), 303–315.

11 Stephen H. Norwood, *The Third Reich in the Ivory Tower: Complicity and Conflict on American Campuses* (New York, 2009); on Columbia in particular, Stephen H. Norwood, "Complicity and Conflict: Columbia University's Response to Fascism, 1933-1937," *Modern Judaism*, 27, no. 3 (2007): 253-283.

12 On Butler's main theory in that respect see Nicholas Murray Butler, *The International Mind: An Argument for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes* (New York, 1912); see also Clinton, "Nicholas Murray Butler and 'The International Mind.'"

relies as much on Butler's personal papers, university records and Carnegie Endowment materials at the Columbia University Archives as it does on the records of the Prussian Ministry of Culture and the German Foreign Ministry.

By sketching this tumultuous relationship, the paper is part of a larger historiographical trend in diplomatic history, which underlines the significant role of individual transnational actors in international relations. In recent decades, diplomatic historians have begun to look beyond the traditional foreign-policy establishment to ponder the actions and impact of academics, students, foundation officers, missionaries, humanitarians, musicians and even tourists as informal foreign policy actors.[13] Butler's case offers a particularly intriguing window onto such private initiative and influence, and emphasizes the diplomatic potential of transatlantic academic relations in the early twentieth century.[14]

Moreover, tracing Butler's involvement with Germany opens a different perspective on a transatlantic relationship that is often recounted through major political, military, and economic events: The First World War and the Versailles peace treaty, the U.S.-brokered reparations settlements of 1924 (Dawes-Plan) and 1929 (Young-Plan), the Great Depression, and the Second World War.[15] By contrast, this paper foregrounds the cultural dimension of transatlantic relations in two important ways: first, it examines the formative years of American and German cultural diplomacy, its main actors, and the (mis-)perceptions that informed them. Second, it traces the developments in the academic world that accompanied and shaped some of the key events of the period, that is, the confrontation of the era of the Great War, the process of transatlantic reconciliation in the 1920s, and Americans' initial accommodation of Nazi Germany. The paper will analyze Butler's, and the United States' volatile relationship with Germany in three chronological sections, focusing on the pre-war Wilhelmine era, the war and postwar period, including Weimar Germany, and the early Nazi years.

I. Butler, Germany, and transatlantic cultural diplomacy at the turn of the century

Butler's involvement with Germany dates back to the 1880s. An ambitious young man, Butler acquired all the traits he believed necessary to move up in the world early on: a posh accent, immaculate dress,

13 See Jessica Gienow-Hecht, *Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850–1920* (Chicago, 2009); Ian Tyrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire* (Princeton, NJ, 2010); Heather D. Curtis, *Holy Humanitarians. American Evangelicals and Global Aid* (Cambridge, MA, 2018); Christopher Endy, *Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2003); on the academic context, see Ludovic Tournès and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., *Global Exchanges: Scholarships and Transnational Circulations in the Modern World* (New York, 2018), Heather Ellis and Ulrike Kirchberger, eds. *Anglo-German Scholarly Networks in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Leiden, 2014); Paul Kramer, "Is the World Our Campus? International Students and U.S. Global Power in the Long Twentieth Century," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 5 (2009): 775–806.

14 See especially Thomas Adam and Charlotte Lerg, "Diplomacy on campus: the political dimensions of academic exchange in the North Atlantic," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies,* 13, no. 4 (2015): 299-310.

15 Manfred Jonas, *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History* (Ithaca, NY, 1984); Werner Link, *Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1921–32* (Düsseldorf, 1970); Klaus Schwabe, *Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany and Peacemaking* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1985).

a courteous and cosmopolitan demeanor — and a European education. Like 10,000 other Americans in the nineteenth century, Butler (a PhD in philosophy from Columbia University in hand) spent a year at a German university, enrolling at the University of Berlin in 1884. Although Butler would often speak of the profound impact that his German teachers (especially the Neo-Kantian professor of philosophy Friedrich Paulsen) had had on him, it is difficult to ascertain how influential, in terms of his scholarship, his time abroad truly was.[16] What is certain, however, is that his European education gave him a proficiency in French and German, strengthened his interest in world affairs, and aided his steep career at Columbia. A philosophy instructor at the tender age of 23, Butler became professor and dean of the Faculty of Philosophy five years later; then, in 1902, now 39 years old, he became president of the university — a post he would hold until 1945.

At this point, at the very latest, Butler began to renew his relationship with Germany. Butler was part of a group of enterprising university presidents who sought to reform U.S. higher learning and aimed to turn their universities into leading research institutions.[17] To this end, they recognized that establishing closer ties with Europe's and particularly Germany's world-renowned institutions of higher learning could help raise their universities' academic profile, global visibility and, by extension, enrollments and endowment.[18] In the summer of 1905, Butler thus ventured to Germany, where he managed to meet with Emperor Wilhelm II and Friedrich Althoff, the official in charge of Prussian universities. There, he successfully concluded an agreement for a German-American professorial exchange to be based at Columbia University and the University of Berlin respectively. In the following years, Butler turned Columbia University into a U.S. hub for relations with German science and culture: In 1906 and 1907 he served as president of the recently founded Germanistic Society of America, in 1911 he opened a *Deutsches Haus* at Columbia, and he welcomed and honored German academics and ambassadors on campus on a regular basis.[19]

Butler's search for German ties was doubtlessly driven by real enthusiasm for Germany and German culture. Like many Americans of his class and education, Butler cherished and conspicuously consumed European culture. What is more, his conversations and lunches with Wilhelm II in the summer of 1905 had greatly flattered and impressed Butler and he would remember them fondly as late as 1939.[20] A second factor, however, was Butler's lively competition

16 See Butler's foreword in *Friedrich Paulsen: An Autobiography*, trans. and ed. Theodor Lorenz (New York, 1938).

17 Laurence Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago, 1970)

18 This process is covered in detail in Lerg, *Universitätsdiplomatie*.

19 See Columbia University Library, Rare Books & Manuscript Library [CUL], Spec MS Coll 0255 Columbia University. Deutsches Haus Records.

20 Nicholas Murray Butler, *Across the Busy Years*, Vol 2, 56-77; A detailed account in Butler to John Burgess, August 13, 1905, CUL, Box 319/2, Burgess, John William.

with other American university presidents such as Charles W. Eliot of Harvard, William R. Harper of Chicago or Benjamin I. Wheeler of the University of California.[21] It was Harvard University's agreement for a professorial exchange with the University of Berlin in late 1904 that prompted Butler's trip to Germany just a few months later. Yet, for Butler — and this *was* exceptional — his pursuit of German connections was also a means of *cultural diplomacy*. In the more than forty years of his Columbia presidency, Butler would use the university's resources, its access to international networks, and the prestige of academic ritual to boost not only his own and Columbia's but also the United States' visibility and influence in the world. Above all, Butler believed that intellectual exchange between Germany and the United States could help educate their respective publics to develop greater knowledge and appreciation of each other's culture and to think in terms of international cooperation — what Butler famously called "the International Mind." Ultimately, the professorial exchange was part of a cultural initiative intended to maintain German-American "friendship" just as geopolitical conflict in Latin America began to sour their relationship around the turn of the century.[22]

Butler's political agenda is evident from the set-up of Columbia's professorial exchange with Berlin, particularly those aspects in which it differed from Harvard's: unlike at Harvard, where German exchange professors taught classes in their academic specialty and in German, the exchange professorship at Columbia was geared towards a wider public impact, focusing on German current affairs, and professors taught in English. Moreover, the exchange professors did not hail from Columbia or Berlin alone but were recruited countrywide, serving as national, not institutional representatives. The exchange's self-declared *national* mission was also apparent from its name: with the consent of the German emperor and the American president, the German professor in New York held the title of *Kaiser-Wilhelm-Professor of German History and Institutions,* while the American professor in Berlin held the *Theodore-Roosevelt-Professorship of American History and Institutions.* Accordingly, as Butler himself proudly declared, the exchange was less an academic than a diplomatic arrangement. As he wrote to Friedrich Schmidt-Ott, Althoff's successor in the Prussian Ministry of Culture:

> My conception of the Roosevelt Professorship is that it represents an exchange not between institutions but between nations [… and] it is this characteristic of the Roosevelt

21 On Harvard and German universities, see Franziska von Ungern-Sternberg, *Deutschland und Amerika. Das Germanische Museum in Cambridge, Mass. Kulturpolitik zwischen den Kontinenten* (Cologne, 1994).

22 Jörg Nagler, "From Culture to Kultur: Changing American Perceptions of Imperial Germany, 1870–1914," in *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America since 1776*, ed. David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt, 131–154 (New York, 1997).

> Professorship that gives to it a special meaning and a special distinction.[23]

For Butler, then, academic relations were always part and parcel of international politics. At a time when there was no official U.S. cultural diplomacy to speak of, informal actors like Butler confidently stepped in and used their own means — their cultural capital, access to university endowments, and broad transnational contacts — to bolster U.S. influence and visibility in the world. At least as far as Butler was concerned, this amounted to a deliberate act of informal foreign policy making. It is indicative of Butler's vision (and his ego) that he repeatedly likened Columbia to a U.S. Ministry of Culture.[24]

At the same time these developments shed light on the early days of German cultural diplomacy. Transatlantic projects like the professorial exchange after 1900 derived from a mutuality of Butler's and German interests.[25] Prussian officials shared Butler's quasi-diplomatic understanding of international academic relations, or at least parts of it. Since about the turn of the century, the Prussian Ministry of Culture and Wilhelm II had begun to pursue an active cultural diplomacy towards the United States, including support for prestigious projects like the Germanic Museum at Harvard (1902), the professorial exchanges with Harvard and Columbia (1904/05), and the *Deutsches Haus* at Columbia (1911). The impetus behind these measures was clearly political, intending to use cultural ties to improve the deteriorating German-American relationship.[26] Prussian officials drew on what they considered Germany's unique influence at U.S. universities in the hope of swaying American elites in Germany's favor, or at least slowing their drift towards Germany's imperial rivals, France and Great Britain.[27] In the official German mind, well-connected alumni of German universities like Butler were seen as crucial, staunchly Germanophile partners in this task, whose promotion of and apparent devotion to German culture they rewarded with significant social courtesies and state honors. In 1910, for example, Butler received an honorary doctorate from the University of Berlin and was inducted into the Order of the Red Eagle, the highest honor the Prussian state awarded to foreigners.[28] Germans were not alone in considering Butler to be highly receptive to such flattery. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, found Butler one of those Americans "wholly unable to withstand contact with royalty."[29]

23 Butler to Schmidt-Ott, Oct 6, 1910, GSPK, NL Schmidt(-Ott), 418 Butler, New York, Korrespondenz 1909–15.

24 Butler to Schmidt-Ott, June 16, 1911, CUL, University Archives, Rare Books & Manuscript Library, Central Files: Box 338/Friedrich Schmidt.

25 Bernhard vom Brocke, "Der Deutsch-Amerikanische Professorenaustausch. Preußische Wissenschaftspolitik, internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und die Anfänge einer deutschen auswärtigen Kulturpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg," *Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch* 31, no. 2 (1981): 128-182, 150.

26 See Nagler, "From Culture to Kultur," and Nancy Mitchell, *The Danger of Dreams. German and American Imperialism in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999).

27 Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, "Die politische Funktionalisierung der Kultur: der deutsch-amerikanische Professorenaustausch 1904–1914," in *Zwei Wege in die Moderne: Aspekte der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen 1900–1918*, eds. Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase and Jürgen Heideking (Trier, 1997), 45–88.

28 "Butler Honored By Kaiser. Prominent at Berlin Centenary", *Columbia Spectator*, Oct. 17, 1910, 6.

29 Quoted from Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, "The Uses of 'Friendship'. The 'Personal Regime' of Wilhelm II and Theodore Roosevelt, 1901–1909," in *The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II's Role in Imperial Germany*, eds. Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist (Cambridge, 2003), 143–175, 150.

And yet, in hindsight, Butler's relationship with Germany also encapsulates German-American misunderstandings of that period. For one, Germans fundamentally misjudged the nature of Butler's and American academia's attachment to Germany. Their actions rested on a feeling of superiority and the belief that the thousands of Americans educated at German universities had given Germany special influence in a country that the Germans regarded as an intellectual backwater, a cultural colony of Europe. As the German ambassador to Washington, Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, remarked dismissively shortly before the First World War: "today an American culture does not yet exist. After a short acquaintance with any American, it is soon clear whether his culture is of English, German or French origin."[30] German characterization of Butler as a "Germanophile" reflected such zero-sum-thinking, and made Germans blind to the fact that U.S. academics and university presidents like Butler strove to "internationalize," not to "Germanize" the American campus.[31] Indeed, whereas German academics hoped to maintain their allegedly exclusive position on the American campus, Butler welcomed a French house (the *Maison Française* was opened on campus in 1913), French exchange professors and French honors with equal enthusiasm.[32] In the decade before the war, Butler concluded professorial exchanges not just with Germany but also with France, the Netherlands, Japan and Austria; in the same vein, he assumed the presidency not only of the *Germanistic Society*, but also of the (Anglo-American) *Pilgrims Society* and the *France-America Society* (as well as a dozen others). If anything, Butler's cultural internationalism was informed not by Germanophilia but by U.S. exceptionalism.[33] Irrespective of his regard for European culture, Butler saw American education and culture as soon to be on par with Europe, and with many of its own ideas and principles to impart on what seemed an excessively militarist Old World. It comes as no surprise, then, that Butler grew increasingly impatient with German arrogance, as can be seen from his complaints to Berlin about sending only second-rate German professors to Morningside Heights. In February 1913, for example, he complained to the Prussian Ministry about "Prof. [Felix] Krueger of Halle" whom he characterized as "an agreeable little man of very ordinary capacity [but] in no sense the intellectual or academic equal of the men who we were sending as Roosevelt-professors."[34] Ultimately, Butler's annoyance indicated the different premises and objectives of German and American cultural diplomacy: Whereas Germans saw initiatives like the professorial exchange as an opportunity to cement their preeminent academic position and gain public influence, Americans like Butler considered

30 German Embassy Washington to Reichskanzler von Bethmann-Hollweg, Jan. 8, 1914, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts [PA] Botschaft Washington, 1523, Bernstorff. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are the author's.

31 On this tendency, see Elisabeth Piller, "The Transatlantic Dynamics of European Cultural Diplomacy: Germany, France and the Battle for U.S. Affections in the 1920s," *Contemporary European History*, forthcoming 2021.

32 Robert J. Young, *Marketing Marianne: French Propaganda in America, 1900–1940* (New Brunswick, NJ, 2004); German observations of French advances in: PA, Botschaft Washington 449, Akten betreffend das Schulwesen (auch Fortbildungsschulen) und Universitäten, Vol 7, 1907–1908.

33 Butler, "Are We Our Brothers' Keepers? Opening Address as Chairman of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, May 18, 1910," in *The International Mind*, 45–66, esp. 62–66.

34 See Butler to Wilhelm Paszkowski, February 13, 1913, GSPK VI HA NL Schmidt-Ott 481 Professorenaustausch, deutsche und amerikanische Universitäten; see also Lerg, *Universitätsdiplomatie,* 360.

it a step towards academic parity and U.S. ascendancy. These different motivations, the coexistence of competition and cooperation, [35] explain some of the vitality of German-American cultural relations in the decade before the First World War, just as they would inform transatlantic antagonisms after 1914.

II. War and peace in the academic world, 1914–1932

The First World War occasioned a deep rift in Butler's and America's relationship with Germany, and one that would take well over a decade to mend. American academics began to drift away from Germany and into the Allied camp well before the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies in April of 1917. Butler's case illustrates some of the dynamics and the emotions behind this wartime cultural mobilization and its complicated legacy for German-American reconciliation in the 1920s.

1. Butler and transatlantic mobilizations after 1914

Like many Americans, Butler was caught in the middle of the European conflict from August 1914. For Butler this was true in an emotional sense as well as in a physical sense — he was on vacation in Europe in early August.[36] The outbreak of the war shattered the academic internationalism of prewar decades and ideologically divided the scientific community.[37] In all belligerent countries, members of the academic community joined the national war effort as soldiers, scientists and propagandists. In the latter capacity they promoted their national cause at home and abroad and tried to win the support of the most important neutral nation, the United States.[38] In late August 1914 Butler returned to New York City to find his desk laden with letters from European friends and acquaintances, all of them expecting him to listen sympathetically to their arguments and, ultimately, take their side. As could be expected, German officials and academics, too, readily identified Butler as a potential asset in winning U.S. favor and consequently made him a primary addressee of their myriad pamphlets, letters, and manifestos.[39] In the most (in) famous of these, the *Manifesto of the Ninety-Three,* ninety-three German intellectuals and artists threw their cultural prestige behind the German war effort and tried to refute British "lies": they defended the German invasion of neutral Belgium as a military necessity, denied that any atrocities had occurred, and belabored the heroic unity of the German people.[40] Just what German academics expected their American peers to make of these proclamations was clear from one

35 On the theme of cooperation and competition in German-American academic relations see Emily J. Levine, "Baltimore Teaches, Göttingen Learns: Cooperation, Competition, and the Research University," *The American Historical Review* 121, no. 3 (2016): 780–823.

36 Nicholas Murray Butler, *Across the Busy Years*, Vol 2, (New York, 1940) 247-264.

37 See Marie-Eve Chagnon and Tomás Irish, eds. *The Academic World in the Era of the Great War* (London, 2018).

38 M. L. Sanders, "Wellington House and British Propaganda During the First World War," *The Historical Journal* 18, no. 1 (1975): 119-146; Charlotte Lerg, "Off Campus: German Propaganda Professors in America, 1914-1917," in *The Academic World*, eds. Chagnon and Irish, 21-41.

39 See for example the correspondence in GSPK, VI HA NL Schmidt-Ott 541 Amerika Verschiedenes.

40 Wolfgang and Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg, *Der Aufruf "An die Kulturwelt!": Das Manifest der 93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart, 1996).

appeal stating that "the universities of America know what German culture means to the world, so we trust they will stand by Germany."[41]

Needless to say, this turned out to be a striking misjudgment. U.S. elites, especially on the Eastern seaboard, rather quickly adopted an anti-German or at least pro-Allied position. Not only did they hold Germany responsible for the war but they were also repelled by the German invasion of neutral Belgium, the German army's atrocities against civilians and the destruction of cultural landmarks such as the university library of Louvain.[42] What is more, they experienced German scholars' defense, indeed, denial of these deeds as an act of moral bankruptcy. Already by late October, the sociologist Charles Elwood (an alumnus of the University of Berlin) found that Germany had lost the favor of about 90 per cent of American academics "in spite of the traditional influence of Germany over American universities."[43] Indeed, many American scholars who had previously entertained close relations with Germany, such as former Harvard President Charles W. Eliot, railed publicly against German "militarism" and accused German scholars of being complicit in a war of aggression.[44]

By contrast, Butler exemplifies a more cautious academic response. He adopted a moderate position that was shaped by his German ties, pacifist conviction and belief in American exceptionalism. He considered the war a senseless tragedy, but attributed it — at least initially — not to any one nation but to European militarism more generally. When he opened the academic year at Columbia in September 1914, Butler shared his deep regret about a war that had been started "by kings and by cabinets" and had been accepted by the "masses of population" only with "grim resignation."[45] To illustrate his point, Butler shared a personal anecdote that would prove fateful for his relationship with Germany:

> The most significant statement that I heard in Europe was made to me on the third day of August last by a German railway servant, a grizzled veteran of the Franco-Prussian war. In reply to my question as to whether he would have to go to the front, the old man said: "No; I am too old. I am seventy-two. But my four boys went yesterday, God help them! and I hate to have them go." "For, Sir,"" he added in a lowered voice, "this is not a people's war; it is a kings' war, and when it is over there may not be so many kings."[46]

41 "Scientists Plead Germany's Cause. Professors Ask Universities of America to Stand by Kaiser," *New York Tribune*. Sep 25, 1914, 3.

42 Nicoletta F. Gullace, "Sexual Violence and Family Honor: British Propaganda and International Law during the First World War," *American Historical Review* 102, no. 3 (Jun. 1997): 714–747, 717.

43 Charles A. Elwood, "Germany and American Opinion," *The Sociological Review* 8 (1915): 106–111.

44 See the correspondence between Charles Eliot and Jacob Schiff in *New York Times Current History, the European War*, Vol 1, 465-472, and Dr. Eliot's Third Letter (Sept 28, 1914), "Why is America anti-German?," 482-486.

45 *Address of President Butler at the Opening Exercises of the Academic Year of Columbia University, Sept. 23, 1914* (New York, 1914), 6.

46 *Address of President Butler*, 6.

Although Germans would soon focus on the allegedly insulting character of this anecdote, Butler arguably told it not to indict Germany but to argue that enlightened world opinion (the "International Mind") and U.S. mediation could facilitate a lasting peace. In an interview with the *New York Times* a few weeks later he predicted that the war would bring a more democratic future to Europe and proclaimed the United States "the first moral power in the world today."[47] Like President Wilson, Butler saw the war as a chance for U.S. moral leadership and, like him, initially believed that such leadership required continued U.S. neutrality.

Acting on this conviction, Butler sought at first to play the role of honest broker between Germany and the United States. In letters, articles and interviews he tried to explain the German position to Americans and vice versa.[48] In particular, he attempted to convince his German friends that anti-German sentiment in the United States was not (as they believed) the result of British misinformation but a justified response to German actions. Holding on to the popular notion of "two Germanies," that is, the idea that there was a lofty Germany of scholarship, music and a jovial people and another Germany of excessive military drill and autocratic government, he tried to assure his German interlocutors that Americans blamed German leaders and not the German people. As he wrote to a German friend,

> the terrible war keeps me awake at night [...] There is everywhere expressed the profoundest admiration and the deepest sympathy for the German people, but at the same time American public opinion is almost unanimously in favor of the Allies (even among those who know Germany well and love her most) because it is felt that the policy of militarism has far more power in Germany, Austria and Russia than anywhere else in the world and that unless the Allies are successful the power of militarism will increase and not diminish.[49]

Throughout the first months of the war, Butler thus made a clear effort to maintain a degree of even-handedness, to clear up "misunderstandings," or at least to couch his disapproval in conciliatory language. Such a position, however, was doomed to failure.

Butler's stance drew heavy criticism on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, the champions of preparedness, that is, advocates of U.S. war preparation, including Butler's former friend Theodore

47 "The United States of Europe. Interview with Nicholas Murray Butler," *New York Times Current History* Vol 1 (1915): 565-571, 571.

48 Butler to Schmidt-Ott, Oct 28, 1914, Central Files: Box 338/Friedrich Schmidt; University Archives, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library.

49 Butler to Paszkowski, Sept 22, 1914, VI HA NL Schmidt-Ott 418 Butler, New York, Korrespondenz 1909–15; Butler to Paszkowski, May 20, 1915, VI HA NL Schmidt-Ott 418 Butler, New York, Korrespondenz 1909–15.

Roosevelt, accused him of "playing the game of the pacifists and the German-Americans in this country, who wish and who are in effect doing all they can to put our weight behind Germany."[50] Meanwhile Butler's German friends were equally indignant. They considered his equation of Germany with militarism and his distinction between German leaders and the German people highly offensive. To German minds, Butler's harmless anecdote about the railroad employee was nothing short of a "falsification of the attitude of the German people" (as Schmidt-Ott reported to Wilhelm II)[51] and an indication that "he has with concealed (if not with open) colors defected to the other [Allied] camp."[52] Despite Butler's repeated offer to continue the professorial exchange, the Prussian Ministry chose to terminate it, and most other transatlantic interaction, in May 1915.[53]

These experiences left a bad aftertaste for all involved. Responding to the termination of the professorial exchange, Henry Walcott Farnam of Yale University, who had also received part of his education in Germany, and was the designated Roosevelt Professor for 1915, related to Butler:

> the sudden emergence of what seems almost like an opaque wall between the standards of my German friends and my own, the difficulty if not impossibility of ever again having that same feeling of interest and sympathy in German life and history which I have cherished since my boyhood, all belong to the imponderable yet very real losses of the year [...].[54]

This feeling of disappointment was shared on the other side of the Atlantic. "America," Schmidt-Ott complained to a German professor just a few weeks later, "is a hopeless case [...] You would not believe the nonsense that Mr. Butler and others have been writing in their letters. And the moral superiority of that nation has become nearly insufferable."[55] The professorial exchange, begun as an experiment in international understanding, thus ended in discord and disillusionment.

In the broader context of the First World War, Butler's experience is important for two reasons. First, it illustrates a larger rift in the academic world. During the first year of the war, German-American academic contact withered as both sides felt increasingly separated by an "opaque wall" of different standards and interpretations. By the time a German submarine sank the British ocean liner *Lusitania*

50 *Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur Hamilton Lee*. January 22, 1915. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. LoC Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o211490. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University.

51 Schmidt-Ott to Wilhelm II, Nov 8, 1914, GSPK, I HA Rep 89 13367 Förderung der geistigen Beziehungen zu Amerika, Vol. 3, 1914–1916.

52 Kühnemann, Abschrift, Oct 3, 1914, GSPK VI HA NL Schmidt-Ott 411 Kühnemann, Berichte von amerik. Universitäten 1909–17.

53 Butler to Schmidt-Ott, November 30 1914, Central Files; Box 338/Friedrich Schmidt; University Archives, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library.

54 Farnam to Butler, May 27, 1915, Columbia University, Central Files; Box 665/Farnam, University Archives, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library.

55 Schmidt-Ott to Dobschuetz, Jun 17, 1915 NL Schmidt-Ott 420, GSPK.

in May 1915 with more than one hundred Americans on board — a turning point in U.S. sentiment towards Germany — German and American scholars had for the most part stopped communicating already.[56] Second, Butler's case underlines an often overlooked, but defining feature of this development: its deeply emotional nature. This is particularly apparent from German (over)reactions: Butler's harmless anecdote about the Franco-Prussian war veteran, for example, sparked an official investigation to find that railroad employee.[57] To be sure, wartime patriotism and accusations of German "war guilt" made Germans hypersensitive to criticism anyway; but they took particular offense at the disapproval emanating from U.S. universities because American academics seemed to owe so much to German universities. Thus they considered Butler's neutralist position not just a disagreement among friends but an act of ingratitude, even betrayal.

As a consequence, the lessons many German scholars drew from U.S. rejections were radical: all efforts to win American academic favor would have to cease immediately, never to be taken up again. German prestige, a vocal group of professors argued, had only suffered from a decade's courtship of what they saw as an academically inferior United States; the wartime animosity at Columbia and Harvard, the focal points of these efforts, had revealed its utter fruitlessness.[58] "If one should ever try to re-establish [the professorial exchange]," Eduard Meyer, a well-known historian and former German exchange professor at Harvard, declared in February 1915, "it is to be hoped that no German professor would stoop so low as to respond to a call to read at one of these universities."[59] Ultimately, the bitter disappointment of German academics and officials demonstrated just how fundamentally they had misjudged both German influence and the "Germanophilia" of men like Butler.

American reactions, too, were the result of misperception and emotion. In particular, Americans failed to see that the myriad pronouncements of German professors were not so much the product of a uniquely militarist mindset as they were a defensive overreaction by men who felt (physically and propagandistically) "encircled" by enemies. They also failed to show much concern for the fact that German professors signed such appeals not in their capacity as scholars but as self-appointed representatives of the German nation.[60] Hence, they judged German claims about the defensive nature of the German war effort and their outright denial of German atrocities in Belgium, each of them made without any robust evidence, not only a violation

56 Carol Gruber, *Mars and Minerva: World War I and the Uses of Higher Learning* in America. (Baton Rouge, LA, 1975), 71–72; on the Lusitania: Frank Trommler, "The Lusitania Effect: America's Mobilization against Germany in World War I," *German Studies Review* 32, no. 2 (2009): 241–266.

57 Paszkowski to Schmidt-Ott, Dec 28, 1914, GSPK, VI HA NL Schmidt-Ott 420.

58 See "Selbstachtung vor den Neutralen!," *Kriegshefte der Süddeutschen Monatshefte* (Dec 1914), 415; "Das Ausländertum an den deutschen Hochschulen," *Der Tag*, June 15, 1915, clipping in GSPK, I HA Rep 89 13367 Förderung der geistigen Beziehungen zu Amerika, Vol 3, 1914–1916; Ludwig Fulda, *Amerika und Deutschland während des Weltkrieges* (Leipzig, 1916), 19–20.

59 Eduard Meyer, *Leipziger Illustrierte Zeitung*, Feb. 18, 1915, reprinted in Eduard Meyer, *Nordamerika und Deutschland*, 9–10 (Berlin, 1915).

60 Klaus Schwabe, *Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral. Die deutschen Hochschullehrer und die politischen Grundfragen des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Göttingen, 1969).

of *moral* but also *academic* standards. Worse still, they considered German scholars' flimsy arguments (and their apparent belief that American scholars would readily swallow them) as a studied insult to their intelligence — and one symptomatic of German intellectual arrogance towards Americans. Albion Small, one of America's most influential sociologists, and, again, an alumnus of the University of Berlin, expressed just how "difficult it is for us to believe that men whom we have regarded a paragons of scientific methods can so flagrantly abandon the elements of critical procedure, unless they assume that Americans are incapable of detecting plain substitution of opinion for reality."[61] In all, these academic divisions finally laid bare the different understandings of the transatlantic academic relationship: whereas Germans expected loyalty from their American "students," Americans expected intellectual respect from their German "peers." It was these disappointed assumptions that made the German-American falling out so very bitter.

This rift in the academic world held a larger significance for transatlantic affairs. As Butler's example shows, the academic and diplomatic worlds had become entangled in the prewar decades and they continued to converge after 1914. Academics figured prominently in home front mobilization the world over.[62] Their cultural authority, international experience and access to published opinion helped shape public discourse. German observers considered former Harvard President Charles Eliot the "most dangerous, most conniving of our enemies and, because of the authority that his words carry in the United States, a hostile army corps."[63] Little wonder, then, that academic antagonisms percolated through to transatlantic politics. In Germany, the experience of American rejection radicalized many German scholars into increasingly uncompromising positions. U.S. ingratitude and the obvious futility of German friendship initiatives convinced them that only a "hardball" approach would get the desired results in the United States — in the academic as in the diplomatic and military worlds. It is no coincidence that an adamant nationalist like historian Eduard Meyer became a key proponent of unrestricted submarine warfare. He used his considerable scholarly authority and first-hand knowledge of the United States to help legitimize the position of those German leaders (such as Erich Ludendorff) who were eager to downplay U.S. military potential in the long debate leading up to the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare, a policy that would eventually draw the United States into the war in April 1917.[64] Thus academic alienation came to affect German *Amerikapolitik* at large.

61 "German Professors Insult American Intelligence says Albion W. Small." *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Jan 10, 1915; similar: "German Propaganda Answered. Dean Edgar Brandon of Miami University Resents Its Slight Upon American Intelligence." *New York Times*, Jan 13, 1915, 8; and Peabody to Schmidt-Ott, Oct 20, 1914, GSPK VI HA NL Schmidt-Ott, 420.

62 On mobilization see John Horne, ed. *State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War* (Cambridge, 1997).

63 Kühnemann to Schmidt-Ott, Sep 22, 1914, GSPK VI HA, NL Schmidt-Ott, 411.

64 Manfred Nebelin, *Ludendorff. Diktator im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 2011), 300.

A similar process was observable in the United States. Many American academics culturally mobilized against Germany long before the United States entered the war, and they began to move closer to British and French universities in a way that presaged the alliance of 1917.[65] When the United States finally joined the Allied war effort, it did so not only economically and militarily but also culturally: German books were banned from libraries, the German language erased from school and university curricula and German music from concert halls. American academics, often German-trained, joined the U.S. propaganda effort, mobilizing a reluctant nation against German barbarism.[66] At Columbia, Butler erased all traces of German influence (including the closure of the *Deutsches Haus* in 1917) and transformed his campus into an ideological and physical recruiting ground for the American Expeditionary Force.[67] His volte-face resulted from emotions, convictions and ambitions alike. Clearly, Butler's personal disappointment fueled his growing belief that a defeat of Germany was tantamount to the defeat of militarism and hence every true pacifist's duty.[68] At the same time, joining the American war effort promised Butler and his university the visibility and prestige that German connections previously had.[69]

2. Butler and the difficult demobilization of minds

If Butler's relationship with Germany offers insights into the transatlantic dynamics of cultural mobilization during the Great War, his slow reconciliation with the defeated nation in the 1920s underlines the difficult demobilization of minds thereafter.[70] Butler's example illustrates the psychological hurdles of finding common ground in the postwar years, just as it attests to the important role that cultural relations would eventually play in fostering transatlantic accord. It shows, too, that the German-American rapprochement of the 1920s, often attributed to financial entanglements and shared economic interests, had a notable cultural dimension.[71]

The demobilization of minds after the war was extremely difficult. This was the case even though there were good reasons on both sides to quickly renew transatlantic relations. Certainly, Germans and Americans alike should have had a vested interest in renewing their academic relationship. Germany, for its part, looked to win the support of a newly influential United States in revising the Versailles Treaty, particularly the reparations provisions.[72] Since it was widely

65 German unrestricted submarine warfare, its campaign of sabotage and espionage in the United States, and a number of diplomatic blunders alienated many Americans and ultimately led the U.S. to join the war against Germany in April 1917; see Michael Neiberg, *The Path to War: How the First World War Created Modern America* (New York, 2016).

66 George Blakely, *Historians on the Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War* (Lexington, KY, 1970).

67 Irish, *The University at War,* 96-97.

68 "How to obtain lasting peace: 'by victory only' declared Nicholas Murray Butler; military defeat of Germany necessary, he says; 'World is at war with an idea'—His formula", *Los Angeles Times*, Feb 17, 1918.

69 Irish, *The University at War,* 105; Lerg, *Universitätsdiplomatie,* 554.

70 Daniel Kevles, "'Into Hostile Political Camps': the Reorganization of International Science in World War I," *Isis* 62, no. 1 (1971): 47–60.

71 For a detailed discussion see Piller, *Selling Weimar. German Public Diplomacy and the United States* (Stuttgart, 2020).

72 Manfred Berg, "Germany and the United States: The Concept of World Economic Interdependence," in *Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in* 1922, eds. Carole Fink, Axel Frohn et al. (New York, 1991), 77–93.

recognized that Washington would be unwilling to exert itself on behalf of Germany as long as U.S. opinion remained hostile to Germany, this should have suggested a concerted German effort at public diplomacy, including the resumption of academic exchange.[73] Likewise, Butler and U.S. cultural internationalists should have had a special interest in Germany. In the early 1920s, they began to use the United States' unprecedented influence and cultural resources to pacify and stabilize an ailing continent, often acting in lieu of an "isolationist" U.S. government.[74] In light of Germany's alleged penchant for militarism and autocracy, it would have been logical to center at least part of this internationalist agenda on the fledgling Weimar Republic.

And yet, German-American academic contacts remained sparse in the postwar years. In fact, Butler's hopes for lasting peace at first rested on continued cooperation with America's wartime allies, which he pursued through myriad cultural ventures.[75] In the early 1920s, Butler used the Carnegie Endowment's and Columbia University's funds to support the reconstruction of the libraries at Reims, Louvain and Belgrade (victims of the Central Powers), established student exchange programs with British, Italian and French universities and feted Allied war heroes like Marshall Foch on and off campus.[76] At the same time, Butler kept the utmost distance from Germany and German scholars and even encouraged their exclusion from international scientific and academic organizations (and the League of Nations) in 1919, believing that they should show some repentance before being readmitted to the international community.[77] Thus Butler rebuffed a more conciliation-minded Swedish colleague in an open letter of April 1919,

> We [American academics] have not forgotten the amazing prostitution of scholarship and science to national lust marked by the formal appeal to the civilized world made by German professors in September 1914. That appeal was an unmixed mess of untruths, and the stain which it placed upon the intellectual and moral integrity of German schol-

73 AA to Nadolny (Stockholm), Apr. 28, 1921, PA R 64979.

74 Butler to Stresemann, Nov 13, 1925, CEIP, Box 35 4–5 Butler Correspondence, 1908–1925, Columbia University, Rare Book & Manuscript Library Collections; on U.S. informal influence in the interwar period see Winn, "Nicholas Murray Butler"; Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York, 1982); Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933* (Ithaca, NY, 1984); Liping Bu, *Making the World Like US. Education, Cultural Expansion and the American Century* (Westport, CT, 2003), 51-83; Helke Rausch, "Akademische Vernetzung als politische Intervention in Europa. Internationalismus-Strategien US-amerikanischer Stiftungen in den 1920er Jahren," *Jahrbuch für Universitätsgeschichte* 18 (2015): 163-186.

75 On Butler's opinion of the peace treaty, see "Calls Treaty Epoch-Making: German Militarism Dead Forever Says Nicholas Murray Butler." *New York Times*, May 08, 1919; on the "qualified internationalism" that French, British and American universities fashioned, see Tomás Irish, "From International to Interallied: Transatlantic University Relations in the Era of the First World War, 1905–1920," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 13, no. 4 (2015): 311–325.

76 Nicholas Murray Butler, *In Honor of Marshal Foch. Address as President of the France-America Society at the Banquet in Honor of Marshal Foch Hotel Waldorf Astoria, November 19, 1921* (New York, 1921); Embassy Washington to AA, "Jahresbericht des Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924," Apr 23, 1925, PA Botschaft Washington, 1548.

77 Nicholas Murray Butler, "American Opinion and the Problems of Peace," *International Conciliation* (Special Bulletin) 134a (New York: 1919), 8.

> ars and men of science will forever remain one of the most deplorable, discouraging events of the war which German militarism and Prussian autocracy forced upon the peaceful and liberty-loving nations of the world.[78]

As a consequence, contacts with German universities and scholars remained rare in the early 1920s and the few American projects that invited German participation (such as the Carnegie Endowment's survey of European school textbooks in 1922) often ended up perpetuating the bias they were officially committed to overcome.[79]

Figure 2. Columbia University President Nicholas Murray Butler reading a message to Marshal Foch before conferring on him the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws, November 19, 1921. French ambassador Jusserand is seen on the left. ©Columbia University Archives.

But Germany made no efforts to get in touch with academic opinion-shapers like Butler either. While German diplomats saw renewed scholarly exchange as highly desirable, German academics remained culturally mobilized, indeed, remobilized in response to the Versailles Treaty. Feeling wrongfully excluded from the world of scholarship, they responded to their expulsion from international scientific organizations in 1919 (what German scholars called the scientific "boycott") with an increasingly organized "counter-boycott," often demanding tokens of pro-Germanness and recognition of the "injustice" perpetrated upon Germany before deigning to reenter international cooperation.[80] Under these circumstances, no meaningful transatlantic cooperation, let alone cultural diplomacy resumed in the early 1920s. Butler's non-relationship with Germany — and Germany's non-relationship with Butler — attests to the difficulties of re-establishing cordial transatlantic ties, even and especially among those who had known each other well. As late as 1923, the German embassy in Washington considered U.S. universities a bulwark of

78 "Butler Arraigns German Scholars," *New York Times*, April 19, 1919, 17.

79 Tomás Irish, "Peace through History? The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Inquiry into European Schoolbooks, 1921–24," *History of Education* 45, no. 1 (2016): 38–56.

80 Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus, "Internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 1919–1933. Vom Boykott und Gegenboykott zu ihrer Wiederaufnahme," in *Forschung im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Gesellschaft. Geschichte und Struktur der Kaiser-Wilhelm- und Max Planck-Gesellschaft*, eds. Rudolf Vierhaus and Rüdiger vom Bruch (Stuttgart, 1990), 858–885.

anti-German sentiment. "Nowhere," noted one official report, "are expressions of hatred of Germany still as common as in school and university circles."[81]

It was only the year 1923, Germany's year of crises, characterized by the French occupation of the Ruhr and German hyper-inflation, that effected a real change of sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic. This has long been recognized with regard to economic relations. In the fall of 1923, Germany's impending financial and political collapse (and the specter of Bolshevism and disorder it raised) prompted U.S. foreign policy makers to "return" to Europe. Constrained by isolationist sentiment at home, they worked informally through American businessmen and financiers (the Dawes-Committee) to help settle the Franco-German reparations dispute and further a consensual revision of the peace treaty.[82] And yet, this famous economic intervention was followed by a cultural intervention, personified by Butler. By late 1923, Butler, who had avoided Germany for nearly a decade, sought to renew contact in numerous ways: he joined a relief drive to benefit German intellectuals, supported the set-up of a German-American student exchange, opened Columbia's doors to German professors, and publicly advocated peaceful revision of the peace treaty. [83] That Butler relinquished his decade-long presidency of the France-America Society shortly thereafter also shows that his change of heart — like America's at large — was not so much an expression of sympathy for Germany as a concern over France's military course of action in the Ruhr.[84] The events of 1923 convinced many Americans that French intransigence was a hindrance to peace in Europe and seemed to confirm their prewar contention that militarism was more of a general European phenomenon than a uniquely German problem.[85] At the same time, Butler apparently realized that his strategy of isolating Germany had not taught it a useful lesson but had almost toppled the German Republic.[86] Changing tack, Butler thus began to throw his public resources behind reintegrating Germany and German academics into the family of nations. In late 1923 he felt that a new "spirit of goodwill and cooperation" was imperative and reminded an academic audience, "that even our late enemies have an *amour propre*, and you must not treat them forever as slaves."[87]

But in Germany, too, 1923 inspired a new commitment to transatlantic cooperation. Liberal scholars, in particular, began to see the fruitlessness of German self-isolation and embraced the opportunity to renew ties with the United States. By 1924, Ernst Jäckh, a

81 German Consulate General, New York, [Kraske] to AA, Jan. 7, 1923, "Berliner Lehrergesangsverein," PA, R 80295.

82 Patrick O. Cohrs, "The First 'Real' Peace Settlement after the First World War: Britain, the United States and the Accords of London and Locarno 1923–1925," *Contemporary European History* 12, no. 1 (2003): 1–31, 2.

83 German Consulate General, San Francisco to AA, Mar 24, 1923, Graf Hugo Lerchenfeld, PA R80296.

84 Reuben Clarence Lang, "Die Meinung in den USA über Deutschland im Jahr des Ruhrkampfes und des Hitlerputsches," *Saeculum* 17 (1966): 402–416.

85 See Butler's 1924 announcement to the CEIP's Board of Trustees, Winn, "Nicholas Murray Butler," 566, fn 43.

86 The Rockefeller Foundation began to support German medical research in late 1922, see Rockefeller Foundation, *Annual Report* 1922, 338–39.

87 "Dr. Butler pleads for world concord," *New York Times,* Nov 15, 1923, 30.

journalist-turned-professor, who had founded the reform-minded *Hochschule für Politik* in Berlin in 1920, had prepared the ground for closer cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment and its incoming president, Butler.[88] From an official perspective, too, it seemed highly desirable to win U.S. sympathy and support for a further revision of the peace treaty.[89] By the fall of 1925, the German ambassador to Washington, Adolf Georg Otto von Maltzan, advised building closer relations with Butler and the Carnegie Endowment because it offered "very remarkable opportunities to influence public opinion, especially the intellectual circles, in all countries [...] We cannot pass up the chance to work towards an attitude favorable to Germany."[90]

However, Butler's example illustrates that even at this moment when both sides prepared to renew their contacts, finding words and gestures of reconciliation was far from easy. This was especially true for Germans, who even in the mid-1920s found it difficult to forget or forgive wartime "betrayals." In a long 1926 report, the *Amerika-Institut* in Berlin, an institution heavily invested in transatlantic reconciliation, had to admit that Butler was the epitome of the "disloyal type."[91] Even German diplomats responded to Butler in an almost pathological manner. A letter that Butler had politely addressed to Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in April 1925 had — as an internal memorandum admitted — been "purposefully left unanswered" by the German Foreign Ministry for more than six months.[92] Mending relations with Butler was a complicated matter, one that required utmost tact, a measure of self-effacement and a willingness to make a new beginning — qualities that were not abundant in postwar Germany.

That reconciliation proved ultimately successful was due to the fact that all involved knew just how complicated a task it would be. Butler, in particular, showed an excellent grasp of German psychology, acknowledging the Germans' immense desire for foreign recognition. After 1924, he strategically expressed his admiration for German learning and culture on every public and private occasion.[93] Opening a German Book Exhibition at Columbia in mid-1925, Butler acknowledged Germany's intellectual influence on his life and declared: "thank God, the War is over. The time has come for liberal and broad-minded men and women to begin to build a new and peaceful civilization upon the ruins of that which was overturned with as much sorrow and suffering and destruction [...]."[94] In a similar vein, Butler welcomed Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff, counselor of the German embassy in Washington, to Morningside Heights in November of 1925 and, as Dieckhoff

88 On Jäckh and his U.S. reception see Rose C. Feld, "New University Trains Germans for Politics," *New York Times*, Dec 20 1925, XX8; Ernst Jäckh, American Cooperation for the support of Democratic Organization in Germany ca. Dec 1924, PA 80297; Ernst Jäckh, *Amerika und Wir. Amerikanisch-Deutsches Ideenbündnis* (Stuttgart, 1929).

89 Amerika-Institut to AA, Nov 14, 1925, PA R 64999.

90 German Embassy to AA, "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace," Sep 11, 1925, PA, Botschaft Washington, 1548.

91 Amerika-Institut [Dr. Bertling] Memorandum II, May 26, 1926, PA R 64909

92 German Embassy Washington to AA, Oct 14, 1925, PA Botschaft Washington, 1548; on the deliberate nature of this delay: Aufzeichnung (Fuehr), Jun 21 1926, PA, R 80299.

93 Amerika-Institut, Memorandum II, May 26 1926, PA R 64909 and AA to German Embassy Washington, Jul 27 1925, PA Botschaft Washington, 1548.

94 Remarks by Nicholas Murray Butler at the opening of the German Book Exhibit at Earl Hall, Oct 3, 1925, copy in, PA R 65043.

reported, "came to speak of his old teachers and friends in Berlin. He showed me pictures of Paulsen and Althoff on his office walls and related anecdotes of himself, Althoff and the Kaiser."[95]

Efforts to reestablish relations culminated in Butler's carefully prepared visit to Berlin in June 1926, his first since 1912. On the American side, the visit was intended to acquaint Butler with Weimar leaders, a prerequisite to Carnegie work in Europe.[96] On the German side, the motivation was to renew Germany's access to Carnegie funds, U.S. universities and the hearts and minds of the American people — all of which Butler was believed to be able to facilitate.[97] Karl Oscar Bertling, director of the Amerika-Institut, characterized Butler as a real "power factor" in transatlantic affairs and as a key to unlock academic and scientific relations with the United States.[98] Weighing in on Butler's visit, the German Foreign Ministry's expert on the United States agreed and advised

> given his great standing in the United States as well as in Paris and London, we only stand to benefit from having good, or at least, normal relations with Dr. Butler. It is thus politically important that his upcoming visit to Berlin — where he can expect no less and no more than what is commensurate with his standing and importance — proceeds in an entirely harmonious way.[99]

Ultimately, Butler and Germany's mutual interest in transatlantic rapprochement produced just that desired harmony. The dinners and receptions given in Butler's honor gathered the top tier of German bureaucrats, businessmen and science organizers, and Foreign Minister Stresemann met with Columbia University's president for an hour-long conversation, which greatly impressed Butler.[100] His trip to Berlin put Butler's relationship with Germany on an entirely new footing and produced astonishingly immediate and far-reaching results. Butler now fully embraced Weimar Germany. Henceforth, he praised the reliability of its government, commended Germany's successful spiritual disarmament and even championed peaceful revision of its Eastern borders.[101] Moreover, as he told a German newspaper, he had committed himself to making sure "that Germany once again has the rightful place in American public life which she has had for more than 100 years."[102] In the coming years, Butler would use the Carnegie Endowment and Columbia's considerable resources to this end: He invited prominent Germans like the author Thomas Mann to lecture across the United States, established

95 Attachment to Embassy Report, Nov 18, 1925, PA, Botschaft Washington, 1548 Stiftung "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace," Vol 1, 1925–1932.

96 Katharina Rietzler, "Before the Cultural Cold Wars: American philanthropy and cultural diplomacy in the inter-war years," *Historical Research* 84, no. 223 (2011): 148–164, 162.

97 A detailed description of German aims in Aufzeichnung (Fuehr), Jun 21, 1926, PA, R 80299; Stresemann to German Embassy, Washington, May 10, 1926; German Embassy Washington to AA, May 18, 1926, PA, Botschaft Washington, 1551.

98 Amerika-Institut, Memorandum II, May 26, 1926, PA R 64909.

99 Aufzeichnung (Fuehr), Jun 21, 1926 PA, R 80299.

100 In 1930 Butler would initiate a Stresemann Memorial in Berlin; see CEIP, Box 324 Folder Stresemann Memorial, Columbia University, Rare Book & Manuscript Library Collections.

101 "War spirit is gone Dr. Butler Asserts," *Columbia Spectator* 49, no 165, June 30 1926, 1.

102 "Eine Unterredung mit Präsident Butler," *Berliner Tageblatt*, Jun 24, 1926, PA Botschaft Washington, 1548.

a Carnegie Chair at the Hochschule für Politik to bring experts on international relations to Berlin, and in 1929/30 reopened the *Deutsches Haus* at Columbia as well as the Roosevelt-Professorship in Berlin.[103] In 1932, it was Butler who presided over the Goethe Centenary in the United States, welcoming Germany's most famous living author, Gerhart Hauptmann, in a splendid on-campus ceremony. By the end of the postwar decade, few Americans were as committed, or as important, to giving form and substance to renewed transatlantic friendship as Butler.

These developments, I would argue, are crucial to understanding interwar transatlantic relations in general. First, they elucidate the cultural component of transatlantic politics in the 1920s. One cannot help but notice how closely American cultural initiatives paralleled the course of transatlantic politics. Alongside U.S. economic intervention in 1923/24, America's cultural intervention in Germany constituted yet another, equally informal way to stabilize Europe. After the mid-1920s, U.S. cultural internationalists like Butler began to play an important role in reconciling the American public with Germany and reintegrating Germany into the family of nations. Their cultivation of transatlantic educational and intellectual exchanges reflected America's pursuit of "peaceful change" in Europe no less than its involvement in the reparations settlement. At the same time, this American policy dovetailed with German desire to use its remaining cultural capital to peacefully undo the Versailles Treaty. The astonishing attention that German diplomats paid to a non-state actor like Butler shows that they comprehended the unique power of informal cultural relations in the United States, a country that was politically isolationist and devoid of official cultural diplomacy.[104] It is telling that despite the German Foreign Ministry's close attention to protocol, Butler was welcomed in Berlin with hardly less fanfare than was Anatole de Monzie, the French Minister of Culture, just a few months earlier.[105] As Butler's example shows, the American commitment to "peaceful change" and the German desire for a "peaceful revision" aligned also in the cultural field.

At the same time, a focus on cultural relations lays bare the profound psychological legacy of the war. Even where transatlantic interests overlapped, the demobilization of minds proved slow and difficult. If overcoming wartime resentments was not easy for Butler, for a defeated and humiliated Germany cultural demobilization was more arduous still. This was true individually as well as structurally. For

103 Statement by the President of the Carnegie Endowment regarding the new work of the Endowment in Europe, Aug 23, 1926, CEIP, Box 97, Report, Butler, Columbia University, Rare Book & Manuscript Library Collections; "Columbia to have new German House," *Columbia Daily Spectator* 52, no. 64, Jan 9, 1929, 1; these and other initiatives in Wala, "'Gegen eine Vereinzelung Deutschlands'"; Butler to Woodbridge, September 23, 1931, Central Files; Box 342/8 Woodbridge; University Archives, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library.

104 Kurt Düwell, "Die Gründung der Kulturpolitischen Abteilung im Auswärtigen Amt 1919/20 als Neuansatz," In *Deutsche auswärtige Kulturpolitik seit 1871*, eds. Kurt Düwell and Werner Link (Köln, 1981), 46–61; German Embassy Washington to AA, Oct 30, 1928 "Stand der Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten" PA R 80145; for a general analysis: Piller, *Selling Weimar*

105 Katja Marmetschke, "Ein Wendepunkt für die deutsch-französische Verständigung. Das Treffen zwischen dem preußischen Kultusminister C.H. Becker und dem französischen Erziehungsminister Anatole de Monzie im September 1925 in Berlin," in *Französische Kultur im Berlin der Weimarer Republik. Kultureller Austausch und diplomatische Beziehungen,* eds. Hans Manfred Bock (Tübingen, 2005), 37-51.

Figure 3. Butler welcomes Gerhart Hauptmann to New York, February 26, 1932. The photo shows (from left to right): Butler, Margarete Hauptmann, Gerhart Hauptmann, New York mayor James J. Walker. ©Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-U0928-507.

example, German officials were initially hesitant to invite Butler to Berlin because they feared nationalist attacks if they were seen to take a "first step" towards him. Only once Butler had provided public tokens of goodwill were they willing to welcome him back because, as a Foreign Ministry report noted, "it is entirely ruled out that we could be accused of pursuing him."[106] Nor, and this too has to be acknowledged, did German and American academics ever (again) enjoy a fully harmonious relationship. In the interwar period, even liberal German academics harbored some uneasiness about economic and cultural "Americanization" and worried about the corrupting influence of an allegedly shallow American mass culture.[107] Butler and his immense resources seemed to embody this threat. Moritz Julius Bonn, a German academic and associate of Butler's at the Carnegie Endowment's Paris office tellingly characterized him as "the greatest creator and disseminator of platitudes I have ever experienced. From his office he churned out standardized intellectual mass products with the same speed that a Ford car rolled out [of] its factory."[108] Germany's conservative academic establishment, for its part, kept its distance from Butler and other "disloyal types." They never fully reconciled themselves to German defeat, the Republic or the increasingly prominent role the United States played in the (academic) world. As late as 1929, Eduard Meyer (admittedly a particularly resentful character) considered America, "with its inner dishonesty and moralistic arrogance" — clearly, Butler's America — "the most disgusting of our enemies."[109] In Butler's tumultuous relationship with Germany, reconciliation and resentment were never far apart.

106 Aufzeichnung (Fuehr), Jun 21, 1926, PA, R 80299.

107 Adelheid von Saldern, "Überfremdungsängste. Gegen die Amerikanisierung der deutschen Kultur in den zwanziger Jahren," in *Amerikanisierung: Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts*, eds. Alf Lüdtke, Ingo Marssolek, Adelheid von Saldern (Stuttgart, 1996), 213-243.

108 Bonn, *So macht man Geschichte*, 295-96.

109 Alexander Demandt "Eduard Meyer und Oswald Spengler," in *Eduard Meyer. Leben und Leistung eines Universalhistorikers*, eds. William M. Calder III and Alexander Demandt (Leiden, 1990), 159–181, 169.

III. Butler, U.S. internationalists and American appeasement, 1933–1937

The ascent of the Nazis was yet another turning point in German-American relations, albeit not as immediately or unequivocally as one might expect in hindsight. In the years after January 1933 Americans were trying to make sense of Nazism and of what, if anything, it might mean for German-American relations. Their attitude, however, was not simply one of rejection. Rather, U.S. opinions remained ambivalent for long, influenced by longer-standing images of Germans and Germany, by the lessons of the First World War as well as continued leisure and educational travel to the Third Reich.[110] American academics like Butler were an important part of this "American debate on Nazism," as Michaela Hoenicke-Moore has called it, and for years advocated the maintenance of normal relations with Nazi Germany.[111] The final section of this article will use Butler's example to understand the reasoning behind this cultural variant of "American appeasement."[112]

The American debate of what the Nazi takeover would mean for Germany and for the United States began immediately in early 1933. Diplomatic missions and news correspondents reported on the substantial changes taking place in Germany, including in German higher education. The newly appointed American ambassador to Germany, William E. Dodd, a Chicago historian, wrote with great distress about the dismissal of professors, the radicalization of the German student body and the political coordination of German universities.[113] Already in early March, his predecessor, U.S. Ambassador Frederic Sackett, had predicted that "[d]emocracy in Germany has received a blow from which it may never recover. Germany has been submerged under a huge Nazi wave. The much heralded Third Reich has become a reality."[114] And yet, American academics by and large mustered only a lukewarm condemnation of Nazi Germany, leaving public protest to religious organizations and their students. Butler embodied this American accommodation. Although he discontinued the Carnegie lectures at the Hochschule für Politik after the Nazi takeover of that institution in early 1933 and also suspended the Roosevelt Professorship at the University of Berlin in 1934 (citing financial reasons), he avoided public criticism of the regime and maintained other forms of academic exchange: he continued to welcome German students, scholars and ambassadors on campus, participated in public events at the *Deutsches Haus* and in 1936 sent a delegate to the 550th anniversary of Heidelberg University, organized under the aegis of the German Ministry of Propaganda. As Stephen Norwood has shown,

110 Michaela Hoenicke-Moore, *Know Your Enemy. The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945* (New York, 2010); Philipp Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung 1933-1945* (Stuttgart, 1997).

111 Helke Rausch, "Sympathy for the devil? American support for German sciences after 1933," in *Intellectual Collaboration with the Third Reich: Treason or Reason?*, eds. Maria Björkman, Patrik Lundell, and Sven Widmalm (New York, 2019), 119-133.

112 Arnold A. Offner, *American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933–1938* (Cambridge, MA, 1969).

113 William Dodd to Nicholas Murray Butler, Jan 17, 1934, Box 43, Library of Congress (LoC) MSS18697, William Edward Dodd Papers.

114 The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State, Mar 9, 1933, FRUS, The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa, Vol II, 206–209, 209.

many other American university presidents and academics took similar positions. According to Norwood, "Butler and leading members of his administration failed to grasp the impact of Nazism on German higher education, and they participated in high-profile events and programs the Hitler regime sponsored to improve its image in the West."[115] He therefore regards Butler as representative of American higher education, which was "complicit in enhancing the prestige of the Hitler regime by seeking and maintaining friendly and respectful relations with Nazi universities and leaders."[116]

Still, Norwood's explanation for Butler's complicity — his antisemitism and his ignorance of, and indifference to, the brutal nature of Nazism[117] —clouds the influence of other factors that informed the decisions of men like Butler in light of their long relationship with Germany. This is not to doubt the truth of Norwood's observations. Butler's antisemitism is well-documented and showed itself on many occasions. For example, prior to the First World War Butler refused to regularly appoint a Jewish scholar as Theodore Roosevelt Professor (as he had originally promised James Speyer, one of the exchange's benefactors) and it was under Butler's aegis that Columbia introduced admission quotas to restrict the number of Jewish students.[118] In addition, Butler, part of the conservative wing of the U.S. peace movement, was far more concerned with the dangers posed by militarism and socialism than those posed by social inequity or racial bias. Whereas Butler, for example, carefully eschewed any contact with Bolshevist Russia, he actively cultivated ties with fascist Italy until the mid-1930s. No doubt, Butler's antisemitism and conservatism partly explain his apparent moral indifference to the Nazi persecutions of Jews and political opponents.

And yet, an all too exclusive focus on these factors obscures other considerations that shaped American cultural internationalists' attitudes towards — and their public accommodation of — Nazi Germany. For one, there is plenty of evidence that Butler neither ignored nor accepted Nazi transgressions. He was genuinely shocked when Moritz Julius Bonn, who had been on the Carnegie Endowment's Paris board since 1927, was dismissed as rector of the Berlin Commercial College and he reflected, it seems, quite extensively on the position to take towards Nazi Germany. One of the best-informed Americans of his time, Butler had followed German events closely for years and continued to keep abreast of the German situation through a variety of informants, including Carnegie representatives,

115 Norwood, *Third Reich in the Ivory Tower*, 79.

116 Norwood, *Third Reich in the Ivory Tower*, 73.

117 See Norwood, "Complicity and Conflict: Columbia University's Response to Fascism, 1933-1937," *Modern Judaism*, 27, no. 3 (2007): 253-283.

118 See correspondence in Nicholas Murray Butler Papers, Box 391, Folder James Speyer, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library; Rosenthal, *Nicholas Miraculous*, 332-352.

American scholars and ambassadors.[119] In fact, Butler's lukewarm initial response seems not to have grown out of ignorance of Nazi brutalities but out of uncertainty about the future of the regime. Even from Butler's privileged position it was difficult to gain a clear picture of German events. While it was apparent that wide-ranging changes and horrific persecutions were taking place, just what they meant or for how long they would last was not. German governments had changed rapidly in previous years and it was, at least in 1933 and 1934, not unreasonable to think that the Nazi government, too, might soon topple.[120]

In fact, even those American internationalists that assumed that the Nazis would stay in power were hopeful that the repressive nature of the regime would soon ease. The former ambassador to Germany, Alanson B. Houghton, having just returned from a month-long stay in Germany in May 1933, wrote to Butler: "[…] a year ago Germany seemed under crumbling morale — now spirits are high […] facing the future with confidence and evidently determined that Germany must again and shall again take her old place among the nations of the world. A definite revolution has taken place." He acknowledged that there was "no freedom of speech, no freedom of the press" and that "the present government stands frankly on force and will use it unhesitatingly." The treatment of Jews he found "objectionable from every tolerant or decent point of view." At the same time, however, he was hopeful that force and repression would ease once the government was firmly established.[121] In any case, it seemed to men like Butler unwise to imperil their relationship with Germany — a relationship they had just painstakingly repaired — for what might well be a fleeting period of repression.

For Butler this position was strongly reinforced by the fact that many of his long-standing partners (at first) retained their posts. Ernst Jäckh at the Hochschule für Politik, with whom he had worked since 1924, or Karl Oscar Bertling at the Amerika-Institut, whom he had known since 1910, were initially confident that they could arrive at a modus vivendi with the new government.[122] The German foreign service, too, presented a picture of consistency, not radical change. Although Ambassador von Prittwitz resigned in 1933 — the only high-ranking German diplomat to take that step — his right hand man, Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff, who had been in Washington throughout the 1920s (and had sat in Butler's office in 1925), continued to head the foreign ministry's America department before he eventually was appointed ambassador to Washington in 1937. In

119 Butler to Woodbridge, Dec 23, 1931, MS#1375 Frederick James Eugene Woodbridge Papers, Box 1, Correspondence, Folder: Butler/Woodbridge, 1931, Columbia University Archives; Nicholas Murray Butler to William Dodd, Dec 18, 1933, Box 43, LoC, Dodd Papers.

120 Norwood, *Third Reich in the Ivory Tower*, 79.

121 Alanson B. Houghton to Nicholas Murray Butler, June 1, 1933, Nicholas Murray Butler Papers, Box 122, Alanson B. Houghton, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library; this was echoed with regard to German universities by Dodd to Nicholas Murray Butler, March 8, 1934, Box 43, LoC, Dodd Papers.

122 Amerika-Institut to Schmidt-Ott, May 23 1933, GSPK, VI HA NL Schmidt-Ott 540 Amerika-Institut.

a sea of conflicting information and interpretations, such personal continuities — which Nazi Germany cultivated for just that reason — proved highly meaningful.[123] That they can at least partly account for Butler's accommodation is illustrated by his relationship with Hans Luther, the German ambassador to Washington from 1933 to 1936. Luther, a bourgeois politician through and through, had served in various Weimar governments in the 1920s, including as Weimar Germany's Chancellor in 1925 and 1926. When Luther's visit to Columbia in late 1933 sparked widespread student protest Butler was indignant — not because Luther was a Nazi, but because, in Butler's mind, he was *not*. In fact, to Butler, ambassador Luther — a descendent of Martin Luther — was not so much a representative of the Nazi government as he was a representative of German culture and history. Butler rebuffed student protesters with the telling insistence that Luther was a perfect ''gentleman'' and hence deserved a cordial welcome on campus.[124]

But Butler's accommodation was not only the result of uncertainty or apparent continuity. Arguably it was also the product of some of the assumptions inherent in U.S internationalism. Many U.S. internationalists believed that after 1933, more than ever, it was important to maintain friendly contact with Germany, not least to offer encouragement to those Germans suddenly trapped in a dictatorship. This was one reason why American universities continued to welcome German students on campus. As Stephen Duggan, the director of the Institute of International Education, wrote to Henry Pritchett, a Carnegie trustee (both of them associated with Butler) in late 1933, "I am wholly opposed to isolating Germany. On the contrary I believe the Germans are now in particular need of contact, and personal contact, of the right kind."[125] Secondly, American internationalists always conceived of relations with Germany as part of a broader *European* agenda. While this had proven frustrating to Wilhelmine Germans, it proved beneficial to the Nazis. In fact, American internationalists countered criticism of their continued engagement with Germany with the telling response that if they restricted their contacts only to European democracies there would be few countries left to deal with. When Columbia's attendance at the Heidelberg university jubilee in 1936 sparked heavy public criticism, the Columbia delegate, Professor Arthur Remy, rebuked (well-founded) accusations of the jubilee being a Nazi propaganda event noting that, "with the atmosphere prevailing in the Europe of today no great celebration will be held anywhere without some political or social bias present."[126] Last but

123 Offner, *American Appeasement*, 30; on these continuities see Piller, *Selling Weimar,* Chapter 8.

124 "Butler denies plea for ban on Luther," *Columbia Spectator*, Nov 20, 1933, 1.

125 Duggan to Pritchett, Nov. 20, 1933, quoted in Halpern, "The Institute of International Education," 156; see also Stephen P. Duggan to William Dodd, July 21, 1934, Box 44, LoC, Dodd Papers.

126 A Report of the Celebration of the 550th Anniversary of Heidelberg University, June 27th to July 1936, by Arthur F. J. Remy, 5, Columbia University Archives Central Files, Box 549 Heidelberg.

not least, U.S. accommodation was part of U.S. disillusionment with the Paris peace, which had successively moved Americans closer to Germany's desire for revision.[127] As much as Butler, for example, disliked the Nazi government and its insistence on re-armament,[128] he initially considered German actions at least partly understandable. After all, no other country had seriously disarmed in the preceding decade. In fact, for Butler who had vainly campaigned for universal disarmament in the 1920s, German re-armament seemed an almost logical consequence of the world's failure in that respect. The fact that many U.S. academics were also avid (cultural) internationalists and peace advocates hence shaped their initial responses to Germany and turned them into champions of American "appeasement."

And yet, even as U.S. accommodation rested on uncertainty about the German future, personal continuities and internationalist assumptions, it cannot be understood without considering Butler's long relationship with Germany, in particular, the experience of the First World War. I would argue that Butler's accommodation of Nazi Germany was motivated by an honest desire not to repeat past mistakes. Indeed, no matter how different 1914 and 1933 appear in hindsight, Butler felt that he was facing similar mechanisms of public outrage and pressures to isolate Germany. While he disagreed with Nazi Germany, he was careful not to fall back into the war's divisive rhetoric, which he had clearly come to regret.[129] His major lesson of the First World War, when culture and politics had been fatefully intertwined, seems to have been to insist that the two had nothing to do with each other. Butler, who had built an entire career on the fusion of academic and diplomatic affairs, now claimed that German exchange students, the Heidelberg jubilee, even the visit of German ambassadors to campus were purely academic, not political matters.[130] In a joint statement with presidents A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard and James Rowland Angell of Yale, Butler tried to justify the participation at the Heidelberg jubilee stating that "our participation in this celebration bore witness to the unity of the world of scholarship, which is independent of the political conditions prevailing in any country at any particular moment."[131] Butler himself implicitly connected his response to the cultural purges and overreactions of the Great War, when he defended his continued association with Nazi Germany shortly thereafter:

> We may next expect to be told that we must not read Goethe's FAUST, or hear Wagner's LOHENGRIN, or visit

127 Selig Adler, "The War-Guilt Question and American Disillusionment, 1918–1928," *Journal of Modern History* 23 (March 1951): 1–28.

128 Rosenthal, *Nicholas Miraculous*, 392.

129 While Butler was not one to admit past mistakes, his change of heart is indicated by the fact that in his 1940 autobiography Butler considerably changed the story about the railway servant in 1914. He now declared him to have been "German Swiss" and his three sons being called to serve in the *Swiss* army, mobilized to defend the country against an Austrian invasion; Butler, *Across the Busy Years,* Vol 2, 251-252.

130 This desire was also evident in Professor Stephen Remy's report, Columbia's representative at the Heidelberg celebrations, Columbia University Archives, Central Files, Box 549 Heidelberg, A Report of the Celebrations of the 550th Anniversary of Heidelberg University, June27th to July 1st, 1936, by Arthur F. J. Remy, 4.

131 Statement about the University of Heidelberg Celebration, Columbia University Archives, Central Files, Box 549 Heidelberg, CUL, Rare Book & Manuscript Library.

> the great picture galleries at Dresden or study Kant's KRITIK because we so heartily disapprove of the present form of government in Germany [...] The public has yet to learn that our academic relationships have no political implications of any kind.[132]

Of course, coming from Butler one might dismiss such statements as disingenuous, as a rhetorical sleight-of-hand to deflect public criticism. But it is also likely that Butler insisted on the separation of culture and politics because he had come to realize how much their unfettered alliance during the First World War had undermined the prospects of international understanding. Even if Butler's antisemitism and conservatism partly explain his accommodation of Germany, the experience of the First World War and its aftermath also convinced Butler that abstaining from public criticism and maintaining at least a modicum of academic exchange might ultimately be more conductive to world peace than the cultural mobilizations of past decades. That culture and politics could not be so neatly separated when dealing with a totalitarian regime dawned only slowly on Butler and other cultural internationalists. Certainly, to fully grasp Butler's, and American academia's response to Nazism demands not only an understanding of the 1930s but also of the 1920s, even the 1910s. Only this longer trajectory of disappointments and hard-won reconciliation make American cultural appeasement comprehensible, and, in a sense, consequential.

This is not to say that Butler did not ultimately distance himself from Nazi Germany. True to his internationalist priorities, it was Nazi Germany's ever more apparent military aggression, not its policy of political and racial persecution that alienated Butler. 1936/37, in particular, proved a turning point for Butler and U.S. public opinion more generally. Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland (1936), its rearmament plans, and its military alliance with Italy and then Japan in 1936/1937 proved too much for the Nobel peace laureate.[133] While Columbia had still sent a delegate to the Heidelberg University jubilee in 1936, it sent none to the University of Göttingen's jubilee a year later. In his 1937 Carnegie report Butler warned of the rise of those illiberal ideologies, which "have taken possession of the peoples of Japan, of Russia, of Germany and of Italy" and pointed to the need to "keep the world safe for democracy."[134] That President Franklin Delano Roosevelt would soon echo these notions in his famous quarantine speech shows that Butler, now in his seventies,

132 Nicholas Murray Butler to Hubert Beck, May 29, 1936, Columbia University Archives, Central Files, Box 549 Heidelberg, CUL, Rare Book & Manuscript Library.

133 Rosenthal, *Nicholas Miraculous,* 390-391.

134 "Dr. Butler assails neutrality in war," *New York Times,* Mar 1, 1937, 10.

had not lost his feel for U.S. public sentiment.[135] In the last decade of his life, Butler would once more oversee Columbia's war effort, preach U.S. responsibility for the world and ponder the conditions of lasting peace. By the time he finally retired from the Columbia presidency in October 1945, nearly blind and deaf, German universities lay in ruins and the United States had become that "first moral power in the world" which Butler had known it to be all along.

Conclusion: Butler, Germany and the coming of the American century

Butler's lifetime, 1862-1947, coincided with U.S. ascendancy on the world stage. As this paper shows, Butler embraced and shaped this development. He was part of a generation of U.S. internationalists who believed in and preached American responsibility in the world. What is more, they used the immense resources of university and foundation endowments (larger than that of many a European ministry of culture) to forge international intellectual cooperation, albeit on American terms. In fact, while Butler was driven by an honest desire for world peace, his approach to international cooperation reflected a belief in U.S. moral superiority. Over the course of his lifetime, Butler created and cultivated intellectual networks that pivoted on U.S. expertise and money, thereby making sure that his nation grew not only into a military and economic but also an academic superpower. Long before the United States ever developed an official cultural diplomacy in the very late 1930s, men like Butler pursued an informal cultural diplomacy and laid the foundations of the cultural cold wars.

Apart from this general insight, Butler's relationship with Germany brings into relief the impressive cultural dimension of transatlantic politics in the first half of the twentieth century. The economic, political and military developments that are traditionally seen to define German-American relations were accompanied *and* shaped by cultural interactions. Initiatives like the professorial exchange exacerbated German-American competition and cooperation around the turn of the century; the academic falling-out after 1914 colored and arguably radicalized both countries' war efforts; from the mid-1920s, U.S. cultural politics, alongside financial involvement, became an informal American means to stabilize and reconcile with the Weimar Republic. By the late 1920s, Butler and other educators facilitated German-American reconciliation on campus, thereby reinforcing and expressing the transatlantic rapprochement at large. Their strenuous efforts to this end shaped U.S. appeasement well

135 Americans were largely out of sympathy with Nazi Germany after the mid-1930s, see the Gallup data on Germany in Detlef Junker, *Kampf um die Weltmacht. Die USA und das Dritte Reich, 1933–1945* (Düsseldorf, 1988), 70–78.

into the late 1930s. While Butler's antisemitism and conservatism were significant factors in his (and many others') moral indifference to Nazi repression, so, too, did his experience of the First World War inform his public accommodation. Butler's example, in short, shows that U.S. reactions to the rise of Nazi Germany cannot be fully understood without a long-term perspective.

This said, Butler's relationship with Germany — exceptionally well-documented on the German side — illustrates that U.S. ascendency happened not simply on U.S. terms. To be sure, Butler always played on European desires to gain the favor of an increasingly important United States. But Germans and Europeans, too, always played on Butler's ambitions and harnessed his search for personal and national acclaim to their interests. Importantly, while Butler might have *acted* as U.S. informal ambassador to Europe, Europeans also *accepted* him as such, and for their very own reasons. As Butler's example shows, U.S. expansion was never a unilateral or one-dimensional process, but often a mutually beneficial agreement. In a way, the countless honors, awards and social courtesies that Europeans showered upon Butler were a strategic investment in transatlantic relations — and a means to position themselves favorably in the coming American century.

Elisabeth Piller is Assistant Professor of Transatlantic and North American History at Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg. Her work on transatlantic relations and foreign policy has appeared in the *Journal of Contemporary History*, the *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* and *Diplomatic History*. She is the recipient of the 2019 Franz Steiner Prize, which is awarded biennially by the German Historical Institute Washington to an outstanding scholarly book manuscript in the field of North American studies or transatlantic relations from the early modern period to the present. Her first monograph, *Selling Weimar: German Public Diplomacy and the United States, 1918–1932,* is forthcoming in the GHI's Transatlantische Historische Studien series, published by the Franz Steiner Verlag, in January 2021. She is currently working on her second book, a study of U.S. humanitarian aid and transatlantic relations in the twentieth century.

"TAKEN ON FAITH": EXPERTISE IN AERIAL WARFARE AND THE DEMOCRATIC "WEST" IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Sophia Dafinger
UNIVERSITY OF AUGSBURG

The current Covid-19 pandemic has once again shown how contested the status of experts is in "western" democracies. On the one hand, they seem to be the only ones from whom help can be expected in crises: they can assess and analyze confusing situations, make predictions on the basis of their knowledge and give recommendations for action. Millions of people came to the sudden realization that without the knowledge of exponential growth, infection pathways, and aerodynamics it was obviously impossible to make politics. On the other hand, it became clear that even experts do not know everything. Above all, concrete instructions for action could not necessarily be deduced from their knowledge. At the first peak of the crisis in spring and summer 2020, both those critics who feared for democratic processes and wanted to prevent long-term governance based on emergency regulations and without active parliamentary opposition and those who generally reject the supposedly exclusive knowledge of "elites," and who often linked these reservations with a number of anti-Semitic clichés, debated the question of what political influence experts might and should have. Finally, in spring 2020 some of the interviewed experts emphasized that they do not see themselves as politicians and are happy not to have to decide for the community how to weigh up different life- or at least health-threatening risks in a confusing situation in a meaningful way.[1]

Until the 1970s, it was atypical for experts to be so visible in the media and to engage in public debate, as they usually advised governments and their representatives behind closed doors.[2] Especially in war

1 In the NDR podcast episode of 30 March 2020, virologist Christian Drosten said "Science has no democratic mandate. A scientist is not a politician, he was not elected and does not have to resign. No scientist wants to say things like: This political decision was the right one or that political decision was wrong. Or this political decision must be made next. You'll hear this from no respectable scientist. […] Both sides say that politics makes the decisions and not science. Both politics and science say this." See https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/info/coronaskript154.pdf, 4. And a few weeks later: "If a political decision has to be made […] then life science information is one of the criteria. And economic information, for example, is another one of the criteria. Politics must bundle this information and make a rational decision for society. That is » the great difficulty and the great responsibility of politics." See https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/info/coronaskript190.pdf, 5.

2 This is still the case today, but during the Vietnam War forms of investigative journalism and opinion journalism developed in the USA that went far beyond the dissemination of existing information, such as official press releases, and is today considered a guideline for good journalistic work. For further details, see Christoph Meister, *No News without Secrets. Political Leaks in the United States from 1950-1976* (Marburg, 2016), 187-204.

and crisis situations, in which expert knowledge was particularly in demand, hardly any of their activities were made public. For this form of political consulting, on the other hand, it was important to convey clear messages, since experts derived their authority and status precisely from ordering complicated settings and clarifying situations with the help of their exclusive insights. Doubts or a clear indication that knowledge is preliminary and cannot replace political decisions therefore usually had no place in their expertise. This applies all the more to those scientific experts who became politically relevant and have occupied a central place in the decision-making processes of governments since the emergence of the modern state apparatus, but especially since the increasing mechanization in the nineteenth century and during the two world wars, which further accelerated this process. They drew their legitimacy from references to the inescapability of rational, methodologically sound scientific procedures, from the belief in the ability of exact sciences to correctly grasp reality, and from the promise of being able to model the future and thus make it predictable.[3]

This applies not least to the disciplines of the social sciences, which emerged around 1900 and slowly established themselves. In the twentieth century, sociology, psychology, political science, anthropology, ethnology, parts of the historical sciences, and also economics developed their self-understanding as empirically working disciplines not least in exchange with buyers of their expertise, and since 1914 this has increasingly meant: with the state. The world wars, especially the Second World War, became significant for the social sciences in this respect primarily because they heralded a new form of aerial warfare, in which the civil societies of the belligerent powers were included as participants in the war. Although there had already been individual bombings at the end of the First World War, it was only the technical and strategic developments of the interwar period that led to the use of bomber planes far behind the front lines from 1939 onwards. The figure of the social science expert in the twentieth century was thus more closely connected with aerial warfare than is possibly apparent at first glance. Conversely, the Second World War had a greater impact on the disciplinary development of the social sciences than one might initially assume. In the United States, it was — in addition to Roosevelt's New Deal policy — the occasion for a scientification of politics that led to the first interdisciplinary social science projects modeled after the Big Science research projects in the natural sciences. After 1945, these projects became models for the

3 Dirk van Laak, „Planung, Planbarkeit und Planungseuphorie," Version: 1.0, in *DocupediaZeitgeschichte*, 16.2.2010, http://docupedia.de/zg/Planung (last accessed 8/25/2020).

founding of social science-based research and consulting institutes and still had an impact on warfare in Vietnam.[4] The history of social science expertise is thus a central element of a modern transatlantic history of violence and conflict, which asks how modern wars were planned and waged, what knowledge was needed for this, and how this knowledge fed back into the respective societies.

After 1945, the integration of social science expertise into the evaluation and planning of aerial warfare led to a specific form of cooperation between the state and science. It is worth reflecting on the logic of this cooperation, on its ambivalences, struggles, and consequences — both for the scientific disciplines involved and with regard to the question of how democratic societies actually conceive foreign and security policy. How did this cooperation between social science and politics come about in the context of the air war and what sustained it? Who was interested in it? Who benefited from it? What knowledge did it generate and what remained of it? And what was not asked, not heard or forgotten?

Particularly revealing for these questions is the example of the United States as the strongest military power in the second half of the twentieth century, as one of the most important actors in international politics and as a living democracy.[5] The history of social science experts on aerial warfare also provides insight into the self-image of democratic societies. It is linked to the debate about what influence experts should actually have on decision-making processes and to what extent secrecy is compatible with democratic procedures. In the course of the twentieth century, American society has had to develop a consensus on what constitutes legitimate wartime violence when there are no longer any classic frontlines. In view of new technologies, this process continues to change. Writing about aerial warfare experts in the United States therefore does not only mean reflecting on how modern warfare has evolved. What can be shown on the example of aerial warfare experts also spurs us to think beyond the concrete case in hand about what democratic societies are willing to accept in terms of wartime violence — and what they aren't. At the same time, transatlantic history once again shows how closely German and U.S. history of the twentieth century are connected in a context whose pivotal point was the Second World War. Beyond the history of occupation, strategic partnership in the cold war, or the history of Americanization, the history of scientific expertise is part of the Westernization that Anselm Doering-Manteuffel[6] has

4 On the history of the so-called scientification of the social, the essential work remains Lutz Raphael, "Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 22, no. 2 (1996): 165-193.

5 Although there are hardly any studies on the activities of air war experts in other countries, there is every indication that the USA in comparison relies heavily on institutes and think tanks associated with the respective branches of the armed forces, see Rolf Hobson, "'Defense Intellectuals.' Zur Karriere von Schreibtischstrategen," in *Erbe des Kalten Krieges*, ed. Bernd Greiner, Tim B. Müller and Klaas Voß (Hamburg, 2013), 148-158.

6 Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, „Westernisierung. Politisch-ideeller und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der Bundesrepublik bis zum Ende der 60er Jahre," in *Dynamische Zeiten. Die 1960er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften*, ed. Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried and Karl Christian Lammers (Hamburg, 2000), 311-41, here 314.

described as "the gradual emergence of a common set of values in the societies on both sides of the North Atlantic."

During the Second World War, it became apparent that in all participating countries numerous expectations were tied to aerial warfare. Following isolated bombings during the First World War and in colonial contexts and in light of existing aerial warfare doctrines, the first American Air Force generals as well as the War Department and the White House hoped that bombing would not only cause physical damage, but also psychological and indirect social damage. This was based on the assumption that modern societies were particularly fragile because they were specialized and interdependent.[7] All governments therefore discovered the civilian population as a decisive factor in war. This applied to the so-called home fronts, whose willingness to make sacrifices and persevere was invoked by governments everywhere. But the fact that the civilian population became part of the war effort was also true inasmuch as the people far behind the military frontlines had actually become the target of enemy military forces. The new bomber squadrons, which were systematically deployed in strategic aerial warfare against industries and infrastructures and also against cities and residential areas for the first time during the Second World War, changed the face of war fundamentally.

Knowledge about societies, about people and supply structures could now possibly become decisive for war. At the very least, however, modern aerial warfare was simply unthinkable without such knowledge as the social sciences possessed and could produce. With the dissolution of the boundaries of war, with the revolutionization of space through aerial warfare, and with the inclusion of civilians as a "home front," all of society was now in a state of war — and the fledgling social sciences were consulted by both the military and politics. In the early 1940s, a whole group of young scientists belonging to the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant establishment on the American East Coast seized the opportunity to influence the course of events with their research, for the concepts according to which strategic aerial warfare was planned did not rest on a firm empirical foundation. In reality, in 1944, it was not clear to anyone whether it was really a productive idea to destroy the enemy's arms industry and infrastructure and to attempt to attack the "war morale" of the population from the air. Regardless of moral considerations, the question was simply: Does it make any military sense at

7 See Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945* (Princeton, 2002), 7.

all to fight for air supremacy over enemy territory and bomb targets far behind the front lines? The answers given by social scientists to this question could therefore determine what the concrete planning of air raids would look like.

Figure 1. The face of "total war": Cologne after aerial bombing. Public domain.

While social scientists and aerial warfare experts could only question publicly accessible texts and intelligence information during the war, a new situation arose with the occupation of first the European, then the Pacific theater of war: Now it was possible to collect empirical data. The U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) seized this opportunity. In addition to the expected increase in knowledge, the generals were also concerned with power: they hoped that the scientific confirmation of their own importance would enable them to become independent of the Army and form a separate branch of the armed forces.[8] They therefore campaigned for the establishment of a survey under civilian chairmanship and were ultimately successful. In 1944 and 1945, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) evaluated those strategic bombings for which the United States was responsible. By the spring of 1945, it already employed more than 1,000 people, the majority of them academically trained military personnel, but also several dozen specially recruited civilian scientists and a few women scientists. They worked in interdisciplinary departments where their task was to draw lessons from the European theater of war for the ongoing aerial warfare in the Pacific region.[9]

8 On the objectives of the USAAF generals, see Gian P. Gentile, *How Effective is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo*, (New York, 2001).

9 For a detailed discussion of the USSBS, also see Sophia Dafinger, *Die Lehren des Luftkriegs. Sozialwissenschaftliche Expertise in den USA vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis Vietnam* (Stuttgart, 2020) as well as Sophia Dafinger, "Keine Stunde Null. Sozialwissenschaftliche Expertise und die amerikanischen Lehren des Luftkrieges," in » *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History*, 17, no. 1 (2020): 11-35, online at https://zeithistorische-forschungen.de/1-2020/5809 (last accessed 8/25/2020).

Among the most prominent members of the USSBS were John Kenneth Galbraith, head of the Overall Economic Effects Division and one of the most famous liberal economists of the twentieth century,[10] and Paul H. Nitze, Head of the Equipment Division and the Utilities Division and later Deputy Secretary of Defense under President Kennedy.[11] Nitze was one of those academically educated experts whose career did not lead him into work at research institutes but into politics. The social psychologist Rensis Likert headed the Morale Division, which dealt with the "war morale" of the population. Likert became one of the most prominent opinion researchers in the 1930s and later shaped organizational and corporate sociology.[12] Social scientists are still familiar with his name today from questionnaire research. The so-called Likert Scale, which he developed to measure attitudes, added a differentiated panorama to the previously common choice between agreeing or disagreeing with a given statement, ranging from "don't agree at all" to "fully agree," and has since been frequently used in questionnaires. Among the new experts on the air war in the 1940s was also Galbraith's collaborator Paul A. Baran, who later became known as a Marxist economist. In the second tier there were a whole number of German emigrants, including Jürgen Kuczynski, and also dazzling personalities such as the writer Wystan Auden or the composer Nicolas Nabokov. Above all, however, numerous young and ambitious social scientists, such as Daniel Katz, Gabriel Almond and William Sewell, were involved in the interdisciplinary team.[13] The USSBS was engaged in Big Social Science.

The various teams of the USSBS began their work on site in Germany immediately after the arrival of the occupation troops. They visited factories, collected production plans and other documents, interviewed functionaries such as Albert Speer and Wilhelm Keitel as well as policemen, school principals and pastors, but also — and this was unusual — several thousand ordinary Germans.[14] All in all, the USSBS spent almost a year evaluating the air war in Europe and the Pacific region using the latest empirical research methods and summarizing the results in clearly structured reports. Its staff was concerned with both the direct and the indirect consequences of bombing — and in the so-called Morale Division, where most social scientists were employed, the question of war morale was central. With the help of elaborately designed and repeatedly tested questionnaires, which provided a fixed list of questions, but allowed open answers and the possibility of more precise questions, the USSBS employees spoke with *Volksgenossen* in Speyer and Nazi party members in Hamburg,

10 On Galbraith, see Richard Parker, *John Kenneth Galbraith. His Life, His Politics, His Economics* (Chicago, 2005).

11 Publications on Nitze mainly focused on his career as a foreign policy expert, for example: David Callahan, *Dangerous Capabilities. Paul Nitze and the Cold War* (New York, 1990). Nitze himself reflects on his role in the USSBS in his autobiography with the telling title *From Hiroshima to Glasnost. At the Center of Decision. A Memoir* (New York, 1989).

12 There are extensive papers in the Likert estate, but unfortunately there is no relevant biography. On his academic work, however, see Jean M. Converse, *Survey Research in the United States. Roots and Emergence 1890-1960* (Berkeley, 1987).

13 Blair T. Johnson and Diana R. Nichols, "Social Psychologists' Expertise in the Public Interest: Civilian Morale Research During World War II," in *Journal of Social Issues* 54, no. 1 (1998): 53-77 discusses the work of young social psychologists during World War II.

14 The USSBS has its own Record Group in the National Archives, College Park, RG 243. See Sophia Dafinger, *Die Lehren des Luftkriegs*; Gian P. Gentile, *How Effective is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo* (New York, 2001) and David MacIsaac, *Strategic Bombing in World War Two. The Story of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey* (New York, 1976).

with ideologically trained BDM girls in Kassel, but also specifically with (sometimes supposed) members of the German resistance such as Hanns Böckler or the mayor of Munich in the Weimar days, Karl Scharnagl. The answers of the interviewees were translated by coding personnel into a code which allowed to analyze and to present them statistically and made it possible to relate variables to each other: bomb tonnage to defeatism; degree of destruction to perseverance. The USSBS staff produced a total of 316 reports, which are still considered an invaluable source of information for the history of the Second World War, the "Third Reich" and Japan.[15]



Figure 2. Big Science: The efficient deployment of numerous field teams had to be planned precisely. Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Rensis Likert Personal Papers, Box 27, Folder "Morale Division Work in Japan 1945."

The question which remained unanswered was which of the above-mentioned connections was actually causal. Did increased bombing inevitably lead to more defeatism, for example? This question was not easy to answer on the basis of the questionnaires and conversations, since Albert Speer had claimed in his interview that Nazi Germany could not have coped with a large number of major air raids like the one on Hamburg — but the answers of the "common people" suggested that once a certain degree of destruction has occurred, the negative effects on the "war morale" would not increase any further. The extent to which this uncertainty should be disclosed was the subject of lively debate between department heads and the Washington headquarters of the Survey. John Kenneth Galbraith considered the attacks on Nazi Germany a grandiose failure, since the economic power of the German Reich seemed to have increased until 1944. Paul H. Nitze was convinced that even more intense and sustained bombing of the German public utility infrastructure would have been necessary.[16] He saw this assessment confirmed by Albert Speer (Minister of Armaments since 1942),

15 An overview of these reports is available online at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.c006010729&view=2up&seq=4 (last accessed 11/13/2020).

16 He saw this view confirmed by Albert Speer in an interview, see United States Strategic Bombing Survey, APO 413, Minutes of Meeting with Reichsminister Albert Speer, Flensburg, May 22, 1945, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, John Kenneth Galbraith Personal Papers, Box 5, Folder "United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Interview with Albert Speer," 1f. » Looking back on the Vietnam War, he explained his skepticism about U.S. warfare with the same conviction: "For strategic bombing to be really, truly effective [it] comes to the horrible end of the spectrum, while not that much bombing, in some cases, […] actually increased people's determination." Paul H. Nitze oral history interview, AFHRA, K239.0512-977, 1977-1981, cp 1, 01095290, 164.

Figure 3. Civilian and military personnel coding the interviews. Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Rensis Likert Personal Papers, Box 27, Folder „Morale Division Work in Japan 1945".

with whom an expert interview had been conducted. Rensis Likert and his Morale Division in turn observed fear reactions, despondency and resignation among the population, but the Morale Division in its internal communications made it unmistakably clear that no causal link could be established between the bombing and war fatigue.[17]

As mentioned above, the initiators of the USSBS also had Japan in mind from the beginning, where the air war only took on a systematic and frightening dimension with the firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945, but the end of the war was not yet foreseeable. When Japan finally capitulated in August 1945, the survey was extended to the Pacific theater of war. In Japan, the Survey believed that the tradition of work at home, the enormous importance of the collective and a reckless neglect of civil defense all had an impact on the civil population's morale during the war.[18] All three conclusions were based, at least in part, on culturalist and tendentially racist arguments. Especially the reports produced in Japan contributed to undifferentiated resentment after 1945 about a supposedly "Asian" form of warfare that was to resurface in Korea and also in Vietnam. One assumption in particular continued to carry weight: that no distinction could be made between combatants and non-combatants on the basis of a strict concept of honor that demanded selfless sacrifice for one's country.[19]

17 On December 4, 1945 Harold Nisselson wrote to Burton R. Fisher: "No relation between bombing and loss from expectation." NARA, Microfilm Publication M1655, Roll 92, Reports 13a.1-14a.1(13).

18 See The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale*, (Washington, 1947), online at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015002274416&view=2up&seq=8 (last accessed 11/13/2020).

19 On the Japanese theater of war, see Sheldon Garon, "Japan: der Krieg der anderen?", in *Eine Geschichte des Krieges. Vom 19. Jahrhundert bis in die Gegenwart*, ed. Bruno Cabanes (Hamburg, 2020), 624-638 as well as a report completed by Ruth Benedict in September 1945 for the Office of War Information: Report No. 25 Japanese Behavior Patterns by Ruth Benedict, 15.9. 1945, NA, Microfilm Publication M1655, Roll 134. In this context, the following report is also interesting: Japanese Group Morale Attitudes, NA, Microfilm Publication M1655, Roll 92, Reports 13a. 1–14a. 1 (13).

Although all departments were thus observing the profound consequences of the air raids, it was still not clear how "strategic aerial warfare" had actually contributed to ending the war. Nevertheless, the Survey's secretariat presented a final report claiming that the Air Force had decided the war.[20] The Secretariat in Washington avoided naming the controversies directly and spoke of the crucial importance of strategic aerial warfare for the course of the war. Not all experts were happy with this. Galbraith in particular was furious that this was a falsification of the results.[21] He met with little response, however. Overall, the USSBS as a large-scale research project had been satisfactory for all those involved: The generals had been given a helpful panorama of the effects of aerial warfare, the scientists had been able to combine ideal research conditions with new opportunities for influence, and the political leaders had a justification for the high costs of the war. The American public received the survey largely positively and also followed the interpretation of the final report.[22] In 1947, the Air Force did indeed become an independent branch of the military.[23]

Figure 4. Concerned about public image: The USSBS photographically records an interview situation in Japan. Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Rensis Likert Personal Papers, Box 27, Folder "Morale Division Work in Japan 1945."

The interests of the social scientists had thus proved to be compatible with those of military and political decision-makers. Cooperation,

20 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (European War)* (Washington, 1945), 15.

21 As early as June 1945, Galbraith, together with Nitze, advised the military leaders in Washington about worthwhile targets on the Japanese battlefield and pleaded against possible attacks on cities and for the bombing of transportation networks and critical economic infrastructure. He criticized the USSBS Secretariat's draft for the European final report as misleading and strongly advocated the intellectual honesty to name the weaknesses of American strategy, see Richard Parker, *John Kenneth Galbraith. His Life, His Politics, His Economics* (Chicago, 2005), 182f.

22 See the press clippings collection in NA, RG 243, Entry 1, Box 1.

23 Richard Overy, *Der Bombenkrieg. Europa 1939 bis 1945* (Berlin, 2014), 901.

however, required the continued active balancing of interests. More than once after the end of the war did the U.S. Congress question whether it was in the interest of a democracy to finance supposedly commissioned research for the armed forces.[24] Several hearings of experts before both chambers show that this field of politics and science was also characterized by considerable conflicts of objectives and that there was no agreement at all on central questions: What should war look like in the present, what should the "war of the future" look like, and with what objectives, strategies, costs and what means should it be waged? At the same time, the protagonists were struggling to determine the degree of influence these experts on violence should have. Negotiation processes and the active representation of their own interests were thus a crucial part of the shaping of the military and academic complex.

The two most important institutions in this context were the "Human Resources Research Institute" of the Air Force itself and the much better known RAND Corporation. The "Human Resources Research Institute," HRRI for short, was attached to the "Air University," a center for professional military education for prospective officers and established directly on an Air Force base in Alabama. Its — short — history shows that the U.S. Air Force, newly founded in 1947, was convinced after the war that social scientists had something substantial to contribute to modern warfare.[25] But its history also shows how fragile this cooperation actually was. Founded in July 1949, the HRRI was abolished in February 1954 due to budget cuts by Congress.[26] The most important reason for this was that the participating scientists did not succeed in communicating their relevance. To the Air Force, their work seemed to focus too little on its practical application. Congress, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the HRRI lacked distance from the Air Force and more generally, that far too much research was being funded for the military.[27] The HRRI was not the only research institute that received money from the Department of Defense. The RAND Corporation, for example, is still successful today with a completely different concept. From the very beginning, it attached great importance to describing itself as independent, while at the same time cultivating the image of a young, flexible, interdisciplinary and highly innovative research institute. Formally, RAND was indeed an independent think tank, but it was founded after the war in close cooperation with the Air Force and maintained close ties with its most important donor until the 1970s. Within the RAND Corporation, the Social Science Department, founded in 1949, began a secondary analysis of the USSBS and at the

24 On the relevant debates, which also inevitably dealt with the supposedly "socialist" agenda of the social sciences, see Gene Lyons, *The Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1969), esp. 144f. and Mark Solovey, "Riding Natural Scientists' Coattails onto the Endless Frontier. The SSRC and the Quest for Scientific Legitimacy," in *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 40, no.4 (2004): 393-422.

25 The U.S. Air Force placed its hopes above all in the concept of psychological warfare, see Arthur M. Johnson, "The Origin and Development of the United States Air Force Psychological Warfare Program 1946-1952," June 1, 1953, AFHRA, K318.804-1, 1946-1952, 00495883, 1. But the tasks of the HRRI also included dealing with "military management, officer leadership, officer education, manpower, [...] strategic intelligence," see note, Human Resources Research Inst., AFHRA, 239.1619-19, 1950-1951, 153572.

26 So far, there is hardly any research on the HRRI. For more on the history of the HRRI, see Dafinger, *Die Lehren des Luftkriegs*, 159-183.

27 On the debate about funding research in the social sciences in the U.S. after 1945, see Mark Solovey, "Riding Natural Scientists' Coattails onto the Endless Frontier. The SSRC and the Quest for Scientific Legitimacy," in *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 40, no. 4 (2004): 393-422; also more recently Mark Solovey, *Social Science for What? Battles over Public Funding for the "Other Sciences" at the National Science Foundation* (Cambridge, 2020).

same time promoted research on so-called psychological warfare. This sounded new, and in part it was actually about alternatives to bombing residential areas that might avoid bloodshed. However, the concept was controversial, and many believed that psychological warfare was really just old wine in new bottles.[28]

When the next air war began in Korea in 1950, the air war experts were thus still at the beginning of their postwar work on the Second World War. Therefore, they made an effort to expand their knowledge on the ground and sent a small group of nine experts to Seoul as early as November 1950 to conduct interviews that were primarily intended to make psychological warfare more efficient. They therefore questioned prisoners of war about the effect of leaflets and North Korean refugees about the effects of the war on Communist rule. Field studies in North Korea, however, were not possible, so the work differed markedly from that of the USSBS. More importantly, the Air Force itself increasingly tried to avoid discussions about its "performance" in the Korean War. The generals were of the opinion that political guidelines had made their promising strategy, which included the use of nuclear weapons, impossible and thus undermined its effectiveness.[29] So if the Korean War is considered a "forgotten war," this certainly applies to its internal evaluation. As a result, the air war doctrine of the Second World War and the empirical work of the USSBS remained the basis for future planning.

Thus the Vietnam War, too, began with heavy strategic bombardments. Already the Rolling Thunder air operation against North Vietnam (from March 1965 to 1968) was geared toward psychological effects and strategic results by trying to force negotiations.[30] The subsequent bombardment of supply routes between North and South Vietnam in particular, which lasted for years, fulfilled a similar function in agrarian Vietnam as the attacks on factories and the

28 The RAND Corporation has attracted a lot of attention from both contemporaries and researchers. See in particular Bruce L. R. Smith, *The RAND Corporation. Wissenschaftliche Politik-Beratung in den USA* (Düsseldorf, 1971); Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York, 1983); Martin J. Collins, *Cold War Laboratory. RAND, the Air Force, and the American State, 1945-1950* (Washington, 2002); Alex Abella, *Soldiers of Reason. The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire* (Boston, 2009). On the survival of military concepts of World War II, see also Sophia Dafinger, "Keine Stunde Null. Sozialwissenschaftliche Expertise und die amerikanischen Lehren des Luftkrieges," in *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History*, 17, no. 1 (2020): 11-35, online at https://zeithistorische-forschungen.de/1-2020/5809 (last accessed 8/25/2020).

29 Bernd Stöver, *Der Kalte Krieg. Geschichte eines radikalen Zeitalters 1947-1991* (Munich, 2011), 97.

30 Alexander Emmerich and Philipp Gassert, *Amerikas Kriege* (Darmstadt, 2014), 201.



Figure 5: "A better objective." Cartoon by Elmer Messner, 1951. © Library of Congress.

railroad network in industrialized Europe. Military supplies to the front were to be stopped, while the constant attacks were also intended to erode the morale of the enemy. Studies and reports of the Vietcong Motivation and Morale Project, for which the RAND Corporation was responsible, supported the assumption that this was a wise strategy. Between 1965 and 1967 this project was led by Leon Gouré, a controversial member of the think tank who saw himself as a key consultant to the Air Force.[31] Despite a lack of clarity on the war situation and a lack of information about the effects of the bombing in North Vietnam, Gouré attempted to identify concrete starting points for military action against the Vietcong by the Air Force.

His conclusion that the Communist opponents were to be weakened by air strikes to such an extent that they would have to engage in peace negotiations did not go unchallenged within the RAND Corporation. Early on, two of his colleagues pointed out contradictions in the statements of the prisoners of war who were interviewed in large numbers for the project.[32] Some RAND employees also saw the

31 On Gouré and the study he led, see Sophia Dafinger, „Wie tickt der Feind zur Krisenzeit? Der US-amerikanische Experte Leon Gouré im Kalten Krieg," in *Osteuropa* 67, no. 1-2 (2017): 131-42.

32 The accusations were mainly related to Gouré's sampling, which was arbitrary in the eyes of his colleagues, see Mai Elliott, *RAND in Southeast Asia. A History of the Vietnam War Era* (Santa Monica, 2010), 125.

problem that statements made by prisoners to American researchers were of little value for some questions.[33] But the Air Force was happy to hold on to the idea that it was possible to optimize desired effects of aerial warfare if only enough data were available.[34] This internal controversy reflected a growing fundamental unease about the Vietnam War among the American public. And indeed, the networks of aerial warfare experts eroded in the course of this war. This was partly because they could no longer ignore the moral dimension of strategic aerial warfare. On the other hand, it was simply because the Vietnam War made it abundantly clear that the vision of a fast, precise and seemingly "clean" air war was and remained a chimera from a military point of view as well. The 1970s therefore marked a turning point in the history of social science expertise on aerial warfare. Although it still exists today, it follows different rules.

What does the history of air war expertise show when one takes a step back and tries to abstract from the individual projects? Five observations can be highlighted:

First, the experiences of the Second World War shaped U.S. foreign and defense policy for several decades. This was not least due to the fact that the strategic air war revolutionized space and shifted the military front to the center of the belligerent societies. The Second World War thus led to an understanding of war as a state of society. In the USA there was talk of a "total war." This meant that war was no longer the sole profession of the military, it now involved the entire society. Military and civilian life merged in a way that allowed unbounded violence that was hard to contain by international law. The "state" of society and the "war morale" of individuals thus became resources for warfare.

The Second World War also revolutionized the institutional system of science: it led to numerous large-scale interdisciplinary research projects, created new networks between science and politics, overturned the rules of research funding and influenced the development of (new) disciplines. In the United States, the experience with wartime "operations research" led to the establishment of new think tanks

33 Konrad Kellen in particular openly criticized Gouré, see Mai Elliott, *RAND in Southeast Asia. A History of the Vietnam War Era* (Santa Monica, 2010), 23. On Kellen's criticism regarding the interviews, see Konrad Kellen, "Conversations with Enemy Soldiers in Late 1968 / Early 1969. A Study of Motivation and Morale," September 1970, RM-6131-1-ISA/ARPA, RAND Corporation Archives.

34 To this end, the Air Force itself set up a project called "Corona Harvest," the aim of which was to secure as much data as possible, such as the number of aircraft, the type and degree of bombing, the distance covered, the losses suffered, the damage to equipment, etc. For example, some documents were microfilmed in the field and the collections were regularly brought to the USA, see Seventh Air Force, Operation Plan 540-69, Corona Harvest, 1 July 1968, AFHRA K740.32269-540, 1 Jul 1968, c. 1, 00525291, 2. From the collected data, a department of the Air University at the Alabama Air Force Base prepared corresponding reports. See *The Effects of United States Air Operations in Southeast Asia. Volume I: The Effects and Impact of United States Air Operations Against North Vietnam 1965-1968*, AFHRA, K717.6094, 1965-68, 1006904. Behind the whole project was the idea that in the future (processable) data would decide wars; see Antoine Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare. Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity* (London, 2009), esp. 126.

after 1945 where applied science flourished and was subsequently actively translated into the language of political and military decision-makers. Until the 1970s, aerial warfare experts continued to draw on the empirical studies carried out during the Second World War. In 1956, for example, an Air Force employee wrote an internal document expressing his displeasure that neither the strategies for air warfare nor the organizations involved in it had been adapted since the Second World War.[35] This was possible because conventional warfare — that is, a war without nuclear weapons — along with a policy of nuclear overkill remained the status quo. Its most modern weapons were fighter planes and bombers. In the classic narratives of the "Cold War" this dimension is often obscured. As a conflict between two opposing systems the "Cold War" is not a key factor in the history of aerial warfare expertise. Neither can the "Cold War" be understood as a trigger for the specific cooperation between science and politics, nor did this cooperation end in 1990 or 1991. Of course, the wars in Korea and Vietnam cannot be understood without their function as proxy wars and, as "hot wars," are as much a part of the history of the "Cold War" as the constant threat of nuclear annihilation. Both were also linked in terms of the history of ideas since some of the air war experts did in fact work as nuclear strategists at the same time. Nor should we underestimate what it meant for the nascent Air Force as one branch of the military to have the majority of the country's nuclear arsenal at its disposal. The resulting gain in power explains why projects dealing with nuclear war were generously funded in the first place. Nevertheless, the so-called proxy wars do not entirely fit into the logic of binary conflict. Above all, the experts on air warfare, most of whom found behavioralist forms of social research convincing, had an interest in not losing themselves completely in the trench warfare of the ideological conflict. For they modelled transferable concepts whose claim was to function for a wide variety of historical societies and were thus interested neither in the openness of historical situations nor in their specificity. Thus, in 1975 their consultancy based on empirical research still functioned according to the same principles as it did in 1945.

My thesis of the formative power of the Second World War therefore also includes the observation that the "Cold War" as an analytical concept greatly narrows the view of the international history of the twentieth century, insofar as it is understood as a temporary "system antagonism" between the USA and the USSR. In this respect,

35 "[W]e are at present rigidly tied to World War II concepts, functions, and organizations." NARA, RG 341, Entry P 516, Box 2, Folder: R&D 1-5 'An Optimum Unified Plan' (1956).

I argue that the Second World War should be taken much more seriously as an explanation for the international history of the second half of the twentieth century than is usually the case in classical studies of transatlantic history after 1945. By no means were the transatlantic partners completely caught up in the logics of an East-West antagonism as early as 1949, and if they were, they probably did not themselves see how present the early 1940s still were. This applies to the paths taken by science and planning on both sides of the Atlantic, but it applies above all to the foreign and defense policy of the new undisputed world power, the United States. It was the Second World War that significantly shifted ideas about legitimate wartime violence. Since the Casablanca Conference, civilians as pillars of the war economy and society were considered by the Allies to be militarily relevant and thus fundamentally legitimate targets of attack. And since the fascist Axis powers had been defeated, thus actually ending countless crimes against humanity by means of a "good war," the military's own role in this war remained largely unquestioned. After the end of the war, experts, the military and politics did not immediately question the new dimensions of strategic warfare. Only in this way can U.S.-American warfare in Korea and Vietnam be understood. A latent racism toward the population of "Asian" states, which found its basis in the expertise of the USSBS, reinforced the dissolution of the boundaries of wartime violence there.

Figure 6. "Silent night." Cartoon by Edmund Duffy, 1951. © Library of Congress.

Secondly, it is thus clear that a specific idea of "rational action" and the fact that the experts' activities took place behind closed doors led to an increasing loss of inhibitions.[36] The historian of science Mitchell Ash uses this term to describe two things: both a growing self-restraint among scientists in the service of the so-called national cause and their increasing willingness to intensify the violence of war. In the United States in the 1940s — not least thanks to the USSBS — it was possible to avoid a debate on the legitimacy of aerial warfare. During and after the Second World War, only British society argued about the carpet bombing carried out by the Royal Air Force. In

36 Mitchell G. Ash, "Wissenschaft — Krieg — Modernität: Einführende Bemerkungen," *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte* 19 (1996): 69-75, here 71.



Figure 7. Turning a narrative into numbers: The USSBS Morale Division worked on the coding of answers. NA, RG 243, Records of the Office of the Chairman. Miscellaneous Records, 1940-47, Box 2.

the USA, on the other hand, the Army Air Forces understood how to communicate their role in the "good war" as appropriate to the situation. And even after the Second World War, the experts did not attack the prevailing air war doctrine. They held on to the silent agreement that strategic bombing of civilian targets could shorten wars and was therefore acceptable. Until conflict openly surfaced during the Vietnam War, they invariably pleaded for the further development of strategic air warfare, not for its banning. They unswervingly oriented their activities toward a guiding concept that fitted their understanding of "rational action," namely that of efficiency. The costs of the war (which included the cost of materials, but also the cost of human lives on their own side) were to be minimized. At the same time they strove for the quickest possible victory. Human lives thus became a calculating factor.

Why a calculating factor? Because, and this is my third central thesis, air war expertise and the heightened profile of quantitative empirical social research went hand in hand. The social sciences, which had not yet been established as a discipline before the war, received attention and promotion because of the war. However, this did not apply to qualitative, but only to quantitative approaches to applied social research. Empirical research became increasingly important because, in analogy to the natural sciences, the social sciences also sought to and were expected to produce measurable quantities. Military and political decision-makers demanded clear results that they could use as a basis for their planning. The aerial warfare experts themselves met this demand in order to stabilize cooperation and consolidate their position — but also because they

shared a positivistic, future-oriented view of the world with the consumers of knowledge. They were convinced that the future could be shaped based on constantly expanding evidence and knowledge. The cooperation between the social sciences and politics thus fostered certain disciplines, methods and paradigms. Quantitative social research, behaviorism, cybernetic approaches — all of these were partly developed in the expert circles themselves, and in part war expertise helped these theories and methods to achieve a breakthrough. State funding should not be underestimated as a kind of indirect research support for these quantitative approaches. New research approaches, such as systems analysis, social and organizational psychology, trauma research, group sociology, and survey research, were advanced in the context of expertise for the state.[37] They continue to shape the modern social sciences today. Qualitative approaches to describing societies have remained marginal in comparison to generously funded interdisciplinary quantitative social research.



Figure 8. Draft of a possible presentation of social science findings in the USSBS: At what point does a society collapse under bombing?
NA, RG 243, Entry 1, Box 3: Office of the Chairman. General Correspondence 1944-1947, folder 063: Charts & Tables.

Fourth, this is not the real scandal of the social sciences' contribution to strategic bombing. What can be observed, however, and this is quite remarkable, is how the air war experts pushed a "technocratization" of government action without having to face the democratic debate themselves. The aerial warfare experts and their activities were part of a broader change in democratic planning and decision-making processes. Since the 1940s, scientific advice gained enormously in importance in the United States, until it came under fire during the Vietnam War in the late 1960s. Some air war experts themselves as well as anti-war activists and media representatives increasingly

37 On the history of the social sciences after 1945, see *A Historiography of the Modern Social Sciences*, ed. Roger E. Backhouse and Philippe Fontaine (Cambridge, 2014).

questioned governmental decision-making, including the experts' advisory activities.[38] This criticism concerned both the quality of the expertise, which apparently did not help prevent the military disaster, and their blindness to moral issues. And indeed, the air war experts had concrete claims to shape the situation, which they derived from an elitist understanding of political rule. Planning with an inevitably normative quality was, however, communicated by them as simply logically compelling. Thus they claimed that their recommendations for action were un- or pre-political. They, as scientific experts, would, according to this narrative, merely present the existing options for action in all clarity.

In fact, the experts in their offices were more influential than they would have us believe. Looking back on their activities, indirect consequences that have shaped the so-called "West" become evident as well. The expertise of the social scientists formed powerful concepts of what constitutes modern societies and how they function. They questioned the pillars of social stability, they discovered phenomena such as trauma and resilience, they described fear reactions and studied gender roles. Group psychology also received decisive impulses from the air war expertise. In this way, defense policy research ultimately also influenced domestic policy. In their projects, some air war experts dealt with core questions of sociology: How do societies based on the division of labor function? What do classes, strata or milieus mean for the functioning of political and social systems? Gender issues were also considered and contributed to surprising results, such as the fact that fear reactions do not depend on gender.[39] Such research ultimately also affected American society. The fact that the quantitative social sciences were so strongly promoted in a military context meant that around 1950, for example, more literature on societies subjected to bombing was available than, for example, on flood disasters or devastating storms — with the result that the findings from wars fought far from home were used for domestic disaster policy.[40] This was a challenge for the democratic

38 Most notably among them was RAND employee Daniel Ellsberg, who had initially come to Vietnam as a convinced foreign policy "hawk," but also his colleagues Anthony Russo, Konrad Kellen, Melvin Gurtov, Oleg Hoeffding, Arnold Horelick, and Paul F. Langer, who wrote an open letter to *The New York Times* in October 1969, in which they identified themselves as employees of the RAND Corporation and demanded an immediate withdrawal of American troops, see "Open Letter by Daniel Ellsberg, Melvin Gurtov, Oleg Hoeffding, Arnold Horelick, Konrad Kellen and Paul F. Langer to The New York Times," October 8, 1969, https://web.archive.org/web/20170219075956/www.ellsberg.net/documents/Letter.pdf. (last accessed 10/14/2020). See also Steven V. Roberts, "Six RAND Experts Support Pullout, Back Unilateral Step Within One Year in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, October 9, 1969, 9.

39 The question of the meaning of gender was raised above all during the Second World War, when the stereotype of the hysterical woman was particularly present, see Dietmar Süß, *Tod aus der Luft. Kriegsgesellschaft und Luftkrieg in Deutschland und England* (Munich, 2011), 387.

40 See Irving L. Janis, "The Psychological Impact of Air Attacks: A Survey and Analysis of Observation on Civilian Reactions During World War II," Memorandum for Rand Corporation, Crisis and Disaster Study of 15.01.1949, » RM-93, 1. On the work of "disaster experts" in the USA during the Cold War, see Cécile Stephanie Stehrenberger, "Systems and Organizations under Stress. Zur Geschichte der sozialwissenschaftlichen Katastrophenforschung (1949-1979)," in *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History*, Online Edition, 11, no. 3 (2014): 406-424, http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/3-2014/id=5140 (last accessed 8/25/2020). The importance of the Second World War for civil defense and disaster control after 1945 is also emphasized by Martin Diebel, *Atomkrieg und andere Katastrophen. Zivil- und Katastrophenschutz in der Bundesrepublik und Großbritannien nach 1945* (Paderborn, 2017).

constitution of the USA. For the public was not able to understand exactly what the experts did and how their expertise was used. For a long time they did not have to face a broad social debate. As a result, the evaluations, analyses and planning carried out in ministries, universities and think tanks under strict secrecy were not subject to democratic control.

Nevertheless, the history of expertise in aerial warfare is not a success story of any kind. Therefore my fifth thesis is this: The aerial warfare experts actually failed in their claim to be able to plan future aerial warfare precisely by means of a steady, evidence-based increase in knowledge. First of all, it is by no means possible to speak of a linear increase in knowledge or a steady "scientification" of aerial warfare. However, this was precisely the assumption of experts, politicians and the military. They all shared an idea of temporality, which ultimately assumed that situations would repeat themselves in one way or another in the future. They were therefore convinced that lessons could be learned from the past for planning future events. In fact, the illusion, actively maintained for decades, that many individual learning experiences would eventually lead to complete control over the consequences of aerial warfare points to the changing relationship between science and expertise in a democratic state. The promise to generate lessons was held up by the "air war experts" precisely because their status was fragile and had to be negotiated continuously. Secondly, the content of aerial warfare expertise was also ambivalent and always part of political and military strategic conflicts. Since the 1940s, air war experts have repeatedly formulated findings that should have fundamentally challenged strategic air warfare. Even the Morale Division of the USSBS had not been able to identify a compelling connection between strategic bombing and uncertainty, fear, fatalism or even resistance. However, this knowledge was marginalized and simply forgotten in practice.

Therefore, we still do not know when a society falls apart under bombing. But the history of aerial warfare experts can help us re-accentuating the transatlantic history of the twentieth century. It detaches itself from the narrowing of international relations after 1945 to the logics of the "Cold War," especially the fixation on the atomic bomb. It shows how central the Second World War was for the United States and its defense policy. And it involves actors who are often missing in representations of foreign and defense policy: academics and experts. It thus links previously unconnected fields



WAR DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Date: September 1, 1945

IDENTIFICATION NO.

NAME: Nitze (LAST) Paul (FIRST) H. (INITIAL) — DATE OF BIRTH: 1-16-07

NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment

This action is subject to the provisions on the reverse hereof, when applicable. — EFFECTIVE DATE: 9-1-45 — FOR C. S. C. USE

	(FROM)	(TO)
NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT		
POSITION TITLE AND OCCUPATIONAL CODE		Expert
SERVICE GRADE AND SALARY		$25.00 per diem, W.A.E.
FORCE, SERVICE OFFICE		Office, Secretary of War
DIVISION, BRANCH AND SECTION		U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey Equipment Division
DUTY STATION LOCATION		WASHINGTON, D. C.

REMARKS: Appointment is hereby approved for service not to exceed 180 days.

Figure 9. Well-known name, laconic job title: Paul H. Nitze's career as an "expert." Library of Congress Manuscript Division, The Papers of Paul H. Nitze, Box 165.

of research on international politics, the history of knowledge and science, and flight, exile and migration. It is also clear how close the transatlantic alliance was in the second half of the twentieth century — not only because the FRG was esteemed by the United States as a dependent and loyal partner in the conflict between two superpowers. Rationality, planning and control were regarded as a sensible basis for democratic politics in both countries, and this was by no means an "American" development that was merely adopted on the other side of the Atlantic, but a common development whose roots lay in the war of annihilation unleashed by Nazi Germany.

Until the Vietnam War, when public protests led to major upheavals, the cooperation described above between the social sciences, the Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force worked. Air war experts rationalized attacks on civilian targets to such an extent that they could long appear legitimate to all those involved. In the transatlantic world, listening to experts and taking their knowledge into account in political decisions was a normality for several decades, no matter how fiercely contested. We should therefore not underestimate their importance and continue to research their work for think tanks, armed forces, ministries and governments. The concept of the expert as mediator, coined by Nico Stehr and applied usefully to historiography by Margit Szöllösi-Janze, still seems to me to make sense in this context.[41] If one looks at what scientific innovation meant in concrete terms, what consequences it had, one also comes across the "dangerous suggestions"[42] inherent in the experts' promise to make strategic air warfare predictable. That the cohesion of enemy societies was vulnerable if the bombs hit the right targets at the right time — this assumption was based on a simplified picture of societies and historical constellations. Nevertheless, the experts' promise of being able to control highly complex interrelationships is still effective today.

The experts of the current pandemic can also claim to have used their knowledge to enable governments to manage a situation that

41 See Margit Szöllösi-Janze, *Fritz Haber 1868-1934. Eine Biographie* (Munich, 2015) and Margit Szöllösi-Janze, „Wissensgesellschaft in Deutschland. Überlegungen zur Neubestimmung der deutschen Zeitgeschichte über Verwissenschaftlichungsprozesse," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 30 (2004): 277-313. See also Nico Stehr and Reiner Grundmann, *Expertenwissen. Die Kultur und die Macht von Experten, Beratern und Ratgebern* (Weilerswist, 2010).

42 Herfried Münkler, *Kriegssplitter. Die Evolution der Gewalt im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert* (Reinbek, 2016), 140.

societies would otherwise be facing unprepared. Nevertheless, something has changed. On the one hand, this change may be welcome if it means that a critical and pluralistic public demands a democratic debate on supposed inevitable constraints. The German example shows that the vast majority of the public takes those scientists seriously as experts who openly communicate their knowledge but also the limits of their work. Today, experts act in front of a public that cannot be ignored by politicians in their decision-making. Women, too, are now accepted in greater numbers as experts based on their research, even if they are still clearly underrepresented in a profession in which the attribution of competence is decisive. The fact that even the humanities and natural sciences, in the face of Covid-19, are clearly revealing the ambivalences and gaps in their research is certainly evidence of a changed relationship between democratic societies and their elites, and it is also an expression of a new self-image of the scientists and experts themselves. They formulate in all clarity that knowledge cannot replace political decisions, but can only point out known conditions and consequences. At the same time, however, and this development is worrying, the year 2020 shows very clearly what happens when governments misunderstand this new restraint by acting as if there was no verifiable knowledge at all, as if one's responses to the world's challenges were variable at will. The fact that the USA, the oldest democracy in modern times, seemed to consider scientific expertise to be negligible during the first peak of the health crisis is particularly remarkable in view of the history of evidence-based planning. It is to be hoped that this attitude will not form a precedent.

Translated by Insa Kummer

Sophia Dafinger works as an academic councilor at the Chair of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Augsburg. Her dissertation, for which she received the 2018 Mieczysław Pemper Research Prize, was recently published as *Die Lehren des Luftkriegs: Sozialwissenschaftliche Expertise in den USA vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis Vietnam* in the GHI's „Transatlantic Historical Studies" Series with the Franz Steiner Verlag. She is currently researching the history of solidarity.

Conference Reports

RECREATING SEPARATE SPHERES ACROSS NOT-SO-SEPARATE WORLDS: GENDER AND REEDUCATION IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE USA AFTER WORLD WAR II

Conference at GHI Pacific Regional Office Berkeley, February 20-21, 2020. Cosponsored by the GHI and the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg. Made possible by a grant from the German Research Foundation (DFG). Conveners: Jana Aresin (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg), Heike Paul (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg), Claudia Roesch (GHI Washington). Participants: Nikolai Blaumer (Thomas Mann House, Los Angeles), Katharina Gerund (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg); Sonia Gomez (University of Chicago); Mire Koikari (University of Hawai'i); Akino Oshiro (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg); Tomoyuki Sasaki (William & Mary College); Michiko Takeuchi (California State University, Long Beach); Kathryn Tolbert (*Washington Post*).

Soon after the end of World War II, American occupation forces began to reeducate and democratize the former enemy nations Germany and Japan in order to turn them into allies in the emerging Cold War. Many of these reeducation campaigns were directed towards women. This happened at a time when gender norms within the United States underwent a transformation process as white middle-class women in the U.S. moved *away* from breadwinning jobs and the public sphere into a suburban domesticity.

In order to trace these transformations and their inherent paradoxes, the two-day workshop "Recreating Separate Spheres Across Not-So-Separate Worlds: Gender and Reeducation in Japan, Germany, and the USA after World War II" revisited reeducation programs to investigate their underlying policies through the lens of gender norms and in a comparative perspective. The workshop also focused on different medias of circulation such as magazines, films and literature.

In the first presentation, Mire Koikari discussed different versions of new domestic lifestyles in the English-language *Okinawa Graphic* magazine. The magazine connected Okinawan readers with Okinawa diaspora communities in the United States, Hawaii, Latin America and the Japanese mainland. Koikari discussed a home story of the American high commander and his wife, reports of school lunches that switched from a rice-based to a wheat and milk-based diet, and features on the Japanese Empress Michiko to demonstrate how

images of domesticity strengthened ties to both U.S. occupation forces and mainland Japanese culture.

Following Koikari, Jana Aresin presented her ongoing dissertation project on women's gender norms in American and Japanese women's magazines. She divided women's representations in these magazines into four archetypical roles of women as workers, political activists, consumers, and educators. Women as workers were young and unmarried, while married mothers assumed the role of educators for democracy in their nuclear families. The focus in the magazines, however, was on the role of women as consumers, claiming that women would gain political power through consumerism by learning how to handle money and control their own and their family's finances. Thus, the magazines advocated homemaking as a profession and promoted the concept of modern domesticity that assigned women the roles of homemaker and educator in a compassionate marriage while their husbands fulfilled the role of a single breadwinner.

In contrast to Aresin, Michiko Takeuchi focused on transnational networks of working women in Japan and the U.S. Tracing the similarities between postwar Japanese declarations on women's work and American communist women's demands for working women in the interwar period, she was able to illustrate networks of Japanese and American social reformers since before World War Two. Japanese women activists were especially active in the International Labor Organization and formed networks with international reformers there. The Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) in Tokyo became a networking hub to bring U.S. reformers like Jane Addams, Margaret Sanger and Alice Paul to Japan. Some of these activists, who visited and worked with Japanese feminists in the interwar years, later became involved with reconstruction and NGOs in postwar Germany.

Switching the focus towards male gender norms in postwar Japan, Tomoyuki Sasaki presented his research on the role of the Japanese army in the postwar society. He showed that the army acted as an agent of the Japanese welfare state as it offered job opportunities for unemployed and uneducated men in rural areas who were left behind by Japan's postwar urban industrial boom. By bringing men from overpopulated Kyushu to underpopulated Hokkaido, the Japanese army became an agent of local welfare and development. On Hokkaido, enlisted men engaged in civil engineering projects, provided fire services and disaster relief, and helped farmers who had lost sons with the harvest. Therefore, the army, perhaps inadvertently, became

a well-appreciated civil society institution in postwar Japan. At the same time, the politics of displacement also produced negative effects and led to tensions between soldiers and the local population.

In the first day's final presentation, Heike Paul focused on postwar Germany and the negotiations of women's role and domesticity there. She investigated postwar literary work by progressive author Irmgard Keun, who had praised the "New Woman" in the late Weimar Republic in her best-known novels and spent the war years in exile. Her postwar short story "Nur noch Frauen" (1954), set in a dystopian landscape where only women and one man have survived, emphasizes feelings of alienation on the part of feminists in early postwar Germany: In an economy of scarcity — including that of men — the female majority is not liberated from both Nazis and men, but rather still revolves around men as necessary partners in reproduction. An interpretation of the story suggests that Keun criticizes how women covered up their complicity in the Nazi state by retreating to domestic lifestyles and to their kitchens, a space which the Nazi regime had propagated as the appropriate place for women. Paul then contrasts this form of domesticity as retreat to the U.S. version of domesticity epitomized in Richard Nixon's kitchen debate with Nikita Khrushchev and in Hollywood films such as *Pillow Talk* with Doris Day and Rock Hudson. She concluded that the American version of domesticity also, to some extent, followed the logic of reeducation through informal social change and popular culture that promised access to modern consumer goods and romantic happiness.

The meeting's second day began with Sonia Gomez's presentation on gender norms in U.S. immigration policies towards Japan. In the first part of her presentation, she demonstrated that the Gentlemen's Agreement (1908) between Japan and the U.S. excluded Japanese men from immigrating to the U.S. but allowed Japanese women to enter if they came as wives and not as workers. This gave rise to the figure of the Japanese picture bride, who was married to a Japanese-American man in the U.S. who had only seen her picture — and vice versa. In the second part of her talk, Gomez argued that marriage continued to be a gateway to immigration for Japanese women in the postwar era with the GI Bride Act (1948), which was originally intended for servicemen to bring home their European brides. While the act extended the right of military men to marry whomever they wanted including non-American women, Japanese women only gained access to immigration and American citizenship *through* marriage and

domesticity. Bridal schools by the Red Cross and the YWCA taught Japanese women American styles of homemaking, fashion, and cosmetics along with English, Civics and Government and fostered the concept of citizenship through domesticity. In the end, this immigration policy meant that in both periods far more Japanese women were able to immigrate to the U.S. than men.

Gomez's presentation was followed by a screening of the documentary film *Fall Seven Times, Get Up Eight — The Japanese War Brides,* which introduced three Japanese women who had married U.S. service men and their adult daughters. After the film, one of its directors, Kathryn Tolbert, presented her findings from oral history interviews with other military brides who did not feature in the film. She showed that Japanese women had found themselves in between the American racial lines, especially when they married African American men or lived in the Jim Crow South. Many women ended up in unstable marriages and their husbands eventually left them. Often, they had married men from rural and lower-class backgrounds and were isolated from other Japanese immigrants in rural farm communities, where their wishes to partake in an American consumer lifestyle were not fulfilled. Nevertheless, they continued to stay and raise their children as American citizens.

During the lunch break, three reeducation films from 1948 to 1952 aimed at German audiences were screened. The first advertised the efficiency of the modern kitchen, the second depicted the advantages that electricity had for a Bavarian farmwoman and her husband, and the third explained club life and fundraising by showing how a local women's club in Baden-Württemberg raised money to open a day care center. In her comments on the films, Heike Paul pointed out that these films were part of the second stage of reeducation that did not show cities in rubble or the atrocities of concentration camps , but instead focused on modernization and served to advertise American lifestyles in Germany.

In the final discussion, the question of terminology was raised as German and American sources pertaining to Germany used the term "reeducation" in English or the more negatively connoted *Umerziehung* in German. Sources referring to Japan only used the term "democratization. This led to the observation that reeducation programs made no references to prewar experiences with democracy in either Japan or Weimar Germany. The concept of *Stunde Null* (Zero Hour) after the German capitulation meant a total break from the past. The

Weimar Republic was remembered as unstable with regards to the political system and especially to the permissiveness of fluid gender and sexual norms.

Overall, the different presentations referred to three recurring themes: the postwar ideal of domesticity and its function in different settings, the modernization of homes through consumer goods, and women's participation in civil society. For the U.S. context, the concept of modern domesticity was tied to the nuclear family and the democratic industrial society. In the German context, a similar form of domesticity resonated with backwardness of a different kind and represented a retreat from political participation and taking responsibility for Nazi crimes. In Japan, the teaching of domesticity in bridal schools, magazines and advertisements prepared women for immigration and connected rural and marginalized communities to the rapid industrialization of urban Japanese society.

By bringing together different concepts of gender norms and domesticity in a transnational comparison the workshop went beyond German historiography, which depicts the postwar years as a conservative and inward-looking era, as well as American historiography, which discusses modern domesticity as the home front response to Cold War anxieties. The conference demonstrated that American domesticity had transnational implications beyond the famous Nixon-Khrushchev kitchen debate. In fact, American domesticity promised women in postwar Germany and Japan that a domestic lifestyle would grant them modernization and the benefits of consumerism. These would make their lives easier, their husbands happier, and grant them civic participation. This was the biggest promise that American reeducation campaigns made in the immediate postwar period.

Claudia Roesch (GHI Washington)

GHI News

NEW GHI PUBLICATIONS

1. Publications of the German Historical Institute (Cambridge University Press)

Jan C. Jansen and Simone Lässig, eds., *Refugee Crises, 1945-2000: Political and Societal Responses in International Comparison*

John P.R. Eicher, *Exiled Among Nations: German and Mennonite Mythologies in a Transnational Age*

2. Studies in German History (Berghahn Books)

Anne C. Schenderlein, *Germany on their Minds: German Jewish Refugees in the United States and Their Relationships with Germany, 1938–1988*

Simone Lässig and Andreas Weiss, eds., *The World of Children: Foreign Cultures in Nineteenth-Century German Education and Entertainment*

3. Transatlantische Historische Studien (Steiner Verlag)

Sophia Dafinger, *Die Lehren des Luftkriegs: Sozialwissenschaftliche Expertise in den USA vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis Vietnam*

Elisabeth Piller, *Selling Weimar: German Public Diplomacy and the United States, 1918-1933*

4. Bulletin Supplement

Andrea Westermann and Onur Erdur, eds., *Histories of Migrant Knowledge: Transatlantic and Global Perspectives*. Bulletin Supplement 15 (2020).

5. Other Publications

Das Pazifikbüro des DHI Washington: Aufbauphase 2017-2019

Available at: https://www.ghi-dc.org/publications/publication/publication/das-pazifikbuero-des-dhi-washington-aufbauphase

STAFF CHANGES

Markus Borchertmeyer joined the GHI as Administrative Associate in August 2020. He previously worked for the German Armed Forces administration in Naples, Italy.

Elisabeth Engel, Research Fellow since October 2014, left the GHI in December 2020 in order to pursue her Habilitationsverfahren in the German university system.

Jan C. Jansen, Research Fellow since May 2014, left the GHI in September 2020 in order to take up a tenure-track assistant professorship for global history at the Universität Duisburg-Essen.

David Lazar, Senior Editor since September 2001, retired at the end of June 2020.

Jana Keck joined the GHI in September 2020 as a Research Fellow in Digital History. She studied English and American studies and linguistics at the University of Stuttgart. Before joining the GHI, she worked on the DFG-funded research project "Oceanic Exchanges: Tracing Global Information Networks in Historical Newspaper Repositories, 1840-1914," which brought together a research team of scholars from seven countries in Europe and the Americas to examine transnational and transcontinental news circulation in nineteenth-century newspapers. In her PhD-project, "Text Mining America's German-Language Newspapers, 1830-1914: Processing Germanness," she investigates viral phenomena in America's nineteenth-century German-language press to study the construction and preservation of a German community across states and decades.

Carolin Liebisch-Gümuş joined the GHI as a Research Fellow in Global and Transregional History in October 2020. Her research centers on the interplay between transboundary phenomena (like international organizations, air mobility, or migration) and territorial developments (like nation building, drawing borders, and mobility management). Before joining the GHI, she taught courses in modern history at the University of Kiel for four years. From 2013 to 2016, she was a doctoral candidate at Heidelberg University and a member of the research group "Subaltern Diplomacy, 1930-60" within the Cluster of Excellence "Asia and Europe in a Global Context." Focusing on Turkish nationalists who interacted with the League of Nations, her PhD project revealed the deep-rooted, yet asymmetrical and conflictual entanglements between interwar internationalism and nation building in Turkey. In 2015, she spent one term as a guest student lecturer at the University of Chicago as well as two months at the Orient-Institut Istanbul. Her first monograph, *Verflochtene Nationsbildung: Die Neue*

Türkei und der Völkerbund 1918-38, was published in 2020. In her current project, she explores airport transit zones as historical sites. Tracing their development back to the mid-twentieth century, she investigates their shifting and contested function in the transnational management of global air traffic. She is also preparing a book on the role of airports in the history of migration regimes.

Mario Peters joined the GHI in October 2020 as a Research Fellow in American and Transatlantic History. Before he joined the GHI, Mario Peters was a Feodor Lynen Postdoctoral Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and visiting scholar in the Social History program at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. He completed his PhD in history at Leibniz University in Hannover in 2016, where he also worked as assistant professor and taught Latin American and Caribbean history at the Centre for Atlantic and Global Studies. He is the author of *Apartments for Workers: Social Housing, Segregation, and Stigmatization in Urban Brazil* (2018). His current research interests are spread across the intersection of mobility studies, environmental history, and the study of Inter-American relations. In his new project, he examines the development of Pan-American transportation infrastructures between 1870 and 1970, focusing on the cooperation and exchange of knowledge between North American and Latin American experts who contributed to the planning and construction of these infrastructures.

Rebekka Sherman-Loeffler, joined the GHI in July 2020 as Assistant to the Director. Previously she held the position of seminar coordinator in the Department of Molecular Biosciences at the University of Texas at Austin.

Andrea Westermann, Research Fellow and Head of the GHI's Pacific Regional Office since August 2017, left the GHI in November 2020 in order to return to Switzerland, where she will be a guest scholar at the ETH Zurich in the spring semester 2021.

GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to European and North American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars to pursue research projects that draw upon primary sources located in the United States. We are particularly interested in research projects that fit into the following fields: German and European history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the USA in international relations, and American history (European doctoral and postdoctoral scholars only).

The proposed research projects should make use of historical methods and engage with the relevant historiography. We especially invite applications from doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars who currently have no funding from their home institutions. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to five months.

The GHI also offers a number of other long-term doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles to strengthen key research interests at institute, including: the history of knowledge, the history of race and ethnicity, the history of religion and religiosity, the history of family and kinship, the history of migration, and North American history. In addition to these opportunities, several new fellowships programs have been introduced: the Binational Tandem Research Program for "The History of Knowledge" and "Global and Trans-regional History," and the Gerda Henkel Postdoctoral Fellowship for Digital History.

For further information about these programs and current application deadlines, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns' interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

GHI FELLOWSHIP RECIPIENTS FOR 2021

Long-term Visiting Fellowships

Johanna Folland, University of Michigan
Globalizing Socialist Health: Africa, East Germany, and the AIDS Crisis

Martina Schaefer, Vanderbilt University
Black Power and African Diasporic Religions: The Spiritual and Cultural Trajectory of Black Empowerment, 1965-1998

Thomas Fielder Valone, Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, USHMM
Prelude to Mass Murder: Anti-Jewish Humiliation Rituals in Germany, Austria, Poland, and Lithuania, 1933-1941

Gerda Henkel Fellowship for Digital History

Sebastian Bondzio, Universität Osnabrück
Researching German Migration to the United States by Mining Historical Big Data:
The Castle Garden Immigration Center's Database in Digital History

Short-term Doctoral Research Fellowships

Felix Bader, University of Erfurt
Die zeitgenössische Rezeption des Nationalsozialismus durch ausgewählte orthodoxe Kirchen 1933-1945

Ryan Gesme, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Heimat or Hjemland: National Consciousness, Self-Determination, and the Great War in Schleswig-Holstein, 1897-1920

Matthias Kemmerer, Gesellschaft für Unternehmensgeschichte (GUG)
Deutsche Bank and the Remaking of International Finance, 1968-1985

Natascha Kirchner, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf
The Reception of Käthe Kollwitz in the US between 1933 and 1945

Clemens Alban Ottenhausen, University of Florida
Documenta's Elective Affinities: Modern Art's Comeback in Postwar Germany

Lisa Patt, Universität Erfurt
"Let's Make America Great Again": A History of Nostalgia as a United States Identity Ideology in the 1980s

Short-term Postdoctoral Research Fellowships

Bastiaan Bouwman, Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies
Christian Nongovernmental Organizations and the Post-World War II Refugee Crisis

Stefanie Coché, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen
Religion und Moderne: Religiöse Führungspersönlichkeiten in den USA im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert

Nadja Klopprogge, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen
(Dis-)Connected: The Transatlantic History of the Encyclopedia Africana

Gavin Wiens, University of Toronto/York University
Trading on War: German military advisors and the world, 1815-1989

Horner Library Fellowships

Michael Burri, Bryn Mawr College
The Austro-American Relief Society and Humanitarian Relief to Central Europe after 1918

Charlotte Faucher, University of Manchester
Projecting France: The making of French cultural diplomacy in Britain, c.1870–1946

Maximilian Klose, Freie Universität Berlin
Why They Gave: CARE, the American Public, and US-German Relations after 1945

RESEARCH SEMINAR AND COLLOQUIUM, SPRING/SUMMER 2020

January 30	**Samuel C. Huneke (George Mason University)** The Problem with Persecution: Assessing Gay Life in West Germany
February 19	**Levke Harders (GHI/Universität Bielefeld)** Case Studies on Race and Migration in 19th-Century Alsace
February 27	**Roman Hutter (Universität Wien /University of Amsterdam)** Travelling Poets, Travelling Ideas: Oskar Pastior und das Vermitteln im Kalten Krieg
	Ricardo Neuner (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin) Die Vermessung des Konsumenten: Die Psychologie des Verbrauchers in der amerikanischen Verhaltensforschung nach 1945
June 4	**Amir Theilhaber (GHI/Technische Universität Berlin)** The Ethnological Collection of the Lippisches Landesmuseum in Rural Detmold: A Glocal History from 1835 until the present
June 10	**Anna-Carolin Augustin (GHI)** "Remnants rescued from the Fire": A Transnational Cultural History of Jewish Ceremonial Objects after 1945
June 25	**Clara-Sophie Höhn (Universität Augsburg)** Turning Oneself Inside Out: White Southern Women's Route to Civil Rights Activism

DIGITAL CULTURAL HERITAGE DC MEETUP #DCHDC

January 21	**Student Lightning Talks** Speakers: Alexandra Zaremba (History Doctoral Student, American University), Juli Folk (iSchool Class of 2019, University of Maryland), Tammy Tran (MSLIS Graduate Student, Catholic University), Gerald Jones III (Business Management Major, Mooreland-Springard Research Center, Digital Howard, Howard University)

February 18	**Doug Peterson (Head of Research and Development, Digital Transitions Cultural Heritage)** Image Quality Standards: What they are, why they matter, and how you can get started with them
	Scott Pennington (Digital Imaging Specialist, National Archives) Quick and Dirty Intro to Imaging at National Archives
	Peter Steinhauer (Independent Photographer) Images of Asia: Analog to Digital and Back with Instant Capture
April 21	**The Pandemic and DCHDC**
May 26	**Media, Collaborative Research in Digital Preservation and the Humanities** Speakers: Laura Wagner (Duke University Rubenstein Library), Casey Davis Kaufman (WGBH + American Archives of Public Broadcasting) & Mark Williams (Dartmouth College)
August 18	**Lopez D. Matthews (Howard University Libraries and the Moorland-Spingarn Research Center)** Digitizing the Black Experience
	Marisa Parham (University of Maryland) African American Digital Humanities Initiative (AADHUM)

GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2020/21

In response to COVID-19, the German Historical Institute is closed for visitors until further notice. Unless otherwise noted, all events will be held virtually.

June 9
Racism in Europe: A Critical Assessment
Virtual Panel Discussion
Speakers: Jean Claude Beaujour, Vice-Chair of France Amérique; Charles M. Huber, Former MP in the German Bundestag

June 11
Migration and Xenophobia across the Pacific in the Time of COVID-19: Current Problems in Their Historical Context
Virtual Panel Discussion
Panelists: Mae Ngai (Columbia University), Nayan Shah (University of Southern California), Lok Siu (University of California, Berkeley), Yasuko Takezawa (Kyoto University); Moderators: Albert Manke (GHI PRO) and Yufei Zhou (German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo)

September 15
Rethinking Memory and Knowledge during Times of Crisis
Part 1 of Virtual Panel Series Racism in History and Context
Panelists: Ana Lucia Araujo (Howard University), Manuela Bauche (FU Berlin), Norbert Frei (Universität Jena), and Michael Rothberg (UCLA) | Moderators: Akasemi Newsome (UC Berkeley) and Francisco Bethencourt (King's College London)

October 12-14
Histories of Migration: Transatlantic and Global Perspectives
Bucerius Young Scholars Forum at GHI PRO at UC Berkeley
Conveners: Christiane Reinecke (Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies, Osnabrück) and Andrea Westermann (GHI PRO)

October 15
The Outsiders: Refugees in Europe and the West since 1492
11th Gerald Feldman Lecture (virtual)
Speaker: Philipp Ther (Universität Wien)

October 19 ***Die rechtschaffenen Mörder*: Reading and Conversation with Author Ingo Schulze**
Lecture and Discussion (virtual)
Panelists: Ingo Schulze, Lilla Balint (UC Berkeley), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington)

October 27 **Catholics, Protestants, and the Origins of Europe's Harsh Religious Pluralism**
Lecture (virtual)
Speaker: Udi Greenberg (Dartmouth College); moderator: Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (UC Berkeley)

October 29 **Rethinking Health and Power during Times of Crisis**
Part 2 of Virtual Panel Series Racism in History and Context
Panelists: Manuela Boatcă (Universität Freiburg), Teresa Koloma Beck (Universität der Bundeswehr, München), Monica Muñoz Martinez (UT Austin), and Kathryn Olivarius (Stanford University) Moderators: Elisabeth Engel (GHI Washington) and Leti Volpp (UC Berkeley)

November 10 **The Emperor and the Executioner: Capital Punishment in the Late Habsburg Monarchy**
Lecture (virtual)
Speaker: Alison Frank Johnson (Harvard University)

November 11 **Shipping Rocks and Sand: Ballast in Global History**
34th Annual Lecture of the GHI Washington (virtual)
Speaker: Roland Wenzlhuemer (Ludwigs-Maximilian-Universität München); Comment: Francesca Trivellato (Institute for Advanced Studies)

November 18 **Teaching German and Global History with Digital Sources: Examples from Practice**
Virtual Roundtable
Panelists: Elizabeth Drummond (Loyola Marymount University), Dane Kennedy (George Washington University), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), Harold Marcuse (University of California, Santa Barbara), Katharina Matro (Stoneridge School of the Sacred Heart), Heather Perry (University of North Carolina, Charlotte), and Swen Steinberg (Queen's University, Canada)

2021

February 5-6 **Third Annual West Coast Germanists' Workshop: Facts, Fakes, and Representations**
Workshop at University of California, Berkeley
Conveners: Sheer Ganor (GHI PRO), Isabel Richter (UC Berkeley)

April 19-20

Climate Change, Energy, and Sustainability in the Pacific Region: Knowledge, Policies, and Transfers (1970s-present)
Conference at the German Institute for Japan Studies, Tokyo
Conveners: Sarah Beringer (GHI Washington), Benjamin Beuerle (GHI Moscow), Sonja Ganseforth (German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ)) and Yufei Zhou (DIJ); in collaboration with the Max Weber Foundation Research Group at the National University of Singapore and the Max Weber Foundation China Branch Office in Beijing

April 22-23

Migration and Racism in the United States and Germany in the Twentieth Century
Workshop at GHI Washington
Conveners: Maria Alexopoulou (Universität Mannheim), Elisabeth Engel (GHI Washington)

April 26-27

Change in Motion: Environment, Migration, and Mobilities
Workshop at the Pacific Regional Office of the GHI in Berkeley
Conveners: Sarah Earnshaw (GHI PRO) and Samantha Fox (Zolberg Institute on Migration and Mobility, The New School, New York)

June 7-8

Mobilities, Exclusion, and Migrants' Agency in the Pacific Realm in a Transregional and Diachronic Perspective
Conference at the University of California, Berkeley
Conveners: Albert Manke (GHI PRO) and Sören Urbansky (GHI Washington)

June 15-19

26th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: German History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
Seminar at GHI Washington
Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington)

GHI Library

The GHI library concentrates on German history and transatlantic relations, with emphasis on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In addition to providing essential literature for scholarly research, the library fulfills an important cultural mission: no other library in the United States offers a similarly condensed inventory of modern German history. The library offers access to about 50,000 books, DVDs, CD-ROMs, microfiches, and 220 print journals. In addition, we offer access to about 500 e-books and 100 online journals.

The collection includes books on American history written by German authors as well as historical literature of the institute's past research foci: global history, religious studies, exile and migration studies, environmental history, and economic history. The collection includes only print materials, mostly secondary literature; there are no archival holdings.

The GHI library offers free access to scholars as well as the general public; appointments or reader cards are not necessary. The library does not lend materials but visitors may consult material from the entire collection in our beautiful reading room, which also offers access to a variety of databases for journal articles, historical newspapers, genealogical research, and bibliographical research.

For the library catalog or a list of our databases, please visit www.ghi-dc.org/library. Or send an email to library@ghi-dc.org for any further questions.

The **library hours** are Monday to Thursday from 9 am to 5 pm, Fridays from 9 am to 4 pm, and by appointment.

Enjoy a 20% discount on the recent
Publications of the German Historical Institute

NEW!

Now available in paperback



Exiled Among Nations

German and Mennonite Mythologies in a Transnational Age

John P. R. Eicher

"Eicher offers a masterful analysis of the collective narratives of two highly-mobile Mennonite groups, presenting a revisionist critique of their institutions and accepted categories of identity. His study of nationalist mythologies within and about migrating religious communities is particularly relevant in an era of increasing global mobility and growing nationalism."

Marlene Epp, *University of Waterloo*

978-1-108-48611-8

~~$99.99~~ **$79.99**
~~£75.00~~ **£60.00**



Refugee Crises, 1945-2000

Political and Societal Responses in International Comparison

Edited by
Jan C. Jansen, Simone Lässig

"Historians agree - today's global refugee crisis is not unprecedented. To those who might respond, 'so what?' this volume offers historical case studies, generating rich insights for policy makers. It identifies refugee-mobilizations, changing terminologies, 'crisis' framing, and state interventions that can either promote integration or stigmatize refugees."

Donna Gabaccia, *University of Toronto*

978-1-108-83513-8

~~$99.99~~ **$79.99**
~~£75.00~~ **£60.00**



War and Childhood in the Era of the Two World Wars

Edited by
Mischa Honeck, James Marten

"…addresses a central issue of twentieth-century warfare of why children who, in theory, should be shielded from involvement in war are instead continuously mobilized physically, emotionally, and imaginatively into war. It is a major contribution to our understanding of the history of children and childhood."

David M. Rosen, *Fairleigh Dickinson University*

978-1-108-47853-3

~~$99.99~~ **$79.99**
~~£75.00~~ **£60.00**

Reading and Rebellion in Catholic Germany, 1770–1914

Jeffrey T. Zalar

978-1-108-46074-3

~~$29.99 / £24.99~~ **$23.99 / £19.99**

WINNER, 2020 DeLong Book History Prize, SHARP

Transnational Nazism

Ideology and Culture in German-Japanese Relations, 1919–1936

Ricky W. Law

978-1-108-46515-1

~~$29.99 / £24.99~~ **$23.99 / £19.99**

Decades of Reconstruction

Postwar Societies, State-Building, and International Relations from the Seven Years' War to the Cold War

Edited by Ute Planert, James Retallack

978-1-316-61708-3

~~$34.99 / £26.99~~ **$27.99 / £21.59**

Inventing the Silent Majority in Western Europe and the United States

Conservatism in the 1960s and 1970s

Edited by Anna von der Goltz, Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson

978-1-316-61698-7

~~$36.99 / £27.99~~ **$29.59 / £22.39**

The East German Economy, 1945–2010

Falling Behind or Catching Up?

Edited by Hartmut Berghoff, Uta Andrea Balbier

978-1-108-79261-5

~~$29.99 / £22.99~~ **$23.99 / £18.39**

Austrian Banks in the Period of National Socialism

Gerald D. Feldman, Introduction by Peter Hayes

978-1-108-79926-3

~~$42.99 / £32.99~~ **$34.39 / £26.39**

Bavarian Tourism and the Modern World, 1800–1950

Adam T. Rosenbaum

978-1-107-53085-0

~~$27.99 / £21.99~~ **$22.39 / £17.59**

Nation and Loyalty in a German-Polish Borderland

Upper Silesia, 1848–1960

Brendan Karch

978-1-108-46398-0

~~$33.99 / £25.99~~ **$27.19 / £20.79**

Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s

Edited by Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, Jeremy Varon

978-1-316-50178-8

~~$31.99 / £25.99~~ **$25.59 / £20.79**

Thieves in Court

The Making of the German Legal System in the Nineteenth Century

Rebekka Habermas, Translated by Kathleen Mitchell Dell'Orto

978-1-107-62488-7

~~$31.99 / £25.99~~ **$25.59 / £20.79**

Turkish Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany

Immigration, Space, and Belonging, 1961–1990

Sarah Thomsen Vierra

978-1-108-44605-1

~~$29.99 / £22.99~~ **$23.99 / £18.39**

Beyond the Racial State

Rethinking Nazi Germany

Edited by Devin O. Pendas, Mark Roseman, Richard F. Wetzell

978-1-316-61699-4

~~$34.99 / £26.99~~ **$27.99 / £21.59**

To enjoy a **20% discount** on these titles and more, please visit **www.cambridge.org/PGHI2020**

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE WASHINGTON
Transatlantische Historische Studien
OPEN ACCESS



Elisabeth Piller

Selling Weimar

German Public Diplomacy
and the United States, 1918–1933

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 60

432 pages with 19 b/w illustrations
€ 72,– / $ 96,–
978-3-515-12847-6 HARDCOVER

978-3-515-12851-3 OPEN ACCESS E-BOOK
elibrary.steiner-verlag.de

In the decade after World War I, German-American relations improved swiftly. While resentment and bitterness ran high on both sides in 1919, Weimar Germany and the United States managed to forge a strong transatlantic partnership by 1929. But how did Weimar Germany overcome its post-war isolation so rapidly? How did it regain the trust of its former adversary? And how did it secure U.S. support for the revision of the Versailles Treaty? Elisabeth Piller, winner of the *Franz Steiner Preis für Transatlantische Geschichte 2019*, explores these questions not from an economic, but from a cultural perspective. Based on extensive archival research, her ground-breaking work illustrates how German state and non-state actors drew heavily on cultural ties – with German Americans, U.S. universities and American tourists – to rewin American trust, and even affection, at a time when traditional foreign policy tools had failed to achieve similar successes. Contrary to common assumptions, Weimar Germany was never incapable of selling itself abroad. In fact, it pursued an innovative public diplomacy campaign to not only normalize relations with the powerful United States, but to build a politically advantageous transatlantic friendship.

"In her deeply researched, vividly illustrated history of cultural-diplomatic relations between Weimar Germany and the United States, Elisabeth Piller charts a new course in the history of transatlantic interwar diplomacy."
Victoria de Grazia, Columbia University

"Dr. Piller has achieved a masterful synthesis of diplomatic, intellectual and cultural history."
Michael Kimmage, Catholic University of America

Franz Steiner Verlag

Please order here:
www.steiner-verlag.de

For US orders, please contact:
orders@isdistribution.com

GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE WASHINGTON
Transatlantische Historische Studien
OPEN ACCESS

Sophia Dafinger

Die Lehren des Luftkriegs

Sozialwissenschaftliche Expertise in den USA vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis Vietnam

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 59

362 pages with 3 b/w photos
€ 66,– / $ 88,–
978-3-515-12657-1 HARDCOVER

978-3-515-12660-1 OPEN ACCESS E-BOOK
elibrary.steiner-verlag.de

Wie viele Bomben braucht es, bis eine Gesellschaft zusammenbricht? Sophia Dafinger untersucht eine Gruppe sozialwissenschaftlicher Experten in den USA, für die der Zweite Weltkrieg ein großes Forschungslaboratorium war. Der *United States Strategic Bombing Survey* bildet den Ausgangspunkt für die Frage, wie die Lehren des Luftkriegs nach 1945 formuliert, gelernt, aber auch wieder vergessen wurden – von den Kriegsschauplätzen in Europa und Asien bis nach Korea und Vietnam. Dafinger zeigt, wie selbstbewusst die „Experten des Luftkriegs" agierten und wie relevant ihre Handreichungen für die Ausgestaltung politisch-militärischer Kriegsplanung waren.

"Sophia Dafinger's book contributes powerfully to our understanding of how air forces around the world embraced the amorphous concept of civilian 'morale' as one of the primary targets of strategic bombing."
Sheldon Garon, Princeton University

„Wer mehr über das wechselvolle Verhältnis von Politik und wissenschaftlicher Beratung wissen möchte, sollte dieses wunderbare Buch zur Hand nehmen."
Kerstin Brückweh, Universität Erfurt

„Ein glänzender Beitrag zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte des Kalten Krieges mit zahlreichen Anregungen für die Gegenwart."
Bernd Greiner, Berliner Kolleg Kalter Krieg

Franz Steiner Verlag

Please order here:
www.steiner-verlag.de

For US orders, please contact:
orders@isdistribution.com

GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE WASHINGTON
Transatlantische Historische Studien

Julius Wilm

Settlers as Conquerors

Free Land Policy
in Antebellum America

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 58

284 pages
€ 52,– / $ 69,–
978-3-515-12131-6 HARDCOVER
978-3-515-12132-3 E-BOOK

In early America, the notion that settlers ought to receive undeveloped land for free was enormously popular among the rural poor and social reformers. Well into the Jacksonian era, however, Congress considered the demand fiscally and economically irresponsible. Increasingly, this led proponents to cast the idea as a military matter: land grantees would supplant troops in the efforts to take over the continent from Indian nations and rival colonial powers. Julius Wilm's book examines the free land debates from the 1790s to the 1850s and reconstructs the settlement experiences under the donation laws for Florida (1842) and the Oregon Territory (1850).

Operation Crossroads Africa (OCA) war in den sechziger Jahren die größte in Afrika tätige private Freiwilligenorganisation. 1957 gegründet initiierte OCA zahlreiche Hilfsprojekte in verschiedenen Regionen Afrikas.
Auf der Grundlage umfangreicher Archivstudien und Zeitzeugeninterviews untersucht Katharina Scheffler die Anfangsjahre der Organisation. Sie beleuchtet ihre Gründung sowie die institutionellen und gesellschaftlichen Hürden, die es anfänglich zu überwinden galt. Ein besonderes Augenmerk gilt den Erlebnissen der Freiwilligen selbst und deren Rolle als inoffizielle Botschafter Amerikas auf der einen und als Vorreiter für interkulturelle Verständigung auf der anderen Seite.

Katharina Scheffler

Operation Crossroads Africa, 1958–1972

Kulturdiplomatie zwischen Nordamerika und Afrika

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 57

419 pages
€ 64,– / $ 85,–
978-3-515-11285-7 HARDCOVER

OPEN ACCESS
978-3-515-11286-4 E-BOOK
elibrary.steiner-verlag.de

Elisabeth Engel

Encountering Empire

African American Missionaries
in Colonial Africa, 1900–1939

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 56

303 pages
€ 52,– / $ 69,–
978-3-515-11117-1 HARDCOVER

OPEN ACCESS
978-3-515-11119-5 E-BOOK
elibrary.steiner-verlag.de

In *Encountering Empire*, Elisabeth Engel traces how black American missionaries – men and women grappling with their African heritage – established connections in Africa during the heyday of European colonialism. Reconstructing the black American 'colonial encounter', Engel analyzes the images, transatlantic relationships, and possibilities of representation African American missionaries developed for themselves while negotiating colonial regimes. Illuminating a neglected chapter of Atlantic history, Engel demonstrates that African Americans used imperial structures for their own self-determination. *Encountering Empire* thus challenges the notion that pan-Africanism was the only viable strategy for black emancipation.

Franz Steiner Verlag

Please order here:
www.steiner-verlag.de

For US orders, please contact:
orders@isdistribution.com

GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE WASHINGTON
Transatlantische Historische Studien

Larissa Schütze

William Dieterle und die deutschsprachige Emigration in Hollywood

Antifaschistische Filmarbeit bei Warner Bros. Pictures, 1930–1940

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 55

347 pages
€ 58,– / $ 77,–
978-3-515-10974-1 HARDCOVER

OPEN ACCESS
978-3-515-11014-3 E-BOOK
elibrary.steiner-verlag.de

Nach einer erfolgreichen Karriere im Kulturbetrieb der Weimarer Republik akzeptierte der deutsche Regisseur William Dieterle im Jahre 1930 ein Vertragsangebot der US-Filmgesellschaft Warner Bros. Pictures. Dort gelang ihm der Aufbau eines Netzwerkes deutschsprachiger Künstler, dem Persönlichkeiten wie Max Reinhardt und Fritz Kortner angehörten. Es entstanden Filme, die zum Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus und zur Repräsentation eines „anderen Deutschland" in der Emigration beitrugen. Larissa Schütze beschreibt auf Basis der Firmenunterlagen Dieterles Integration in die institutionellen Strukturen der Warner Bros. Studios und rekonstruiert die Produktionsgeschichte seiner dort entstandenen Filme.

Melanie Henne

Training Citizenship

Ethnizität und Breitensport in Chicago, 1920–1950

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 54

378 pages
€ 62,– / $ 82,–
978-3-515-10955-0 HARDCOVER

OPEN ACCESS
978-3-515-11012-9 E-BOOK
elibrary.steiner-verlag.de

Vorstellungen von „guter Staatsbürgerschaft" dominierten in den USA der Zwischenkriegszeit, die von einer restriktiven Migrationsgesetzgebung geprägt war. Die Einwanderungdebatten waren mit strikten Amerikanisierungsforderungen verknüpft. Am Beispiel von Mitgliedern der Gymnastikorganisation *Sokol* sowie Sportler/innen des *Jewish People's Institute* (JPI) in Chicago wird gezeigt, wie tschechische und jüdische Migrant/innen und ihre Nachkommen Sport als Strategie der Legitimierung und im Kampf um Anerkennung nutzen. Ihre Handlungsoptionen standen dabei im Spannungsfeld von Adaption, Ablehnung und Umdeutung dominanter US-Staatsbürgerschaftskonzepte und beinhalteten die Integration kultureller Selbstbilder.

Alexander Pyrges

Das Kolonialprojekt EbenEzer

Formen und Mechanismen protestantischer Expansion in der atlantischen Welt des 18. Jahrhunderts

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 53

507 pages
€ 72,– / $ 96,–
978-3-515-10879-9 HARDCOVER

OPEN ACCESS
978-3-515-11013-6 E-BOOK
elibrary.steiner-verlag.de

Ab der Wende zum 18. Jahrhundert engagierten sich protestantische Landeskirchen vermehrt im atlantischen Raum und veränderten so die nordatlantische Welt des Protestantismus grundlegend. Abseits der Pfade nationalhistorischer Interpretationen behandelt Alexander Pyrges diesen über kirchliche und herrschaftliche Grenzen hinweg wirkmächtigen Prozess.
Im Zentrum steht das Kolonialprojekt Ebenezer: Im Jahr 1734 gegründet wurde die Gemeinde Ebenezer in der britischen Kolonie Georgia jahrzehntelang durch anglikanische und lutherisch-pietistische Kirchenreformer in England und im Alten Reich gefördert. Die Studie gibt Aufschluss über die religiöse Verdichtung der nordatlantischen Welt im 18. Jahrhundert.

Franz Steiner Verlag

Please order here:
www.steiner-verlag.de

For US orders, please contact:
orders@isdistribution.com

Studies in German History *Series*

German Historical Institute Washington

GENERAL EDITORS

Simone Lässig, Director of the German Historical Institute, Washington D.C., with the assistance of **Patricia C. Sutcliffe**, Editor, German Historical Institute.

*Published in Association with the **German Historical Institute**, Washington D.C.*



Volume 25 *Open Access*

GERMANY ON THEIR MINDS

German Jewish Refugees in the United States and Relationships with Germany, 1938–1988

Anne C. Schenderlein

"This is a solid, comprehensive study of German-Jewish refugees in the United States, especially in Los Angeles and New York. It is probing and judicious."
• **Michael A. Meyer,** Hebrew Union College – Jewish Institute of Religion

Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, approximately ninety thousand German Jews fled their homeland and settled in the United States, prior to that nation closing its borders to Jewish refugees. And even though many of them wanted little to do with Germany, the circumstances of the Second World War and the postwar era meant that engagement of some kind was unavoidable—whether direct or indirect, initiated within the community itself or by political actors and the broader German public. This book carefully traces these entangled histories on both sides of the Atlantic, demonstrating the remarkable extent to which German Jews and their former fellow citizens helped to shape developments from the Allied war effort to the course of West German democratization.

Anne C. Schenderlein is the managing director of the Dahlem Humanities Center at Freie Universität Berlin. After receiving her doctorate in modern European history at the University of California, San Diego, she was a research fellow at the German Historical Institute from 2015 to 2019. Her research has been supported by numerous fellowships, including the Leo Baeck Fellowship and, more recently, a grant from the American Jewish Archives, where she conducted research on American Jewish boycotts and consumption of German products. She is the coeditor, with Paul Lerner and Uwe Spiekermann, of *Jewish Consumer Cultures in Europe and America* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

berghahn
NEW YORK · OXFORD
INDEPENDENT PUBLISHING SINCE 1994

Follow us on Twitter: @BerghahnHistory
www.berghahnbooks.com

Studies in German History *Series*



Volume 24

THE WORLD OF CHILDREN

Foreign Cultures in Nineteenth-Century German Education and Entertainment

Edited by **Simone Lässig** and **Andreas Weiß**

"This collection of essays provides rich, varied, and well-contextualized examples of the disparate forms of media through which knowledge about the world reached German children and adolescents in the nineteenth century. I found it stimulating, original, and engaging." • **Katharine Kennedy**, Agnes Scott College

"The World of Children *is a superb book, much needed by German historiography, and contains fascinating essays with original scholarship and research. It is a pleasure to read and has much to teach us about children's culture in the long nineteenth century."* • **Carolyn Kay**, Trent University

In an era of rapidly increasing technological advances and international exchange, how did young people come to understand the world beyond their doorsteps? Focusing on Germany through the lens of the history of knowledge, this collection explores various media for children—from textbooks, adventure stories, and other literature to board games, museums, and cultural events—to probe what they aimed to teach young people about different cultures and world regions. These multifaceted contributions from specialists in historical, literary, and cultural studies delve into the ways that children absorbed, combined, and adapted notions of the world.

Simone Lässig, since 2006 Professor for Modern History at Braunschweig University, has been the Director of the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC, since 2015. Prior to that, she was the director of the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig, Germany.

Andreas Weiß is a historian based in Berlin. A former research fellow of the Georg Eckert Institute in Braunschweig, Germany, he was also a research fellow at University College London from October 2016 to April 2017.

Order online and receive **50% discount** on *Studies in German History* volumes (use code **SGH**) or take advantage of 30% site-wide code **GHIBooks** on all Berghahn paperbacks and eBooks.

berghahn
NEW YORK · OXFORD
INDEPENDENT PUBLISHING SINCE 1994

Follow us on Twitter: @BerghahnHistory

www.berghahnbooks.com

Studies in German History *Series*



Volume 23

GUSTAV STRESEMANN

The Crossover Artist

Karl Heinrich Pohl

Translated from the German by **Christine Brocks**, *with the assistance of* **Patricia C. Sutcliffe**

Praise for the German edition:
"[A] substantial contribution … Pohl succeeds admirably in locating the statesman Stresemann within his personal experiences and his reactions to a tumultuous, sometimes fortuitous web of events." • German History

As a foreign minister and chancellor of Weimar Germany, Gustav Stresemann is a familiar figure for students of German history – one who, for many, embodied the best qualities of German interwar liberalism. However, a more nuanced and ambivalent picture emerges in this award-winning biography, which draws on extensive research and new archival material to enrich our understanding of Stresmann's public image and political career. It memorably explores the personality of a brilliant but flawed politician who endured class anxiety and social marginalization, and who died on the eve of Germany's descent into economic and political upheaval.



Volume 22

EXPLORATIONS AND ENTANGLEMENTS

Germans in Pacific Worlds from the Early Modern Period to World War I

Edited by Hartmut Berghoff, Frank Biess, and Ulrike Strasser

"Given the numerous and diverse case studies that the individual chapters examine, it is to the credit of the volume's authors and editors that discrete themes are nonetheless clearly traceable throughout the work, the most interesting of these being the myriad and sometimes surprising ways in which Germany's status as a relative 'latecomer' to nationhood and imperial expansion actually served not as a liability but rather as an advantage for German agents and interests." • German History

Traditionally, Germany has been considered a minor player in Pacific history: its presence there was more limited than that of other European nations, and whereas its European rivals established themselves as imperial forces beginning in the early modern era, Germany did not seriously pursue colonialism until the nineteenth century. Yet thanks to recent advances in the field emphasizing transoceanic networks and cultural encounters, it is now possible to develop a more nuanced understanding of the history of Germans in the Pacific. The studies gathered here offer fascinating research into German missionary, commercial, scientific, and imperial activity against the backdrop of the Pacific's overlapping cultural circuits and complex oceanic transits.

berghahn
NEW YORK · OXFORD
INDEPENDENT PUBLISHING SINCE 1994

Follow us on Twitter: @BerghahnHistory

www.berghahnbooks.com

Studies in German History *Series*



Volume 21 *Available in Paperback*

THE ETHICS OF SEEING

Photography and Twentieth-Century German History

Jennifer Evans, Paul Betts, and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann [Eds.]

"...this book is both essential reding for scholars delving into visual history as well as a helpful guide for historians considering the ethical implications of photography and its uses in the modern era." · **German Studies Review**



Volume 20 *Available in Paperback*

THE SECOND GENERATION

Émigrés from Nazi Germany as Historians With a Biobibliographic Guide

Edited by Andreas W. Daum, Hartmut Lehmann, and James J. Sheehan

"Especially the systematic approach turns the volume into an impressive stock-taking of a research area that should be examine further with innovative methods and original questions." · **H-Soz-Kult**



Volume 19

FELLOW TRIBESMEN

The Image of Native Americans, National Identity, and Nazi Ideology in Germany

Frank Usbeck



Volume 18 *Available in Paperback*

THE RESPECTABLE CAREER OF FRITZ K.

The Making and Remaking of a Provincial Nazi Leader

Hartmut Berghoff and Cornelia Rauh

Translated from the German by Casey Butterfield



Volume 17

ENCOUNTERS WITH MODERNITY

The Catholic Church in West Germany, 1945-1975

Benjamin Ziemann

Translated from the German by Andrew Evans

Volume 16 *Open Access*

CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN MODERN GERMANY

Richard F. Wetzell [Ed.]

Volume 15 *Available in Paperback*

GERMANY AND THE BLACK DIASPORA

Points of Contact, 1250–1914

Mischa Honeck, Martin Klimke, and Anne Kuhlmann [Eds.]

Volume 14

MAX LIEBERMANN AND INTERNATIONAL MODERNISM

An Artist's Career from Empire to Third Reich

Marion Deshmukh †, Françoise Forster-Hahn and Barbara Gaehtgens [Eds.]

Volume 13 *Available in Paperback*

THE PLANS THAT FAILED

An Economic History of the GDR

André Steiner

Translated from the German by Ewald Osers

Volume 12 *Available in Paperback*

RAISING CITIZENS IN THE 'CENTURY OF THE CHILD'

The United States and German Central Europe in Comparative Perspective

Dirk Schumann [Ed.]

Order online and receive **50% discount** on *Studies in German History* volumes (use code **SGH**) or take advantage of **30% site-wide** code **GHIBooks** on all Berghahn paperbacks and eBooks.

berghahn
NEW YORK · OXFORD
INDEPENDENT PUBLISHING SINCE 1994

Follow us on Twitter: @BerghahnHistory

www.berghahnbooks.com

German Historical Institute Washington
Fellows and Staff

For further information, please consult our web site: www.ghi-dc.org

Prof. Dr. Simone Lässig, Director
History of knowledge; German social and cultural history; Jewish history; history of religion and religiosity; historical education; educational media and digital humanities

PD Dr. Axel Jansen, Deputy Director
History of the United States; history of science

Anne Kadolph, Administrative Director

Dr. Anna-Carolin Augustin, Research Fellow
Modern German-Jewish history and culture, women's and gender history, Jewish material culture, Nazi art looting and post-war restitution, provenance research, history of collecting, the art market, and consumer culture

Jana Keck, Research Fellow
Digital humanities (text mining, machine learning, visual analytics), American and transnational history (19th-century German migration to the US), periodical studies (historical newspapers)

Dr. Carolin Liebisch-Gümuş, Research Fellow
International history and global history (19th-20th centuries), history of modern Europe and Turkey, international organizations and internationalism, mobility/border Studies, migration and airport history

Dr. Albert Manke, Research Fellow
Global and transnational history; transpacific migration; Cold War studies; social history of Cuba and Latin America; inter-American studies

Dr. Atiba Pertilla, Research Fellow and Digital Editor
Digital history, financial history, U.S. history, 1865–1945, history of migration, history of masculinity and gender, urban history

Dr. Mario Peters, Research Fellow
History of the Americas (19th and 20th centuries), transatlantic history, mobility studies, history of knowledge, environmental history, urban history and housing research

Dr. Claudia Roesch, Research Fellow
History of the family; history of migration; gender and sexuality; transatlantic exchanges; history of knowledge

Dr. Sören Urbansky, Research Fellow
Global and transnational history; microhistory; Russia, the Soviet Union and China (18th to 20th centuries); Chinese diaspora in the Pacific; borders and infrastructures

Dr. Richard F. Wetzell, Research Fellow and Editor of the GHI *Bulletin*
Modern European history; modern German history; intellectual and cultural history; legal history; history of science and medicine; history of sexuality

Dr. Thomas L. Hughes, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
Dr. Robert Gerald Livingston, Senior Visiting Research Fellow

Dr. Sarah Beringer, Head of Section, Research Strategy & Communications
Markus Borchertmeyer, Adminstrative Associate
Anna Maria Boß, Head Librarian
Anita Brown, Library Associate
Daniel Burckhardt, Technical Developer
Susanne Fabricius, Foreign Language Assistant
Heike Friedman, Program Coordinator, GHI West
Daniel Graham, Receptionist
Bryan Hart, Program Officer (Fellowships) and Webmaster
Dr. Katharina Hering, Digital Project Librarian/Metadata editor
Insa Kummer, Project Editor
Alexa Lässig, Social Media Coordinator
Elisabeth Mait, German Language Research Associate
Dr. Kelly McCullough, Project Manager
Ralph Miller, IT/Systems Manager
Stephanie Oehrlein, Administrative Associate
Josh Seale, Events Coordinator
Rebekka Sherman-Loeffler, Assistant to the Director
Melanie Smaney, Administrative Associate
Dr. Mark Stoneman, Editor
Dr. Patricia Casey Sutcliffe, Editor

GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON DC

1607 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE NW
WASHINGTON DC 20009 USA

WWW.GHI-DC.ORG
INFO@GHI-DC.ORG